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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis provides an in-depth discussion on banks’ capital structure which has drawn very 
little attention from the literature. It consists of three major empirical essays. The first essay 
(Chapter III) reviews the major conclusions drawn from the traditional corporate finance 
literature that has at length examined the capital structures of non-financial firms, while 
compares their findings with the limited work on the leverage decisions of banking firms. It 
aims to provide an insight into the factors that actually govern banks’ capital choices, cast 
doubt on whether capital requirements are binding and primarily decide the bank leverage, and 
introduce the core assumption of this thesis – information asymmetry as an important 
determinant of capital structure decisions. The second essay (Chapter IV) empirically 
investigates the effects of information asymmetry on capital structure adjustments of US bank 
holding companies (BHCs) during 1986 to 2015. By identifying BHCs with bankrupt 
subsidiaries and arguing that their managers possess better knowledge than market investors 
concerning the failure of their subsidiaries, this chapter disentangles the real effect of private 
information on the capital structures of holding banks. The results show that subsidiary failure 
significantly affects financial policies of the parent companies. Specifically, BHCs increase 
leverage as early as one year prior to the failure of their subsidiaries, and substantially lower 
leverage after subsidiary failure. Further tests document that the parent BHCs increase not 
only debt borrowing but also liquidity assets, and curtail lending in advance to avoid further 
liquidity and financial constraint problems after their subsidiary failure. Examinations on the 
dynamic patterns of these BHCs’ performance around the subsidiary failure time confirm a 
smoother performance transition. The third essay (Chapter V) adds to the evidence in Chapter 
IV and discusses the information asymmetry effect by identifying a different treatment group - 
BHCs with subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities. The findings lend further support to the 
II 
 
core assumption in this thesis. The chapter also finds the indication that financial constraints of 
BHCs are on average mitigated following their subsidiaries receiving capital infusion 
following the M&A deals. Overall, this thesis has important implications for the public to 
understand various incentives that banks may have in making their capital structure decisions.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
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The goal of this thesis is to look into various motives banks may have to change their 
capital structure. Specifically, the thesis explores capital choices among bank holding 
companies in the United States around the time when their subsidiaries have material status 
changes (e.g., bankruptcy, consolidations). By identifying that whether bank holding 
companies intentionally exploit information advantage to adjust their financing decisions 
during this period, the study aims to offer a new insight into the role asymmetry information 
plays in affecting firms’ capital structure decisions. This thesis therefore contributes to three 
broad areas in the corporate finance and banking literature that explore information asymmetry 
and banks’ capital choices, bank failure and M&A, and risk-shifting. This introductory chapter 
sets the overall context of the thesis by laying out the motivation of the research, an overview 
of each following chapter, and the structure of the thesis.  
 
1.1. Motivation 
 
The seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposes the famous capital structure 
irrelevance principle where they argue that the value of a firm is independent of its financing 
choices in a perfect capital market. Following their pioneering work, many financial 
researchers have systematically investigated the capital structure decisions of non-financial 
firms. However, banking firms are largely excluded from the traditional corporate finance 
literature. Part of the reasons might be that regulation constitutes the overriding departure from 
what have been found for those non-financial firms (Gropp and Heider, 2009). As pointed out 
by Myres (2001) financial firms cannot adjust their financial policies at relatively low costs 
and thus have very limited financing objectives.  
While these views appear sensible, they actually contradict the evidence of the distribution 
of bank capital over the past decades. The Figure 3 in Gropp and Heider (2010) drawing the 
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distribution of banks’ regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio for those largest public traded banks in the 
US and EU from 1991 to 2004 shows that there is large cross-sectional variation in the capital 
ratio of banks under the Basel regulatory regime. Banks also do not appear to hold the 
minimum amount of equity capital as required by the regulatory authorities. In contrast, 
researchers find that there has been a significant rise in bank regulatory capital ratio since 
1990. BHC book equity to asset ratio, on average, rose from 6% in the late 1980s to over 8% 
in the 1990s, and then surprisingly 9% until the 2007-2008 financial crisis (Gropp and Heider, 
2010). In market value terms, this phenomenon is even more noticeable. The market value of 
equity to market value of assets rose from 6% in 1990 to more than 15% after 2000. The 
rightward shift trend in bank capital demonstrates that it is worthy of further investigation for 
bank capital structure. Understanding what factors actually drive the bank capital decision 
over the past decades can provide essential insights for regulations, industry, and various 
reform proposals. 
While it is well documented that banks generally have very high leverage compared with 
most firms from non-banking industry, this does not mean similar determinants do not take 
effect when both banks and non-banking firms decide the form of their capital structure. 
Indeed, Gropp and Heider (2010) document that the determinants of capital structure for banks 
and non-financial firms are very similar. They even report that the sign and significance of 
most variables when examining their effects on bank leverage are similar to those in studies of 
non-financial firms in the US and other G7 countries. Their findings provide the strong 
theoretical foundation for this thesis to examine the various incentives of BHCs adjusting their 
capital choices while at the same time accounting for other important factors that may affect 
bank leverage decisions. The study is also motivated by the fact that a bank holding company 
(henceforth referred to as “BHC”) will suffer from internal capital scarceness when one or 
some of its subsidiaries have major structural changes. This chapter focuses on the changes in 
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subsidiaries including them filing for bankruptcy or announcing M&A deals. Prior literature 
shows that BHCs operate internal capital markets where they allocate capital and liquidity to 
and between subsidiary banks (Houston, James, and Marcus, 1997; Houston and James, 1998). 
Therefore, this provides an effective mechanism through which subsidiary banks affect the 
cash flow, capital position, and liquidity of parent holding companies. Substantial costs 
involved in changes in subsidiaries could have a significant impact on the capital allocations 
and operational activities for the whole organization. BHCs facing such scarce internal capital 
problems have incentives to take actions to avoid the further financial constraints. One of the 
most popular actions BHCs can take in the capital market is to change their financing 
decisions. To demonstrate these arguments, suppose that one or some of a BHC’s subsidiaries 
declare bankruptcy in a specific year. Investors holding the debt or equity of these subsidiaries 
are likely to lose part or all of their investment. As is often the case that subsidiary banks are 
funded by their parent, subsidiary failure means a costly process because the loss incurred will 
be majorly covered by the parent and the internal capital market established by the BHC will 
be hurt to some extent. BHCs facing limited internal funds may be forced to seek external 
financing to sponsor their various financial activities. Additionally, information asymmetry is 
severe prior to subsidiary failure. BHC insiders have information advantage over outside 
investors regarding the status of their subsidiaries. The advantage may be utilized by managers 
to adjust BHCs’ financing decisions accordingly. Furthermore, following the subsidiary 
bankruptcy, managers may instead take actions to mitigate the asymmetric information in 
order to lower the future financing cost. All of these provide motivations for parent banks to 
heavily adjust their capital structures around the periods when their subsidiaries go bankrupt.  
This thesis is closely related to the studies of information asymmetry and financing 
decisions. While the previous literature widely accepts the importance of private information 
in exploring firms’ capital structure, banks are generally excluded from empirical 
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investigations of financing decisions. This is due to the fact that banking industry is generally 
heavily regulated, which may bring the overriding departure from what researchers have 
concluded in those non-financial firms. This thesis, however, specializes the information 
asymmetry arisen prior to the subsequent subsidiary bank status changes and investigates if the 
information asymmetry will be exploited by bank managers to adjust their financing decisions 
accordingly. To the best of the knowledge, this is the first paper to use material structural 
changes of subsidiary banks as a cut-off to discern the real effect of private information. 
Additionally, it also adds the contribution to the limited literature which can reflect banks’ 
financing decisions under asymmetric information. Lucas and McDonald (1992) point out that 
financing decisions of banks can be distorted due to information asymmetry because they are 
better informed of their assets quality than are outsiders. Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) examine 
the pricing behavior of bonds issued by the parent BHCs of failed subsidiaries. Their findings 
show that bond spreads begin rising as early as six quarters prior to the failure, as the issuing 
BHC’s financial condition and credit rating deteriorate. They also report that the spreads for 
troubled BHCs are many times those of healthy ones. Billett and Garfinkel (2004) explore 
banks’ funding choices from segmented markets. They argue that with the existence of 
asymmetry information banks’ securities could be priced remarkably differently by segmented 
markets, and banks will increase their reliance on the relatively cheaper external market. The 
degree of the reliance depends on the costs of raising funds from different markets. 
Accordingly, banks try to take most advantage of the pricing discrepancies and target the 
market with the lowest access costs. Holod and Peek (2007) investigate the access of banks to 
information-based external financial market by comparing the behaviors of banks (including 
bank holding companies) with different transparency in response to the exogenous shock and 
find information asymmetry does affect their financing decisions. Morgan (2002) suggests that 
banking is more opaque than any other sorts of industries. They find that ratings from major 
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agencies often disagree more over the bank bond issues than over issues by other types of 
firms, and this disagreement provides a good proxy for the bank uncertainty associated with 
asymmetric information. The veil between banks and outsiders makes market investors unable 
to accurately quantify the risk of banking firms as well as their securities. While 
supplementing these previous studies, this thesis attempts to propose some new sights of 
judging the private information and examine its effectiveness in changing BHCs’ capital 
structure. Therefore, the core premise within our topic is that banks have information 
advantage over market investors. Whether or not this kind of information asymmetry 
underlying in the banking system may be exploited by bank managers is an open question with 
important implications for understanding various motivations that banks may have in making 
capital choices.  
 
1.2. An overview of chapters 
 
This dissertation studies three major empirical research topics in the area of bank capital 
structure. The first chapter (Chapter II) combines with the existing literature and discusses the 
theories of bank capital structure. It majorly discusses capital structure decisions by firms in 
general. This helps us understand bank capital in a more intuitive way as banks, in the first 
instance, are firms. Some classic models are covered in this chapter, such as trade-off theory 
and pecking-order theory. It also discusses several famous surveys by financial researchers to 
exam the determinants that affect firms’ capital structure choices.  
Chapter III extends the discussion to banking firms. By comparing the similarities and 
differences between banks and non-financial firms, it discusses whether the findings 
concluded in the traditional corporate finance literature can be applied to banks for their 
capital structure decisions. It also discusses the trend in the recent decades that banks 
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substantially increase their capital ratios well above the regulatory minimum. More 
importantly, this chapter draws out the core issue uncovered in this thesis that whether 
information asymmetry plays an important role in changing banks’ capital choices during this 
period. This chapter further discusses some regulatory questions, such as bank illiquid assets 
and liquid liabilities, bank capital, deposits, and monitoring, etc. This chapter finishes with 
some preliminary tests on the determinants that could reliably affect bank capital decisions and 
sets out a clear view on the choices of control variables in the following chapters.  
Chapter IV formally investigates the effects of information asymmetry on capital structure 
adjustments of US bank holding companies (BHCs) during 1986 to 2015. By identifying 
BHCs with bankrupt subsidiaries and arguing that their managers possess better knowledge 
than market investors concerning the failure of their subsidiaries, this chapter disentangles the 
real effect of private information on the capital structures of holding banks. Due to costly 
subsidiary failures, BHCs facing limited internal funds have incentives to find external 
financing before their financial conditions deteriorate. It is plausible that, prior to the 
subsidiary bankruptcy, the BHC may want to raise more debt at relatively lower costs. Once 
the subsidiary bankruptcy is realized, BHCs come under great pressures from regulators and 
market participants to control their default risk (Ashcraft, 2008). Thus, they may wish to lower 
the leverage and have more equity capital to secure the capital requirement. To examine these 
conjectures, this chapter employs a standard event-study difference-in-differences (DID) 
approach. This estimation strategy has been previously used by Schoar (2002), Autor (2003), 
and Almond, Hoynes, and Schanzenbach (2011), among others, to study firm performance 
around different events. In the event-study difference-in-differences (DID) framework, this 
chapter first estimates the leverage changes among BHCs with subsidiary failure (“troubled” 
BHCs) around the time of their subsidiary failure relative to the changes during the same 
period among those BHCs without subsidiary failure (“healthy” BHCs). The results show that 
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subsidiary failure significantly affects financial policies of the parent companies. Specifically, 
BHCs increase leverage as early as one year prior to the failure of their subsidiaries, and 
substantially lower leverage after subsidiary failure. Further tests document that the parent 
BHCs increase not only debt borrowing but also liquidity assets, and curtail lending in 
advance to avoid further liquidity and financial constraint problems after their subsidiary 
failure. Examinations on the dynamic patterns of these BHCs’ performance around the 
subsidiary failure time confirm a more smooth performance transition. The evidence suggests 
that the “troubled” BHCs foresee tightened credit market access and increased borrowing costs 
once the bankruptcy of subsidiary banks is realized. Thus, “troubled” BHCs increase debt 
financing in advance to take advantage of the presently cheaper debt financing and enjoy 
benefits. The findings are consistent with the argument of Billett and Garfinkel (2004) that, 
with the existence of asymmetric information, bank securities could be priced remarkably 
differently in segmented markets, and that banks take most advantage of the pricing 
discrepancies and target the segment, which has the lowest access costs. More importantly, the 
results provide strong support to the view that information asymmetry is an important 
determinant of capital structure decisions.1 
Chapter V adds to the evidence in Chapter IV and discusses the information asymmetry 
effect by looking into BHCs with subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities (treated BHCs) and 
the impact on BHCs’ capital structure decisions, performance, and risk. The results show a 
marked pre-M&A increase in treated BHCs’ relative long-term debt as well as their 
subordinate debt issuance. The findings lend further support to the core assumption in this 
thesis. Further tests on cross-sectional variation in BHC specific characteristics using 
difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) regression models show that the impact of 
                                                          
1  Fama and French (2005), when revisiting the classic pecking order theory, acknowledge that information 
asymmetry is an important or perhaps the only determinant of firms’ capital structure. 
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information asymmetry on bank capital structure decisions is more pronounced for small and 
better capitalized BHCs. These tests shed further light on the mechanisms underlying the main 
results. This chapter also analyzes the dynamic pattern of BHCs’ liquidity and lending around 
the subsidiary M&A time. The idea is to test whether the parent BHCs of subsidiaries 
experiencing M&A deals facing limited internal funds are forced to hoard more cash or 
liquidity assets, and curtail loans to ease the financial constraints before M&A deals taking 
place. The results validate this conjecture with the effect being stronger for smaller and less 
well capitalized BHCs, which suggests they are more vulnerable to internal capital fluctuation 
and thus have more adjustments in both asset and liability parts on their balance sheet. Further 
check on the performance of treated BHCs which increase long-term debt one year before 
subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities relative to those which do not around M&A deals 
shows that the treated BHCs have a more smooth transition in performance and suffer less in 
operating and market performance than those control BHCs which do not make such 
adjustments in advance. This chapter also documents several other mechanisms through which 
subsidiary banks’ engagement in M&A activities affects parent BHCs’ capital structure 
decisions including the following two findings: 1. Information asymmetry induced by 
subsidiary M&A activities affects BHCs’ capital structure decisions by increasing the 
adjustment speed to the target leverage ratio; 2. Around the time of subsidiary banks engaging 
in M&A activities, the more quickly the BHCs close the gap between the last year’s leverage 
and this year’s target, the less risk they contribute to the whole system. Overall, this article, for 
the first time in the literature, systematically examines the dynamic aspects of various BHC 
capital structure decisions around the time of subsidiary bank M&A deals and their effects on 
BHC performance, liquidity, lending, and risk. The study can be seen as supplementary 
testimony in terms of the role of asymmetry information in affecting bank capital choices.  
10 
 
It is worth noting that Chapter III uses subsidiary bank status change (e.g., insolvency or 
acquisition) as a cut-off to discern the real effect of private information on the financial 
policies of holding banks. This constitutes the most important setting in my thesis. The 
following empirical chapters IV and V follow this setting and discuss the effect in the scenario 
of subsidiary failure and M&A, respectively. One may argue that why subsidiary failure and 
MA should be examined separately. The reasons are majorly twofold. First, the responses to 
these two different subsidiary bank events from parent BHCs have different motivations. 
Particularly, a subsidiary failure may be due to the financial deterioration of its own 
circumstance or the deterioration of the holding bank’s circumstance. In anticipation of the 
bankruptcy of its subsidiary bank, the parent BHC may choose to conceal the disadvantageous 
information as argued in Chapter IV. Thus, the financial market does not have the failure 
information beforehand and hence, may over-evaluate the BHC’s credit quality and the BHC 
can accordingly exploit the “window of opportunity” to conduct financing at relatively 
cheaper costs. BHC managers are tempted to do so because they want to grasp currently 
greater and cheaper credit market access, which will be highly likely to vanish once the 
bankruptcy news becomes widely known. These BHCs may also have low liquidity positions, 
thus must find external financing before their troubled affiliates fail. The empirical results of 
Chapter IV confirm that BHCs are incentivized to increase cheap debt borrowing before their 
subsidiaries going bust.  
Whereas in the scenario of subsidiary M&A, the capital structure adjustment of BHCs has 
disparate motives. Subsidiary acquisitions may be a means for BHCs to penetrate new markets, 
realize potential economies, and acquire financial power and prestige associated with larger 
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size.2  Prior literature shows that those BHCs operate internal capital markets where they 
allocate capital and liquidity to and between subsidiary banks (Houston, James, and Marcus, 
1997; Houston and James, 1998). Therefore, they provide an effective mechanism through 
which subsidiary banks affect the cash flow, capital position, and liquidity of parent holding 
companies. As many costs are involved in acquisition activities such as underwriter fees, 
consultancy fees, and distribution costs, these costs could have a significant impact on the 
capital allocations and operational activities for the whole organization. BHCs facing such 
scarce internal capital problems have incentives to seek external financing to avoid the further 
financial constraints. While these actions also take advantage of the information asymmetry to 
attract investors before takeover transactions as argued in Chapter V, BHCs concern more 
about their internal capital allocation problem rather than the deterioration of their financial 
circumstances when in a scenario of subsidiary failure. 
Second, subsidiary failure and MA may pose different influence on the parent BHCs’ 
capital structure decisions. While for either situation BHCs are prone to increase leverage 
beforehand, their capital decisions are quite divisive afterwards. The subsidiary failure lowers 
the credit quality of the BHC, which tightens the BHC’s access to the credit market and raises 
its costs of debt financing (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997). Hence, continuing going for debt 
financing is not a sensible choice once the subsidiary failure is realized. BHCs also come 
under great pressures from regulators and market participants to control their default risks 
(Ashcraft, 2008). Creditors conjecture that subsidiary failure weakens the guarantees made by 
the BHCs and thus demand a higher risk premium for the BHCs’ obligations. Thus, the BHCs’ 
managers need to adjust their equity capital more closely in order to contain asset risk 
exposures in preference to paying large risk premium (Furlong and Keeley, 1989). Therefore, 
                                                          
2 The terms M&A and acquisitions are used synonymously hereafter as in Chapter V I only study the scenario 
when subsidiary banks being the acquirer. 
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following subsidiary failure BHCs tend to lower the debt ratios and increase the capital reserve. 
The main results in Chapter IV validate this conjecture.  
Contrarily, what parent BHCs do following subsidiary M&A could be different. Although 
subsidiary banks make the decisions of merges often for the consideration of efficiency gains 
and these gains may benefit them in turn, they are not necessarily improving the welfare to the 
parent BHCs. Some holding companies may be adversely affected by these changes and 
experience reduced capital available to allocate among the internal capital market. The limited 
capital and liquidity may prompt the parent BHCs to continue to improve their access to cheap 
financing sources (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004). In this vein, subsidiary acquisition 
activities could lead to higher financial leverage ratios and worse capitalization for the holding 
banks for more years to come. The main results in Chapter V also corroborate this conjecture. 
Overall, Chapter IV and V provide two different mechanisms through which information 
asymmetry affects capital structure decisions of parent BHCs. Due to the aforementioned 
reasons, subsidiary failure and MA indeed need to be examined separately and thoroughly. 
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II combines with the existing literature 
and discusses the theories of bank capital structure. Chapter III draws out the core assumption 
in this thesis and conducts several preliminary tests. Chapter IV investigates the information 
advantage BHC managers have prior to the declaration of a subsidiary failure, and analyzes 
the impact it may have on BHCs’ capital structure. Chapter V examines the impact of 
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information asymmetry induced by subsidiary M&A activities on BHCs’ capital structure 
decisions. Chapter VI concludes. 
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Chapter II: Capital structure theories in banking  
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As Gropp and Heider (2010) note, “subsequent to the departures from Modigliani and 
Miller (1958)’s irrelevance proposition, there is a long tradition in corporate finance to 
investigate the capital structure decisions of non-financial firms. But what determines banks’ 
capital structures? ...bank capital structure deserves further investigation.” Unlike general 
firms, banks may be special in many aspects. However, in the first instance, banks are firms. 
Therefore, a good starting point to understand bank capital structure is to evaluate the current 
knowledge about capital structure decisions by firms in general. First, it is necessary to clarify 
some terminology terms used differently by regulators and researchers. Regulators tend to use 
“leverage ratio” to refer to the ratio of a bank’s tier 1 capital to total assets, which, however, in 
this thesis, I will use “tier 1 capital ratio” to refer to. The leverage ratio is generally referred to 
the proportion of a firm's debt in terms of its total assets by finance researchers, and will 
continuously be used this way throughout this thesis.  
 
2.1. Capital structure theories 
 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that the value of a firm is unaffected by its capital 
structure choices under certain conditions, many financial economists have subsequently 
investigated the effects of relaxing these conditions. Several famous theories have been 
proposed, such as pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), trade-off 
theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973), market timing hypothesis (Baker and Wurgler, 2002), 
etc. Pecking order model states that firms prefer to fund investments by first using internal 
funds, then debt, and equity financing only as a last resort. According to this view, the 
leverage ratio of a firm increases when its retained earnings drop and decreases when internal 
funds build up. Trade-off theory states that a firm makes its capital structure decisions by 
trading off the benefits of the tax shield from debt against the costs of financial distress and 
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agency costs. It is often seen as a competitor theory to the pecking order theory. Market timing 
hypothesis states that firms prefer equity financing when the cost of equity is low, and prefer 
debt otherwise. In other words, firms do not generally care whether they finance with debt or 
equity, but choose the form of financing which, at that point in time, appears to be more 
valued by financial markets. Baker and Wurgler (2002) claim that market timing is the first 
order determinant of a corporate capital structure. While controversy exists among researchers, 
the currently more accepted consensus is the second model as large empirical evidence shows 
that most of firms generally set a target leverage ratio and actively adjust towards this ratio, 
which is consistent with the prediction of dynamic trade-off model. In the classic survey 
article by Graham and Harvey (2001), CEOs or CFOs from over 70 percent of the firms report 
that their firms have a target leverage ratio.3 Despite all this, researchers still have large 
estimation discrepancy regarding how fast firms adjust towards their target leverage. For 
example, Fama and French (2002) report a 7 to 10 percent adjustment speed rate for firms 
each year. In contrast, Flannery and Rangan (2006) report a surprisingly 34 percentage points 
speed of adjustment per year. Overall, financial economists are far from reaching consensus, 
nor are they certain that whether the target leverage is fixed or varied over time.  
Nevertheless, one thing we can be certain of is that the Modigliani–Miller theorem provides 
the base to examine real world reasons why a company's value is relevant to the capital 
structure it chooses. These reasons include bankruptcy costs, agency costs, taxes, 
and information asymmetry. Particularly, Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2009) empirically 
certify that information asymmetry is an important determinant of firms’ capital structure, 
which constitutes the building block of the assumptions in this thesis.  
In fact, a number of approaches to explaining capital structure have become possible since 
the introduction of information asymmetry. In one way, capital structure decisions are made to 
                                                          
3 Graham and Leary (2011) also make an excellent review of all the existing capital structure theories. 
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mitigate inefficiencies in the firm’s investment decisions that are caused by the information 
asymmetry (Harris and Raviv, 1991). This strand of research began with the work of Myers 
and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). In another, firms’ capital structure can signal inside 
information to outside investors. This branch of the literature starts with Ross (1977) and 
Brealey, Leland, and Pyle (1977).  
Many have also discussed various characteristics that could affect capital structure and 
financing decisions, e.g., size and market-to-book ratio. Size has been used to proxy firms’ 
expected bankruptcy cost and is expected to be positively correlated with firms’ debt issuance 
(Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 1998; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001; Diamond, 
1991). The market-to-book ratio has been used as a measure of growth opportunities and is 
expected to be positively correlated with firms’ external financing (Baker and Wurgler, 2002).  
Profitability and asset tangibility are also shown to be related to firms’ capital structure 
choices. However, their effects are relatively opaque. Profitability can either be used as a 
proxy for internal cash available for investment funding or taxable income to be shielded 
(Donaldson, 2000; Myers, 1984; Leary, 2009). Similarly, the effect of asset tangibility is 
unclear as it can either proxy for the severity of the information asymmetry, collateral 
available for firms’ external financing, or demand for future investments (Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  
The recent literature has also found firm fixed effects help explain more in the variation of 
firms’ leverage (Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008). This finding suggests that firms’ 
choice of capital structure is largely driven by unobserved time-invariant firm-specific 
characteristics. Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that the value of a firm is unaffected 
by its capital structure choices under certain conditions, many financial economists have 
subsequently investigated the effects of relaxing these conditions. Several famous theories 
have been proposed, such as pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), 
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trade-off theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973), market timing hypothesis (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002), etc. Pecking order model states that firms prefer to fund investments by first 
using internal funds, then debt, and equity financing only as a last resort. According to this 
view, the leverage ratio of a firm increases when its retained earnings drop and decreases 
when internal funds build up. Trade-off theory states that a firm makes its capital structure 
decisions by trading off the benefits of the tax shield from debt against the costs of financial 
distress and agency costs. It is often seen as a competitor theory to the pecking order theory. 
Market timing hypothesis states that firms prefer equity financing when the cost of equity is 
low, and prefer debt otherwise. In other words, firms do not generally care whether they 
finance with debt or equity, but choose the form of financing which, at that point in time, 
appears to be more valued by financial markets. Baker and Wurgler (2002) claim that market 
timing is the first order determinant of a corporate capital structure. While controversy exists 
among researchers, the currently more accepted consensus is the second model as large 
empirical evidence shows that most of firms generally set a target leverage ratio and actively 
adjust towards this ratio, which is consistent with the prediction of dynamic trade-off model. 
In the classic survey article by Graham and Harvey (2001), CEOs or CFOs from over 70 
percent of the firms report that their firms have a target leverage ratio.4  Despite all this, 
researchers still have large estimation discrepancy regarding how fast firms adjust towards 
their target leverage. For example, Fama and French (2002) report a 7 to 10 percent 
adjustment speed rate for firms each year. In contrast, Flannery and Rangan (2006) report a 
surprisingly 34 percentage points speed of adjustment per year. Overall, financial economists 
are far from reaching consensus, nor are they certain that whether the target leverage is fixed 
or varied over time. Nevertheless, one thing we can be certain of is that the Modigliani–Miller 
theorem provides the base to examine real world reasons why a company's value is relevant to 
                                                          
4 Graham and Leary (2011) also make an excellent review of all the existing capital structure theories. 
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the capital structure it chooses. These reasons include bankruptcy costs, agency costs, taxes, 
and information asymmetry. Particularly, Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2009) empirically 
certify that information asymmetry is an important determinant of firms’ capital structure, 
which constitutes the building block of the assumptions in this thesis.  
The extant literature documents several approaches to explaining capital structure with the 
introduction of information asymmetry. In one way, capital structure decisions are made to 
mitigate inefficiencies in the firm’s investment decisions that are caused by the information 
asymmetry (Harris and Raviv, 1991). This strand of research began with the work of Myers 
and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). In another, firms’ capital structure can signal inside 
information to outside investors. This branch of the literature starts with Ross (1977) and 
Brealey, Leland, and Pyle (1977).  
A large stand of literature also provides evidence that several firm characteristics could 
significantly affect capital structure and financing decisions, e.g., size and market-to-book 
ratio. Size has been used to proxy firms’ expected bankruptcy cost and is expected to be 
positively correlated with firms’ debt issuance (Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 1998; 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001; Diamond, 1991). The market-to-book ratio has been 
used as a measure of growth opportunities and is expected to be positively correlated with 
firms’ external financing (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Profitability and asset tangibility are also 
shown to be related to firms’ capital structure choices. However, their effects are relatively 
opaque. Profitability can either be used as a proxy for internal cash available for investment 
funding or taxable income to be shielded (Donaldson, 2000; Myers, 1984; Leary, 2009). 
Similarly, the effect of asset tangibility is unclear as it can either proxy for the severity of the 
information asymmetry, collateral available for firms’ external financing, or demand for future 
investments (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The recent literature has 
also found firm fixed effects help explain more in the variation of firms’ leverage (Lemmon, 
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Roberts, and Zender, 2008). This finding suggests that firms’ choice of capital structure is 
largely driven by unobserved time-invariant firm-specific characteristics.  
As discussed above, the current prevalent opinion in academia regarding firm capital 
structure decisions is that firm managers choose a target leverage ratio to which they actively 
adjust over time. This argument corresponds to the universally accepted dynamic trade-off 
model, where firms have to trade off the benefits of interest tax shield against the costs of 
financial distress and agency costs when increasing their leverage ratio. There is an optimal 
point where the value of the firm reaches to the maximum and which firm managers target to. 
Whether banks have similar working mechanisms is largely in doubt. The relevant literature is 
also very limited. Some financial researchers have argued from the market perspective and 
reported that banks work through a similar trade-off model to the one used by the non-
financial firms determined by the various market factors. Such work includes, but is not 
limited to Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee, and Öztekin (2008), Flannery and Rangan (2008), 
and Gropp and Heider (2010) which can be regarded as preliminary explorations of banks’ 
target leverage. Others argue that the regulation indeed determines the banks’ capital choices. 
Banks hold the minimum required equity capital plus some cushion to avoid the high costs of 
issuing equity or reducing assets at a short notice by the regulation. While no consensus is 
reached, the results in this thesis are more supportive to the market view. As the following 
chapters will do, this thesis examines the validity of the setting of the market view on banks’ 
leverage decisions and presents some mechanisms through which information asymmetry 
operates.  
While the empirical evidence has not concluded that whether banks have preference to only 
hold the minimum regulatory capital plus some capital buffer, or just pursue the optimal 
capital structure decisions driven by market pressures, the literature does reach some 
agreement regarding the characteristics and utilization of bank capital. These consensus could 
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potentially form the important components of the complete bank capital structure theory in the 
future. In detail, they include the following several aspects.  
Bank assets are risky and relatively illiquid compared with liquid liabilities. As already 
known, banks are highly levered and most of their liabilities come from deposits. These 
deposits can be used as instant money and become a primary output of banks. At the same 
time, the assets of banks are more risky. They consist of loans and other portfolios. Banks 
have to monitor the borrower to ensure the return can be adequate enough to repay depositors 
and other investors. Bank capital, as required by the regulation, serves as the buffer protect the 
banks from the default of any assets or portfolios. However, this also creates a paradox where 
the more capital a bank has, that is, the less levered and better capitalized the bank is, the 
weaker the depositors’ monitoring imposed on the bank.  
Second, although bank capital could help prevent from a bank run, it also has high holing 
costs. Therefore, how much a bank needs to hold for its capital is a trade-off. Meanwhile, it is 
commonsense that the revenues of a firm will first meet the claim by debt holders, and then 
they could be paid to shareholders. Accordingly, the gain of stockholders will only increase if 
the firm revenues significantly increase. Banks are no exception. When the major equity 
holders invest more in banks, the more incentives they have to monitor the banks as they could 
potentially earn more in the event of successful loan payback.  
Third, more deposits also force bankers to monitor the borrowers. The more deposits 
invested by depositors, and thus the higher the bank’s leverage. In this case, as banks own 
large amount of deposit contracts, fear of depositors withdrawing money with a short notice, 
bankers have strong incentives to monitor the loan borrowers to ensure the loans will be paid 
back without delay. They can then use the loan revenues to make the promised payments to 
depositors, debt holders, and then shareholders. Thus, a more levered bank with more deposits 
in stock comes with a more rigorous monitoring mechanism.  
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2.2. Asymmetric information and bank capital structure 
 
So far, I have discussed that many financial researchers have systematically investigated 
the capital structure decisions of non-financial firms. However, banking firms are largely 
excluded from the traditional corporate finance literature. Part of the reasons might be that 
regulation constitutes the overriding departure from what have been found for those non-
financial firms (Gropp and Heider, 2009). As pointed out by Myres (2001) financial firms 
cannot adjust their financial policies at relatively low costs and thus have very limited 
financing objectives.  
While these views appear sensible, they actually contradict the evidence of the distribution 
of bank capital over the past decades. The Figure 3 in Gropp and Heider (2010) drawing the 
distribution of banks’ regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio for those largest public traded banks in the 
US and EU from 1991 to 2004 shows that there is large cross-sectional variation in the capital 
ratio of banks under the Basel regulatory regime. Banks also do not appear to hold the 
minimum amount of equity capital as required by the regulatory authorities. In contrast, 
researchers find that there has been a significant rise in bank regulatory capital ratio since 
1990. BHC book equity to asset ratio, on average, rose from 6% in the late 1980s to over 8% 
in the 1990s, and then surprisingly 9% until the 2007-2008 financial crisis. In market value 
terms, this phenomenon is even more noticeable. The market value of equity to market value 
of assets rose from 6% in 1990 to more than 15% after 2000. The rightward shift trend in bank 
capital demonstrates that it is worthy of further investigation for bank capital structure. 
Understanding what factors actually drive the bank capital decision over the past decades can 
provide essential insights for regulations, industry, and various reform proposals. 
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While it is well documented that banks generally have very high leverage compared with 
most firms from non-banking industry, this does not mean similar determinants do not take 
effect when both banks and non-banking firms decide the form of their capital structure. 
Indeed, Gropp and Heider (2010) document that the determinants of capital structure for banks 
and non-financial firms are very similar. They even report that the sign and significance of 
most variables when examining their effects on bank leverage are similar to those in studies of 
non-financial firms in the US and other G7 countries. Their findings provide the strong 
theoretical foundation for this thesis to examine the various incentives of BHCs adjusting their 
capital choices while at the same time accounting for other important factors that may affect 
bank leverage decisions. The study is also motivated by the fact that a bank holding company 
(henceforth referred to as “BHC”) will suffer from internal capital scarceness when one or 
some of its subsidiaries have major structural changes. This chapter focuses on the changes in 
subsidiaries including them filing for bankruptcy or announcing M&A deals. Prior literature 
shows that BHCs operate internal capital markets where they allocate capital and liquidity to 
and between subsidiary banks (Houston, James, and Marcus, 1997; Houston and James, 1998). 
Therefore, this provides an effective mechanism through which subsidiary banks affect the 
cash flow, capital position, and liquidity of parent holding companies. Substantial costs 
involved in changes in subsidiaries could have a significant impact on the capital allocations 
and operational activities for the whole organization. BHCs facing such scarce internal capital 
problems have incentives to take actions to avoid the further financial constraints. One of the 
most popular actions BHCs can take in the capital market is to change their financing 
decisions. To demonstrate these arguments, suppose that one or some of a BHC’s subsidiaries 
declare bankruptcy in a specific year. Investors holding the debt or equity of these subsidiaries 
are likely to lose part or all of their investment. As is often the case that subsidiary banks are 
funded by their parent, subsidiary failure means a costly process because the loss incurred will 
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be majorly covered by the parent and the internal capital market established by the BHC will 
be hurt to some extent. BHCs facing limited internal funds may be forced to seek external 
financing to sponsor their various financial activities. On the other hand, information 
asymmetry is severe prior to subsidiary failure. BHC insiders have information advantage over 
outside investors regarding the status of their subsidiaries. The advantage may be utilized by 
managers to adjust BHCs’ financing decisions accordingly. Furthermore, following the 
subsidiary bankruptcy, managers may instead take actions to mitigate the asymmetric 
information in order to lower the future financing cost. All of these provide motivations for 
parent banks to heavily adjust their capital structures around the periods when their 
subsidiaries go bankrupt.  
This thesis is closely related to the studies of information asymmetry and financing 
decisions. While the previous literature widely accepts the importance of private information 
in exploring firms’ capital structure, banks are generally excluded from empirical 
investigations of financing decisions. This is due to the fact that banking industry is generally 
heavily regulated, which may bring the overriding departure from what researchers have 
concluded in those non-financial firms. This thesis, however, specializes the information 
asymmetry arisen prior to the subsequent subsidiary bank status changes and investigates if the 
information asymmetry will be exploited by bank managers to adjust their financing decisions 
accordingly. To the best of the knowledge, this is the first paper to use material structural 
changes of subsidiary banks as a cut-off to discern the real effect of private information. 
Additionally, it also adds the contribution to the limited literature which can reflect banks’ 
financing decisions under asymmetric information. Lucas and McDonald (1992) point out that 
financing decisions of banks can be distorted due to information asymmetry because they are 
better informed of their assets quality than are outsiders. Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) examine 
the pricing behavior of bonds issued by the parent BHCs of failed subsidiaries. Their findings 
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show that bond spreads begin rising as early as six quarters prior to the failure, as the issuing 
BHC’s financial condition and credit rating deteriorate. They also report that the spreads for 
troubled BHCs are many times those of healthy ones. Billett and Garfinkel (2004) explore 
banks’ funding choices from segmented markets. They argue that with the existence of 
asymmetry information banks’ securities could be priced remarkably differently by segmented 
markets, and banks will increase their reliance on the relatively cheaper external market. The 
degree of the reliance depends on the costs of raising funds from different markets. 
Accordingly, banks try to take most advantage of the pricing discrepancies and target the 
market with the lowest access costs. Holod and Peek (2007) investigate the access of banks to 
information-based external financial market by comparing the behaviors of banks (including 
bank holding companies) with different transparency in response to the exogenous shock and 
find information asymmetry does affect their financing decisions. Morgan (2002) suggests that 
banking is more opaque than any other sorts of industries. They find that ratings from major 
agencies often disagree more over the bank bond issues than over issues by other types of 
firms, and this disagreement provides a good proxy for the bank uncertainty associated with 
asymmetric information. The veil between banks and outsiders makes market investors unable 
to accurately quantify the risk of banking firms as well as their securities. While 
supplementing these previous studies, this thesis attempts to propose some new sights of 
judging the private information and examine its effectiveness in changing BHCs’ capital 
structure. Therefore, the core premise within our topic is that banks have information 
advantage over market investors. Whether or not this kind of information asymmetry 
underlying in the banking system may be exploited by bank managers is an open question with 
important implications for understanding various motivations that banks may have in making 
capital choices.  
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In 2001, George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz jointly received the Nobel 
Prize in economics for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information and adverse 
selection. In this chapter, I discuss the implications of their theory for firm capital structure. 
This theory, however, has much broader applications. As described on the Nobel Prize Web 
site (www.nobelprize.org): Many markets are characterized by asymmetric information: 
Actors on one side of the market have much better information than those on the other. 
Borrowers know more than lenders about their repayment prospects, managers and boards 
know more than shareholders about the firm’s profitability, and prospective clients know more 
than insurance companies about their accident risk. During the 1970s, this year’s Laureates 
laid the foundation for a general theory of markets with asymmetric information. Applications 
have been abundant, ranging from traditional agricultural markets to modern financial markets. 
The Laureates’ contributions form the core of modern information economics.5 
In this vein, to systematically review the bank capital structure given the asymmetric 
information, the following main empirical chapters focus on the setting of bank holding 
companies (BHCs) and their subsidiaries. A BHC is a financial holding group that controls 
one or more commercial banks as well as other non-financial affiliates. The setting is based on 
the parent BHC’s changes in capital structure choices in response to the momentous status 
changes of their subsidiaries such as bankruptcy or M&A. There’s evidence that subsidiary 
failure or M&A can affect the parent as well as the whole holding company system on several 
grounds. As argued by Wall and Peterson (1987), a BHC as the owner needs to provide its 
financial assistance to its troubled subsidiary, which means the balance sheet of the parent is 
influenced by the status of its subsidiaries. Second, Ashcraft (2008) notes that holding 
company subsidiaries often work together to process the common data and provide financial 
products to customers. The failure of one subsidiary will bring down the whole chain of 
                                                          
5 “The Prize in Economic Sciences 2001 - Press Release.” Nobelprize.org. 
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products, finally impairing the whole holding company. Third, the traditional theory suggests 
that the negative effects of highly risky subsidiaries can be insulated by the “firewalls” built 
around other subsidiaries. However, Boyd et al. (1993) cast doubt on this stating ‘firewalls’ 
may not provide the desired result. They report that banking-subsidiary resources will be 
employed to aid financially distressed subsidiaries if the activities of banking and nonbanking 
subsidiaries are not fully separated by law. Fourth, Wall (1987) points out the failure of one 
subsidiary may cause the public to suspect the management quality of the affiliates within the 
holding company and a bank run in a worse situation. In sum, the dilemma described above 
provides BHCs incentives to raise more external funds to alleviate the deterioration of the 
financial conditions incurred by the failure of one or more of their subsidiaries.  
There’re two federal laws enacted in the early 1990s which are connected with the above 
concern. One is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), and 
the other is the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). The 
FDICIA passed by the US Congress in 1991 allows a BHC to use the resources of its 
subsidiaries to support a troubled subsidiary bank including the capital transfer to that bank to 
prevent bankruptcy. That is to say while the ultimate failure of a banking subsidiary may 
potentially harm the internal capital market established by the holding company, the parent 
can actually act as a “source-of-strength” to this troubled child ex ante. The FDICIA clarifies 
this “source-of-strength” doctrine and grants the Federal Reserve the authority to take 
enforcement actions for the BHCs that fail to do so when resources were available. The other 
federal law the FIRREA passed in 1989 authorizes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) to shift the expected losses of a failed subsidiary onto the capital of non-failing 
affiliates. These banking reforms have been documented by the previous literature (Ashcraft, 
2005, 2008). However, these papers mainly focus on the bailouts of sick affiliations and 
associated allocations of the internal capital. In fact, these policies have been challenged by 
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the banking industry through litigation reflecting the fact that the BHCs are not willing to do 
what the regulators are forcing them to do. There might be an incentive contradiction between 
the BHCs and the regulators regarding troubled bank subsidiaries. The following chapters 
contrarily look at the BHCs’ actions in the outside security market and study whether they 
have incentives to find external financing in the wake of the subsidiary structural changes. 
Whether the funds raised by issuing debt or equity from the outside market is for subsidiary 
affiliations or their own interests is worthy of further investigation.  
Additionally, information problems and other capital market frictions make external 
financing costly, while banks play a fundamental role in mitigating many such problems. 
However, this might cause an additional layer of information problems for banks themselves 
as a great variety of bank activities may be difficult for outsiders to attain (Houston, James, 
and Marcus, 1997). Particularly, the unfavorable private information of a bank, being only 
available to bank insiders, may create morale hazard problem resulting from its engaging in 
undesirable activities from the outsider’s point of view. Moreover, managers (insiders) are 
reluctant to release firm relevant information to the market that would compromise their 
strategic programs as pointed out by Kisgen (2006). Therefore, we have reasons to believe that 
banks may exploit such information asymmetry and adjust their financing decisions 
accordingly. BHC managers are able to foresee the subsidiaries’ financial conditions in the 
near future with greater precision than investors, based on their better knowledge of the inside 
information. As reported by Myres (2001), firm managers have large information advantage 
over outsiders. Whether or not this kind of information asymmetry underlying in the banking 
system may be exploited by bank managers is an open question with important implications 
for understanding various motivations that banks may have in issuing securities. Intuitively, 
BHCs may have incentives to pursue more external financing when they ex ante learn one of 
the subsidiaries is going to fail or engage in M&A activities. Managers are tempted to do so 
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because they want to grasp current greater and cheaper credit market access which will be 
highly likely to vanish once the bankruptcy or M&A news becomes known to all. These BHCs 
also tend to be negatively associated with liquidity, thus must find external financing before 
their troubled affiliates fail. Tang (2009) makes a similar allegation for this situation that 
“credit market imperfections such as information asymmetry significantly affect firms’ 
financing and investment decisions”.  
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of BHCs’ book equity ratio (ratio of total equity capital to 
assets) for the 10889 BHC-year observations in the sample for the US BHCs from FR Y-9C 
reports over the period from 1986 to 2015 (the data is described in more detail in Chapter IV). 
As can be seen, there is large heterogeneity in BHCs’ book equity ratios with capital ratios of 
most of banks being around nine percent, which is well above the capital requirement set by 
the Basel accord. However, this figure suggests that bank capital structure is worthy of further 
investigation.  
It is worth noting that prior literature shows that BHCs operate internal capital markets 
where they allocate capital and liquidity to and between subsidiary banks (Houston, James, 
and Marcus, 1997; Houston and James, 1998). Therefore, internal capital markets provide an 
effective mechanism through which subsidiary banks affect the cash flow, capital position, and 
liquidity of parent holding companies. As a BHC owns a significant share of its subsidiaries’ 
equity capital and often has counterparty business relations with subsidiaries, the material 
structural changes of a subsidiary bank may render the debt and equity of the subsidiary 
worthless and hence, brings substantial losses to its BHC and jeopardizes the BHC’s financial 
conditions, accordingly incentivizing BHCs to adjust capital decisions to avoid further 
financial constraints.  
This thesis considers the information advantage BHC managers have in shaping BHCs’ 
capital structure and postulates that, based on the better knowledge of a subsidiary’s up-to-date 
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financial condition, managers in the parent bank are able to foresee the material structural 
changes of a subsidiary in the near future with greater precision than outside investors. The 
following empirical chapters will examine whether bank holding companies exploit such an 
information advantage and adjust financing activities in their own interests. The evidence 
suggests that the “troubled” BHCs foresee a tightened credit market access and the increased 
borrowing costs once the bankruptcy or takeover deal of subsidiary banks is realized. Thus, 
“treated” BHCs increase debt financing in advance to take advantage of the presently cheaper 
debt financing and enjoy benefits. The findings are consistent with the argument of Billett and 
Garfinkel (2004) that, with the existence of asymmetric information, bank securities could be 
priced remarkably differently in segmented markets, and that banks take most advantage of the 
pricing discrepancies and target the segment that has the lowest access costs.  
This thesis majorly makes the following contributions. First, this paper adds to the extant 
literature that documents bank-specific information asymmetry. Houston, James, and Marcus 
(1997) report that a great variety of bank activities may be difficult for outsiders to attain. 
Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004) argue that unfavorable private information of a bank, which 
is available only to insiders, may create morale hazard problems and result in a bank’s 
engagement in undesirable activities. Holod and Peek (2007) investigate the access of banks to 
information-based external financial markets by comparing the behaviors of banks, including 
bank holding companies, with different transparency levels in response to exogenous shocks, 
and find that information asymmetry does affect bank financing behaviors. Morgan (2002) 
argues that the banking industry is more opaque than other industries, and finds that ratings 
from major agencies often disagree more over banks’ bond issues than issues by other types of 
firms. Blau, Brough, and Griffith (2017) report that bank opacity is associated with less 
information efficiency in financial markets. 
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This thesis emphasizes the information asymmetry arisen prior to the subsidiary bank 
failure, and investigates whether bank managers exploit such information asymmetry to adjust 
their capital structure decisions accordingly. The core premise of our question is that banks 
have information advantage over market investors (i.e., the parent bank knows that one or 
some of its subsidiaries may go bankrupt or engage in takeover deals, but investors do not 
have this information). To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first to use subsidiary 
bank status changes as a cut-off to discern the association between private information and 
financial policies of holding banks. The findings of the paper imply that the veil between 
banks and outsiders makes investors unable to accurately quantify the risk of banking firms as 
well as their securities.  
Second, this thesis is related to the market timing theory, which states that firms prefer 
equity financing when the cost of equity is low, and prefer debt otherwise. Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) claim that firms do not generally care whether they finance with debt or equity, but 
choose the form of financing which, at that point in time, appears to be more valued by 
financial markets. Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013) show that firms appear to optimally time 
financial markets and hold precautionary cash buffers in anticipation of adverse financing 
shocks. Our work takes the perspective of banks and attempts to discern the potential timing 
behavior of BHC insiders in anticipation of future subsidiary failure.  
Third, this thesis also extends prior limited work that focuses on bank capital structure. 
Some recent work includes Gropp and Heider (2010), Mehran and Thakor (2011), and Allen, 
Carletti, and Marquez (2015). Gropp and Heider (2010) document that the determinants of 
capital structure for banks and non-financial firms are very similar. Mehran and Thakor (2011) 
show that total bank value, as well as its various components, is positively associated with 
bank capital. Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2015) study optimal bank capital structure and its 
implications for the pricing of equity, deposits, and loans. None of these studies is designed to 
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consider the role of information asymmetry in shaping bank capital structure that is the focus 
of this paper.  
Fourth, this thesis also adds to the literature that examines bank mergers and acquisitions. 
For example, DeYoung et al. (2009) document the fundamental change of banks as the roles of 
financial intermediaries through the consolidations over the past decades, and evaluate the 
economic consequences of this ongoing trend, Karolyi and Taboada (2015) study cross-border 
acquisitions and argue that they provide a mechanism through which banks can change their 
regulatory environment from a stronger supervision environment to a much weaker one, and 
Chen and Vashishtha (2017) explore the effects of bank takeovers on corporate information 
disclosure and find that corporate borrowers significantly increase information disclosure after 
their lending banks engage in takeovers. The main focus of this study is trying to build the link 
between subsidiary bank mergers and the parent BHC’s capital structure decisions.  
Last but not least, this study contributes to the large strand of literature that focuses largely 
on the real effects of private information, such as financing arrangements (Sufi, 2007), equity 
issues (Dierkens, 1991), asset prices (Chan, Menkveld, and Yang, 2008), and competition, 
adverse selection, and information dispersion in the banking industry (Marquez, 2002). One 
implication of this chapter is that some results in the following ones could be associated with 
the role information asymmetry plays in banks’ capital structure decisions.  
Overall, this article, for the first time in the literature, systematically examines the dynamic 
aspects of various BHC capital structure decisions around the time of its subsidiary bank 
material structural changes and their effects on BHC performance, liquidity, lending, and risk. 
This study thus broadly contributes to the literature examining the determinants of firm and 
bank performance (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008; Gropp 
and Heider, 2010; Marcus, 1983). 
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Figure 2. 1: Distribution of BHC book equity ratio 
This figure shows the distribution of BHCs’ book equity ratio (ratio of total equity capital 
(BHCK3210) to assets (BHCK2170)) for the 10889 BHC-year observations in the sample for 
the US BHCs from FR Y-9C reports over the period from 1986 to 2015. 
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Chapter III: Asymmetry information and banks’ capital 
structure adjustments 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
In 2001, George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz jointly received the Nobel 
Prize in economics for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information and adverse 
selection. In this chapter, I discuss how asymmetry information may motivate bank managers 
to alter a bank’s capital structure. This theory, however, has much broader applications. As 
described on the Nobel Prize Web site (www.nobelprize.org): Many markets are characterized 
by asymmetric information: Actors on one side of the market have much better information 
than those on the other. Borrowers know more than lenders about their repayment prospects, 
managers and boards know more than shareholders about the firm’s profitability, and 
prospective clients know more than insurance companies about their accident risk. During the 
1970s, this year’s Laureates laid the foundation for a general theory of markets with 
asymmetric information. Applications have been abundant, ranging from traditional 
agricultural markets to modern financial markets. The Laureates’ contributions form the core 
of modern information economics. 
The recent banking literature has barely covered the capital structure issue. Part of the 
reasons might be regulation constitutes the overriding departure from what have been found 
for those non-financial firms (Gropp and Heider, 2009). As pointed out by Myres (2001) 
financial firms cannot adjust their financial policies at relatively low costs and thus have very 
limited financing objectives. 
In fact, banks may have various motives to change their capital structure. I specifically 
explore financing actions among bank holding companies in the United States when 
information asymmetry is most severe (e.g., internal structure or financial circumstance 
changes). The study therefore aims to disentangle the role of information asymmetry in 
shaping banks’ financial policy. 
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It is widely accepted that banks play an important role in mitigating information problems 
and other capital market frictions that make external financing costly. However, this role 
suggests that a great variety of bank activities may be difficult for outsiders to attain, which, in 
turn, can create an additional layer of information problems for banks themselves (Houston, 
James, and Marcus, 1997). Particularly, the unfavorable private information of a bank, being 
only available to bank insiders, may create morale hazard problem resulting from its engaging 
in undesirable activities from the outsider’s point of view. Moreover, managers (insiders) are 
reluctant to release firm relevant information to the market that would compromise their 
strategic programs as pointed out by Kisgen (2006). Therefore, we have reasons to believe that 
banks may exploit such information asymmetry and adjust their financing decisions 
accordingly. 
BHC managers are able to foresee their internal financial circumstances in the near future 
with greater precision than investors, based on their better knowledge of the insider 
information. As reported by Myres (2001), firm managers have large information advantage 
over outsiders. Whether or not this kind of information asymmetry underlying in the banking 
system may be exploited by bank managers is an open question with important implications 
for understanding various motivations that banks may have in issuing securities. Intuitively, 
BHCs may have incentive to pursue more external financing when they ex ante forecast the 
negative future cash flows. Managers are tempted to do so because they want to grasp current 
greater and cheaper credit market access which will be highly likely to vanish once the 
negative news becomes known to all. These BHCs also tend to be negatively associated with 
liquidity at that moment, thus must find external financing before any rating downgrading. 
Tang (2009) makes a similar allegation for this situation that “credit market imperfections 
such as information asymmetry significantly affect firms’ financing and investment decisions” 
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This conjecture may contradict the traditional trade-off theory which explains that firms 
choose an optimal capital structure to maximize value to current shareholders and debtholders. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, capital structure decisions, like investment decisions, are 
made by managers who have their own incentives. Proponents of the management 
entrenchment theory of capital structure believe that managers choose a capital structure 
primarily to avoid the discipline of debt and maintain their own entrenchment. Thus, managers 
seek to minimize leverage to prevent the job loss that would accompany financial distress. 
Managers are constrained from using too little debt, however, to keep shareholders happy. If 
managers sacrifice too much firm value, disgruntled shareholders may try to replace them or 
sell the firm to an acquirer. Under this hypothesis, firms will have to find a balance between 
debt and equity financing resort in response to a takeover threat or the threat of shareholder 
activism. 
This chapter introduces a new model which I term as information gap model and uses it to 
investigate the role of information asymmetry in shaping banks’ capital structure decisions. As 
an intro empirical chapter, I use subsidiary bank status change (bankruptcy or M&A) as a cut-
off to discern the real effect of private information on the financial policies of holding banks. 
This constitutes the most important setting in my thesis. The following empirical chapters will 
follow this setting and discuss the effect in the scenario of subsidiary failure and M&A, 
respectively. Existing studies show that material subsidiary status change such as bankruptcy 
or having a takeover deal can affect the parent as well as the whole holding company system 
on several grounds. As argued by Wall and Peterson (1987), a BHC as the owner needs to 
provide its financial assistance to its subsidiary, which means the balance sheet of the parent is 
influenced by the status of its subsidiaries. Second, Ashcraft (2008) notes that holding 
company subsidiaries often work together to process the common data and provide financial 
products to customers. The failure of one subsidiary will bring down the whole chain of 
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products, finally impairing the whole holding company. Third, the traditional theory suggests 
that the negative effects of highly risky subsidiaries can be insulated by the “firewalls” built 
around other subsidiaries. However, Boyd et al. (1993) cast doubt on this stating ‘firewalls’ 
may not provide the desired result. They report that banking-subsidiary resources will be 
employed to aid financially distressed subsidiaries if the activities of banking and nonbanking 
subsidiaries are not fully separated by law. Fourth, Wall (1987) points out the failure of one 
subsidiary may cause the public to suspect the management quality of the affiliates within the 
holding company and a bank run in a worse situation. In sum, the dilemma described above 
provides BHCs incentives to raise more external funds to alleviate the deterioration of the 
financial conditions incurred by the failure of one or more of their subsidiaries. 
To capture the value of information asymmetry, I construct a measure of the information 
gap between BHCs and outside investors concerning the prediction of subsidiary bankruptcy 
or engaging in acquisition activities in the next year. I present a model in which outsiders 
predict this based on the parent’s actions and all other publicly available information. The 
framework therefore explicitly accommodates the ability of outsiders to infer bank internal 
conditions by observing the parents’ actions on capital structure changes. The information gap 
is thus defined as the difference between the actual and the forecasted status of subsidiaries. 
We then model the relation between the BHCs’ financing adjustments prior to their subsidiary 
failure or acquisition and our measure of the information gap, controlling for a set of 
conventional variables.  
The empirical analyses suggest that information asymmetry significantly influences BHCs’ 
choices to fund investment. More specifically, BHCs on average increase their long-term debt 
financing by 1.41% one year prior to their subsidiary status change. Further results show that 
BHCs continue to raise their long-term debt in the same year. We however find that ex post, 
long-term debt issuance is lessened immediately and ceteris paribus, BHCs turn to rely more 
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on equity financing and on average increase it by 0.91%. These findings can be explained in 
the following way. First of all, the “troubled” BHC enjoys potential benefits from the 
presently better credit market access because investors can’t easily discern between them and 
other normal BHCs in the presence of information asymmetry. However, the credit market 
access of the “troubled” BHCs will be shortly tightened after their subsidiary banks go into 
liquidation or try to acquire other banks. In anticipation of this managers in the parent banks 
will take advantage and rely more on the cheaper debt financing knowing their future 
borrowing costs will rise sharply. Secondly, overly optimistic expectations about the future 
performance, cause the market to temporarily misprice the debt and equity of these “troubled” 
BHCs in advance of their subsidiary status changes. Informed of this, inside managers will try 
to exploit the mispricing. Similarly, as claimed by Flannery (1986) firm insiders, who are 
better informed than outside investors, choose to issue certain types of securities that the 
market appears to overvalue the most. Myers (2001), among others, describes such kind of 
“financing tactics” or “financing strategies” due to information asymmetry. Thirdly, BHCs 
may prefer to get the benefits of leverage before (Hung et al., 2014). Berger et al. (2005) also 
suggest that firms with unfavorable private information are willing to pay the costs on long-
term debt. Contrarily, raising equity will have limited benefits, but immediate costs with 
significant drops in the share price on the announcement (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). 
Consequently, the “troubled” BHC is more likely to choose to enjoy the relatively cheaper cost 
of debt borrowing when balancing the benefits and costs of debt or equity financing choice. 
This paper is closely related to the studies of information asymmetry and financing 
decisions. While the previous literature widely accepts the importance of private information 
in exploring firms’ capital structure, banks are generally excluded from empirical 
investigations of financing decisions. This is due to the fact that banking industry is generally 
heavily regulated, which may bring the overriding departure from what researchers have 
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concluded in those non-financial firms. This paper, however, specializes the information 
asymmetry arisen prior to the subsequent subsidiary bank failure and investigates if the 
information asymmetry will be exploited by bank managers to adjust their financing decisions 
accordingly. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to use subsidiary bank 
bankruptcy or acquisition as a cut-off to discern the real effect of private information. 
Additionally, it also adds the contribution to the limited literature which can reflect banks’ 
financing decisions under asymmetric information. Lucas and McDonald (1992) point out that 
financing decisions of banks can be distorted due to information asymmetry because they are 
better informed of their assets quality than are outsiders. Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) examine 
the pricing behavior of bonds issued by the parent BHCs of failed subsidiaries. Their findings 
show that bond spreads begin rising as early as six quarters prior to the failure, as the issuing 
BHC’s financial condition and credit rating deteriorate. They also report that the spreads for 
troubled BHCs are many times those of healthy ones. Billett and Garfinkel (2004) explore 
banks’ funding choices from segmented markets. They argue that with the existence of 
asymmetry information banks’ securities could be priced remarkably differently by segmented 
markets, and banks will increase their reliance on the relatively cheaper external market. The 
degree of the reliance depends on the costs of raising funds from different markets. 
Accordingly, banks try to take most advantage of the pricing discrepancies and target the 
market with the lowest access costs. Holod and Peek (2007) investigate the access of banks to 
information-based external financial market by comparing the behaviors of banks (including 
bank holding companies) with different transparency in response to the exogenous shock and 
find information asymmetry does affect their financing decisions. Morgan (2002) suggests that 
banking is more opaque than any other sorts of industries. They find that ratings from major 
agencies often disagree more over the bank bond issues than over issues by other types of 
firms, and this disagreement provides a good proxy for the bank uncertainty associated with 
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asymmetric information. The veil between banks and outsiders makes market investors unable 
to accurately quantify the risk of banking firms as well as their securities. While 
supplementing these previous studies, this chapter attempts to propose some new sights of 
judging the private information and examine its effectiveness in changing BHCs’ capital 
structure. 
The paper is also related to the market timing (or windows of opportunity) theory, which 
states that firms prefer equity financing when the cost of equity is low, and prefer debt 
otherwise. In other words, firms do not generally care whether they finance with debt or equity, 
they just choose the form of financing which, at that point in time, seems to be more valued by 
financial markets. Baker and Wurgler (2002) claim that market timing is the first order 
determinant of a corporation's capital structure use of debt and equity. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model on 
information asymmetry. Section 3.3 gives the description of the data. Section 3.4 contains 
general empirical tests and additional tests are presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2. A model on information asymmetry 
 
3.2.1. Information gap model – theoretical background 
 
In this section, I introduce a new model which I term as information gap model. As Myers 
(2001) argues, firm managers’ information advantage over outsider investors is large. I 
postulate that BHCs’ private information only available to bank managers allows them to 
accurately anticipate the subsidiaries’ status in the near future. 
Let ,
SF
i t  be the indicator of the event of the subsidiary material status change and take a 
value of 1 when a subsidiary of the BHC i fails or acquires other firms in year t, and zero when 
no subsidiary does. As we discuss above, market participants have access to only publicly 
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available information at time t - 1. Define 
, 1i tX   as the information set that is publicly available 
about BHC i including any publicly observable action taken by the BHC at time t - 1 that 
might lead to its subsequent subsidiary status change. After observing the action, the investors 
can infer their expectation of event ,
SF
i t . However, private information which is only available 
to bank insiders, or has not been publicly revealed, may also cause the failure or acquisition of 
a BHC’s subsidiary. We accordingly define 
, 1i tZ   as the private information set.  
Let  , 1 , 1,SF i t i tI X Z   be the indicator function that indicates the subsidiary status of BHC i 
at time t based on the information sets , 1i tX   and , 1i tZ  . It follows that the following equation 
holds: 
 , , 1 , 1,SF SFi t i t i tI X Z                                    (3.1) 
where ,
SF
i t  refers to the observed event of a subsidiary for BHC i at time t. The investors have 
to predict the event without full knowledge of the BHC’s inside information , 1i tZ  . Thus, for 
an outside investor without the knowledge of , 1i tZ  , his / her expectation at time t - 1 of the 
BHC’s subsidiary at t is:  
 , , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
, 1
,
( )
SF SF
i t i t i t i t i t
SF
i t
E X E I X Z X
I X
   

      

                                 (3.2) 
However, for the manager of BHC i who has the knowledge of both , 1i tX   and , 1i tZ  , the 
expectation of its subsidiary is: 
 
 
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
, 1 , 1
, 1 , 1
, , ,
,
( ) ( )
SF SF
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
SF
i t i t
SF SF
i t i t
E X Z E I X Z X Z
I X Z
I X I Z
     
 
 
      

 
                (3.3) 
As a result, the information gap between the BHC manager and the outside investors is: 
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 , , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
, 1
, , ( )
( )
SF
SF SF SF
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
SF
i t
E X Z E X I X Z I X
I Z
     

        

             (3.4) 
Define , 1 , 1( ) ( )
SF
SF
i t i tG Z I Z   as the function depicting the information gap. Here, it’s a 
function of the unobserved variables , 1i tZ   for outsiders.  
Now we can discuss how the information gap will be exploited by bank insiders to adjust 
their financing activities and arrive at our initial hypothesis. 
Consider a BHC of which one or several of its subsidiaries face liquidity shortage in the 
next year. The current external market may over evaluate its credit quality and thus grant 
opportunities for the BHC to hold back the unfavorable information from the outsiders, and 
allow a time window for the BHC to conduct financing at relatively cheaper costs. 
Formally, define the market value of the BHC i at time t - 1 as: 
, 1 , 1 , 1i t i t i tA E D                                               (3.5) 
where , 1i tE   and , 1i tD   are the market values of equity and debt for BHC i at time t – 1, 
respectively. A subsidiary material status change at time t will lead to a reduction of the BHC 
value which will lower the market value of the BHC to ,
SF
i tA . Therefore, we have: 
, , 1 ,
SF SF SF
i t i t i tA A A   , , 0
SF
i tA                                (3.6) 
Hence, the expected market value of the BHC i by the managers is:   
 , , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,, ,SF SF SF SFi t i t i t i t i t i t i tE A X Z A I X Z A                                 (3.7) 
The expected market value of the BHC i by the uninformed public investor is:  
, , 1 , 1 , 1 ,( )
SF
SF SF SF
i t i t i t i t i tE A X A I X A                                          (3.8) 
Thus, the difference in the expected market value of the BHC i from the information gap 
between the BHC and the public is: 
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 , , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,, , ( ) 0
SF
SF SF SF SF
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tE A X Z E A X I X Z I X A     
              
 
, , 1 , , 1 , 1,
SF SF
i t i t i t i t i tE A X E A X Z                                   (3.9) 
It’s clear therefore that there is overpricing in the current market value of the BHC because 
of the increased likelihood of a debt default. In other words, before its subsidiary material 
status change a BHC enjoys potential discrete benefit in its value from the presently higher 
credit market access. 
Effectively, the BHC is in a position to explore mis-pricing by increasing debt or equity at 
time t - 1. When a BHC faces the subsidiary financial distress, its decision is whether to raise 
equity or debt in order to exploit overpricing. These actions, however, have costs, and 
therefore, BHCs must balance the associated costs and benefits of debt and equity to decide 
the optimal financing choice. I argue that BHCs will prefer debt to equity since increasing 
equity will have limited benefits, but immediate costs. The choice of increasing equity at time 
t - 1 may cause significant drops in the stock price on the announcement of an equity issuance 
(Asquith and Mullins, 1986). This is because investors are aware of the problem of 
information asymmetry, and believe that the BHC’s stock is overvalued when the BHC 
undertakes seasoned equity offerings (Fama and French, 2005). 
By using debt financing before, BHCs can take advantage of the relatively better credit 
market access and cheaper financing cost. The cost of debt capital reflects the perceived 
creditworthiness of the BHC, and these BHCs may prefer to get the benefits of leverage 
beforehand. Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005) also suggest that BHCs with 
unfavorable private information are willing to pay the costs on long-term debt. From the above 
analysis we arrive at our hypothesis: BHC managers who perceive superior inside information 
will have a preference to fund investment using debt when information asymmetry arises. 
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3.2.2. Information gap model – An empirical model 
 
Suppose subsidiary failure or acquisition takes place in year 1t  . Let , 1i tSubChange   be the 
indicator of the event of the subsidiary status change and take a value of 1 when at least one of 
the BHC i’s subsidiaries fails or acquires other firms in year 1t  , and zero when no 
subsidiary does. One year prior to the event year, there’s various information regarding the 
whole BHC that could be used to speculate if the BHC will have a subsidiary which is going 
to change the status in the coming year. As I discuss above, market participants only have 
access to publicly available information at time t. Define ,i tX  as the information set that is 
publicly available about BHC i including any publicly observable action taken by the BHC at 
time t that might lead to its subsequent subsidiary status change. After observing these actions, 
the investors can infer their expectations of BHCs’ health status. More formally, based on the 
public available information the outsiders’ expectation in year t regarding whether BHC i has 
any subsidiary which will change the status at 1t   can be achieved by: 
 , , 1 , 0,1
Outsiders
i t i t i tPred E SubChange X                           (3.10) 
However, managers sitting in the parent, when making the inference, will also benefit from 
the private information that is only available to bank insiders and not publicly revealed. 
Similarly, in a more formal way, we define ,i tZ  as the private information set which has 
actually been defined in the previous section. For bank insiders, as they master the superior 
private information ,i tZ  in addition to the public information ,i tX , we can well believe that 
their predictions for the status of their own subsidiaries in the following year are judicious. It 
therefore follows that:  
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                     (3.11) 
This presumption states one essential point underlying in our story: BHC managers have 
good knowledge of their subsidiaries and can foresee their status changes in the near future.  
As discussed, managers in the BHC are able to forecast the circumstances of their 
subsidiaries in the near future since they can always communicate with the managers of their 
subsidiaries and they are well aware of the whole holding company’s financial conditions. It 
naturally follows that there exists a large information asymmetry between inside managers and 
market investors. I term this as Information Gap. I am now ready to specify the empirical 
model that is used to capture the information gap between bank managers and outsiders when 
anticipating the circumstances of subsidiaries. 
In order to obtain the expectation of outsiders at time t for whether BHC i has one 
subsidiary that will change at , I first use a logit model to calculate the likelihood of a 
subsidiary failure or acquisition in the next year based on the information available to 
investors in the current period. I regress the subsidiary status variable , 1i tSubChange   on a 
group of BHC characteristics including: ΔLeverage, size, market-to-book ratio, profitability, 
diversification, liquidity, and marginal expected shortfall. All these variables are publicly 
observable. Therefore, the model reflects predictive abilities of public investors without full 
knowledge of BHCs’ inside information. It is worth mentioning that this logit model is 
different from the above one used for addressing the reverse causality issue. I employ the 
model at the consolidated parent BHC level. That is, I only focus on the outsiders’ predictions 
for whether a parent BHC has one or more subsidiaries that will have circumstance change in 
the following year rather than their forecasts regarding the circumstance of a specific 
subsidiary bank.  
1t 
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The log likelihood function that I use to obtain actual parameter estimates is: 
        , 1 , , 1 ,
1 1
ˆ ln 1 ln 1
n T
i t i t i t i t
i t
L SubChange F SubChange F 
 
     β X X        (3.12) 
Having estimated the parameters, I obtain the forecasted probability of the subsidiary status 
for the parent BHC i in year  by the public investors as given below:  
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X β
            (3.13) 
In fact, combining equation (3.10) with equation (3.13) can exactly arrive:  
 , , 1 ,Pr 1Outsidersi t i t i tPred SubChange X                              (3.14) 
As a result, the information gap between bank insiders and outside investors is:   
                                      (3.15) 
which in practice states the difference between the realized subsidiary circumstance in year 
 and outsiders’ expectation based on the public information available in year t and is a 
function of the unobserved variables  (private information). 
 
3.3. Data 
 
3.3.1. Data source 
 
My data come from three sources. I collect BHC data from Compustat bank data from 
1983-2016, using annual observations. Compustat is a database of financial, statistical and 
market information on active and inactive global companies throughout the world. The service 
began in 1962 and is provided by Standard & Poor’s, a division of The McGraw-Hill 
Companies who supplies financial information and a variety of databases and software 
1t 
, , ,
Insiders Outsiders
i t i t i tIG Pred Pred 
1t 
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products for institutional investors, financial and corporate clients. The database covers 99,000 
global securities, covering 99% of the world's total market capitalization with annual company 
data history available on income statement, balance Sheet, flow of funds and supplemental 
data items back to 1950 and quarterly data available back to 1962 (depending when that 
company was added to the database). With Compustat, I can customize the data output for 
virtually any financial application. Several Compustat files are available in both annual and 
quarterly formats. The industrial annual formats offer both historical and restated data. The 
industrial quarterly formats offer restated data, which is standardized. The restated data allows 
analysts to compare current and prior years’ results on a comparable basis and determine 
financial trends and growth rates. Compustat is available on WRDS including North America 
daily, global daily, bank daily, historical segments daily, snapshot monthly updates, 
and Execucomp monthly updates. The Compustat bank fundamentals used by this chapter 
includes financial, statistical, and market information on the largest and most important banks 
in the United States, including a wide range of fundamental and technical data. Compustat is 
widely used by many corporate finance and capital market researchers. Some of the most 
famous are Myers and Majluf (1984), Asquith and Mullins (1986), and Fama and French 
(2005).6 
Stock prices data are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) is a provider of historical stock market data. 
The Center is a part of the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago. CRSP 
maintains some of the largest and most comprehensive proprietary historical databases in 
stock market research. Academic researchers and investment professionals rely on CRSP for 
accurate, survivor bias-free information which provides a foundation for their research and 
analyses. CRSP is available on WRDS and a powerful tool used by many academic 
                                                          
6 For more information on Compustat, see the official website http://www.compustat.com. 
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researchers and practitioners who would like the market stock and bond data. Some of the 
most famous researchers who ever used this database are Baker and Wurgler (2002), 
Donaldson (2000), Myers (1984), and Leary (2009).7 
Lastly, subsidiary bank data come from the Federal Reserve Report of Condition and 
Income (Call Reports). Call Report data can be accessed through WRDS. Every national bank, 
state member bank, insured state nonmember bank, and savings association ("institution") is 
required to file Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (a "Call Report") as of the 
close of business on the last day of each calendar quarter, i.e., the report date. The specific 
reporting requirements depend upon the size of the institution, the nature of its activities, and 
whether it has any foreign offices. Institutions submit Call Report data to the bank regulatory 
agencies each quarter for the agencies' use in monitoring the condition, performance, and risk 
profile of individual institutions and the industry as a whole. Call Report data serve a 
regulatory and public policy purpose by assisting the agencies in fulfilling their missions of 
ensuring the safety and soundness of financial institutions and the financial system and the 
protection of consumer financial rights, as well as agency-specific missions affecting national 
and state-chartered institutions, e.g., monetary policy, financial stability, and deposit 
insurance. Call Reports are the source of the most current statistical data available for 
identifying areas of focus for on-site examinations and off-site monitoring. The agencies use 
Call Report data to evaluate the corporate applications of institutions, and to calculate the 
deposit insurance assessments of institutions and the semiannual assessment fees of national 
banks and federal savings associations. Call Report data are also used by the public, state 
banking authorities, researchers, bank rating agencies, and the academic community. Some of 
                                                          
7 For more information on CRSP database, see http://www.crsp.com/. 
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the most famous researchers who ever used this database include Loutskina (2011), Gilje, 
Loutskina, and Strahan (2016).8 
To examine BHCs’ capital structure decisions, this chapter looks at four different measures 
of debt and equity financing including changes in long-term debt, short-term debt, total debt, 
and common equity, all scaled by the previous year’s total assets. In the final sample, there’re 
694 BHCs that didn’t have any subsidiary status change during 1983-2016 and 219 BHCs that 
ever had one or more subsidiaries which went bankrupt or acquired other firms in some 
specific years during the same period. 11883 BHC-year observations constitute the final data 
sample.  
 
3.3.2. Estimations of the information gap model 
 
To reiterate, the framework developed so far works on the premise that the managers have 
superior information over public investors. The inside managers know with certainty about the 
near-term status of their subsidiaries, and hence do not need to estimate the logit model (3.12) 
as the outsiders do. Panel A of Table 3.1 presents the logit model that I use to obtain the values 
for the variable ,
Outsiders
i tPred . Panel B of Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for the 
variable ,i tIG  and shows that, for those BHCs whose subsidiaries are static in the next year 
(i.e., , 0
Insiders
i tPred  ), outsiders, on average, infer that the chance that these BHCs will have  
                                                          
8 For more information on “Call Reports”, see https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/call/index.html. 
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Table 3. 1: Information gap estimation 
This table provides estimates of the information gap variable IG. The outsiders’ prediction  is obtained from estimating the logit model 
in Panel A. Panel B lists the descriptive statistics of the information gap variable IG. The dependent variable SubChange is a dummy variable 
indicating if a BHC has one or more subsidiaries that have material status change in the current calendar year. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage 
calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; Size is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total 
assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest 
income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book 
value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall 
return of the banking sector in that given year. All variables are at the consolidated BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 
1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
Panel A: Outsiders’ predictions using the logit model (3.12) 
 SubChange 
ΔLeverage 0.250 
 (1.51) 
Size 0.234** 
 (2.17) 
Market to book ratio 0.228* 
 (1.80) 
Profitability -4.820** 
 (-2.08) 
Diversification 0.101 
 (0.40) 
Liquidity -0.074 
 (-0.26) 
MES -0.875*** 
 (-3.02) 
Constant 1.302*** 
 (3.70) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
N 7483 
Pseudo R2 0.176 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the information gap estimate  
InsidersPred  = 1 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
OutsidersPred  136 0.112 0.086 0.002 0.720 
IG 136 0.888 0.086 0.281 0.998 
InsidersPred  = 0 
OutsidersPred  7347 0.012 0.027 0.000 0.169 
IG 7347 -0.012 0.027 -0.169 0.000 
OutsidersPred
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subsidiary status changes is only 1.19%, which reflects the fact that the information gap is not 
large for these “healthy” BHCs. In contrast, when BHC managers precisely foresee the 
incoming failure or acquisition of subsidiary banks (i.e., , 1
Insiders
i tPred  ), investors, on average, 
only have 11.21% probabilities of correct predictions, while they have nearly 89% chances of 
failing to forecast the occurrence of the subsidiary bankruptcy or acquisition. These results 
suggest a potentially large information gap for those “troubled” BHCs. Ex facto, the content of 
managers’ superior information is captured as well as instrumented by the information gap 
defined above. In the next empirical section, I examine whether the information gap can be 
exploited by bank managers to change BHCs’ financing decisions and ultimately their 
leverage. 
 
3.4. Empirical results 
 
3.4.1. The effect of information gap on BHCs’ capital structure decisions 
 
As discussed, managers in the BHC are able to forecast the circumstances of their 
subsidiaries in the near future since they can always communicate with the managers of their 
subsidiaries and they are well aware of the whole holding company’s financial conditions. It 
naturally follows that there exists a large information asymmetry between inside managers and 
market investors. We term this as Information Gap. In this section, we examine whether parent 
BHCs indeed exploit the information gap to adjust their capital structure. 
To control for BHCs’ characteristics that could affect their financing decisions, this paper 
considers BHCs’ size, market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility, and profitability. These are 
reliable variables demonstrated to be related to the capital structure. Size has been used to 
reveal firms’ expected bankruptcy cost and is expected to be one of the crucial determinants of 
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the capital structure (Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 1998; Hovakimian, Opler, and 
Titman, 2001; Diamond, 1991). The market-to-book ratio has been used as a proxy for growth 
opportunities and is expected to be positively correlated with firms’ external financing (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002). The effect of profitability on leverage, however, is less clear because it 
can either be used as a proxy for internal cash available for investment funding or taxable 
income to be shielded (Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984; Leary, 2006). Similarly, the effect of 
asset tangibility is unclear as it can either stand for the severity of the information asymmetry, 
collateral available for firms’ external financing, or demand for future investments (Titman 
and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  
One may argue that the above variables are extensively borrowed from the empirical 
corporate finance literature that has at length examined the capital structure of non-financial 
firms while financial firms are mostly excluded from analyses. In fact, Gropp and Heider 
(2010) document that the determinants of the capital structure between banks and non-
financial firms are very similar. They even report that the sign and significance of the effect of 
most variables on bank leverage are identical when compared to the results found in the 
classical literature covering for firms such as in the US or more widely, in the G7 countries. 
Besides, the reason I do not include dividends which is examined in Gropp and Heider (2010) 
is that it is not significant in any scenario in the following regression analysis. It is thus 
dropped from the analysis. 
Specifically, I estimate the following model: 
, 0 1 , ,i t i t i t i tY IG          v i,t-1β X                                                          (3.16) 
Table 3.2 reports the regression results. As shown in the table, the information gap 
significantly dominates the financing decisions of the parent BHCs. The positive and 
significant coefficients on IG in column (1) and (2) show that the larger information gap is 
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associated with higher BHC leverage and more long-term debt raised in the year prior to 
subsidiary circumstance change.  
The coefficient estimates indicate that the economic impact of information asymmetry on 
bank capital decisions is also economically large. For instance, the point estimate for IG on 
Leverage implies that leverage changes for BHCs with 1% more information gap is 3.6% 
higher, which indicates a 169.81% increase relative to the sample average Leverage of 
2.12%. Similarly, for the other two leverage measures, 1% increase in information gap is 
associated with a 123.66% increase in long term debt changes (relative to the sample average 
Long-term debt of 1.86%) and an 81.40% decrease in short term debt changes (relative to the 
sample average Short-term debt of 0.86%). 
As discussed earlier, the information asymmetry between outsiders and insiders is 
significantly large before their subsidiaries go bankrupt or acquire other firms. Bank insiders 
benefit from the presently larger information gap and take this advantage to quickly finance 
the BHCs. These evidence suggests that parent BHCs are keen to find external funds in 
advance. These raised funds can act as a cushion against the deterioration of the holding 
company’s financial conditions and further lower the liquidity risk. These findings also 
suggest that when information asymmetry arises, parent banks prefer to raise more of their 
long-term debt. The previous literature documents that long-term debt acts as a cheaper 
financing resort and serves as a preferred choice for external financing (Flannery, 1986; 
Berger et al., 2005). BHCs would like to avoid costly equity financing and exploit the 
temporarily better creditworthiness to obtain funds through long-term debt at low cost 
knowing they will have to undertake the forthcoming capital outflow (Calomiris and Wilson 
1998). 
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Table 3. 2: The effect of information gap on BHCs’ capital structure changes 
Effects of information gap on BHCs’ leverage changes. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total 
liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-
term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s 
short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets 
to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to 
the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal 
Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All variables are at the 
consolidated BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ΔLeveraget ΔLong-term debtt ΔShort-term debtt 
IGt 0.036
*** 0.023*** -0.007** 
 (3.28) (4.22) (-2.31) 
Sizet - 1 -0.019
*** -0.028*** -0.037** 
 (-8.55) (-8.55) (-9.38) 
Market to book ratiot - 1 0.064
*** -0.097*** -0.178*** 
 (7.48) (-7.48) (-12.12) 
Profitabilityt - 1 0.082
*** 0.077*** 0.093*** 
 (11.06) (9.70) (10.13) 
Diversificationt - 1 -0.075 -0.019
* 0.022** 
 (-1.50) (-1.95) (1.67) 
Liquidityt - 1 -0.099
** -0.007 -0.018 
 (-2.48) (-0.85) (-1.60) 
MESt - 1 0.003 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.39) (-0.12) (0.71) 
Constant 0.124*** 0.093** 0.050 
 (12.73) (1.98) (0.98) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
N 6779 6779 6071 
Adj. R2 0.344 0.596 0.125 
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3.4.2. A reexamination on BHCs with publicly traded bonds outstanding 
 
The above test elaborates the way outside investors predict a BHC’s internal circumstances 
in the next year based on its publicly available characteristics in the current year. However, the 
utilization of the general BHC information in the prediction may have limitations, which 
neglect some specific factors that may help reveal BHCs’ internal financial conditions. Berger 
and Davies (1998) find that bank examinations generate bank condition information that has 
not been uncovered by the market, and that part of the valuable private information may be 
transmitted to market participants and incorporated into capital market prices to some extent.9 
I therefore incorporate BHC bond spreads into the information gap model as additional 
publicly observable information that can be used by outside investors. Specifically, for each 
BHC in each year, from its various outstanding bonds I choose the one that has the longest 
maturity as the longer bond yield is more affected by both liquidity and credit risk of the 
issuing firm (Helwege, Huang, and Wang, 2014). I then define the BHC bond spread variable 
YieldSpread  as the yield difference between this BHC bond and a treasury bond with a 
comparable maturity as determined from Datastream. BHCs with no outstanding bonds in that 
year are dropped. Additionally, I exclude any non-straight bonds such as convertibles, callable 
bonds, etc. The sample size is heavily reduced because of either the above screening or the 
availability of bond price data. 
I repeat the logistic regression in Panel A of Table 3.1 after including YieldSpread  as an 
additional regressor. Panel A of Table 3.3 reports the results. To save space I only report the 
coefficient on YieldSpread . The positive and significant coefficient on YieldSpread  shows 
that it is a good predictor and indicates that, the larger the difference between a BHC bond 
                                                          
9 The CAMELS rating system is generally used by US supervisory authorities to examine the soundness of a 
bank’s condition. The evaluation results are not publicly disclosed but only provided to top bank managers.  
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yield and the yield of a comparable maturity treasury bond, the more likely is the issuing 
parent to have subsidiaries go bankrupt or engaging in M&A activities in the following year. 
Panel B of Table 3.3 presents summary statistics of the information gap variable IG. 
Compared with Panel B of Table 3.1, the lower absolute mean values of IG indicate that the 
information asymmetry between market participants and bank insiders is narrowed. My model 
hereby reflects the improved predictive abilities of outside investors based on publicly 
observable information when including spreads on BHC bonds.  
Although outsiders’ predictions are improved, the information gap for those “troubled” 
BHCs is still very large as shown in the table. Thus, my next step is to retest whether the large 
information asymmetry is exploited by parent BHC managers to adjust capital structure 
specifically on these BHCs with outstanding bonds. The empirical specification is the same as 
Equation (3.16). Panel C of Table 3.3 presents the results. The positive and significant 
coefficients on IG in columns (1) and (2) show that the larger information gap is associated 
with more increase in long-term debt and BHC leverage. Overall, the results support my 
argument that bank mangers benefit from their information advantage and adjust the BHCs’ 
capital structure accordingly. 
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Table 3. 3: Information gap for BHCs with publicly traded bonds outstanding 
This table shows the additional estimation of the information gap variable IG and its effect on BHCs with outstanding publicly traded bonds. The 
outsiders’ prediction OutsidersPred  is obtained from estimating the logit model in Panel A. The dependent variable SubChange is a dummy variable 
indicating if a BHC has one or more subsidiaries that have material status change in the current calendar year. YieldSpreadBHC is the yield difference 
between the BHC bond and a treasury bond with a comparable maturity as determined from Datastream. We also include the same variables as we 
use in Panel A of Table 4.15 in the regression, but do not report their coefficients to save the space. Panel B lists the descriptive statistics of the 
information gap variable IG. Panel C reports the effect of information gap on BHCs’ leverage changes one year before subsidiary failure. We only 
report the coefficient on the information gap variable IG in order to save the space. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the 
current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-
term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; and 
ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt 
to the previous year’s total assets. All variables are at the consolidated BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = 
significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%.  
Panel A: Outsiders’ predictions of BHCs having bankrupt subsidiaries 
 SubChange 
YieldSpread 2.306
*** 
 (5.29) 
Constant 0.842*** 
 (12.38) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
BHC Controls Yes 
N 1129 
Pseudo R2 0.269 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the information gap estimate  
InsidersPred  = 1 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
OutsidersPred  26 0.183 0.155 0.004 0.868 
IG 26 0.817 0.155 0.132 0.996 
InsidersPred  = 0 
OutsidersPred  1103 0.009 0.060 0.000 0.349 
IG 1103 -0.009 0.060 -0.349 0.000 
Panel C: Effects of information gap on BHCs’ leverage changes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt 
IG 0.030*** 0.028*** -0.006 
 (3.31) (3.68) (-0.92) 
BHC Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 867 867 867 
Adj. R2 0.223 0.179 0.120 
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3.5. Additional test 
 
In this section, I try to differentiate several channels that lead to BHCs’ capital structure 
changes in the same year and following the arisen of information asymmetry. Specifically, I 
employ the following specification:  
, 0 1 , 1 , 1 ,i t t i t i t t i t i tFinancingDecision SubChange             vβ X            (3.17) 
where FinancingDecision are BHCs’ financing decisions and measured using several 
measures of debt and equity financing including changes in long-term debt, short-term debt, 
and common equity, all scaled by the previous year’s total assets, and , 1i tSubChange   is a 
dummy variable indicating whether there is status change (failure or acquisition) among 
subsidiaries of BHC i in year 1t  , i  and t  capture BHC and year fixed effects, respectively, 
to eliminate time-invariant BHC heterogeneity and year variation. I would like to examine 
subsidiary failure’s influence on the parent’s capital structure changes in the same year (in 
year 1t  ), and one year after (in year 2t  ). Therefore, we have  1, 2t  , where 1t   for 
the same year of the subsidiary bankruptcy and 2t   for one year after the subsidiary 
bankruptcy.  
I continue to use the controls that we used in the above tests, in addition to adding a new 
control variable, Asset tangibility. To reiterate, these controls are reliable covariates 
demonstrated to be related to the corporate financing adjustment. Size has been used to reveal 
firms’ expected bankruptcy cost and is expected to be one of the crucial determinants of the 
capital structure changes (Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 1998; Hovakimian, Opler, and 
Titman, 2001; Diamond, 1991). The market-to-book ratio has been used as a proxy for growth 
opportunities and is expected to be positively correlated with firms’ external financing (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002). The effect of profitability on leverage, however, is less clear because it 
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can either be used as a proxy for internal cash available for investment funding or taxable 
income to be shielded (Donaldson, 2000; Myers, 1984; Leary, 2009). Similarly, the effect of 
asset tangibility is unclear as it can either stand for the severity of the information asymmetry, 
collateral available for firms’ external financing, or demand for future investments (Titman 
and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  
One may argue that the above variables are extensively borrowed from the empirical 
corporate finance literature that has at length examined the capital structure of non-financial 
firms while financial firms are mostly excluded from analyses. In fact, Gropp and Heider 
(2010) document that the determinants of the capital structure between banks and non-
financial firms are very similar. They even report that the sign and significance of the effect of 
most variables on bank leverage are identical when compared to the results found in the 
classical literature covering for firms such as in the US or more widely, in the G7 countries.  
For the same year, the empirical results are reflected in Table 3.4. I can still find highly 
significant impact on long-term debt issuance although there seems not to be the case for 
short-term debt. The slightly higher coefficient suggests that BHCs with most severe 
information asymmetry problem hurry to increase their long-term debt on that year. The mixed 
influence on both long-term and short-term debt yields a significant increase in these BHCs’ 
total debt financing (on average 1.82% more than those whose subsidiaries are all safe). In 
addition, these BHCs continue to curtail their equity borrowing aiming to cut the cost of 
capital. 
  
61 
 
Table 3. 4: BHCs’ capital structure changes in the same year of subsidiary status change  
This table presents the regression estimates for the relation between subsidiary status change and BHCs’ capital structure changes in the 
same year. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total 
liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-
term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt 
calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; Size is 
the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value 
of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of 
noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale 
securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% 
worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All variables are yearly results and at the consolidated BHC level. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; and * 
= significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ΔLeverageBHC ΔLong-term debtBHC ΔShort-term debtBHC ΔEquityBHC 
SubChange 0.025*** 0.019** -0.004 -0.009*** 
 (3.13) (2.38) (-0.36) (-4.50) 
Size -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.001 -0.174*** 
 (-5.03) (-5.75) (-1.15) (-12.66) 
Market to book ratio 0.060** 0.066*** 0.008*** 0.241*** 
 (2.22) (2.97) (2.69) (3.77) 
Profitability 0.113 0.022 0.012 1.917*** 
 (1.14) (0.30) (1.24) (6.99) 
Diversification 0.008 -0.009 -0.002 0.009 
 (0.41) (-0.85) (-1.30) (0.23) 
Liquidity -0.012 -0.007 -0.002 -0.047 
 (-0.86) (-0.59) (-0.91) (-1.10) 
MES -0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.005 
 (-0.12) (1.37) (1.21) (-0.80) 
Constant 0.169*** 0.154*** 0.006 2.221*** 
 (2.99) (3.75) (0.48) (11.41) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 338 338 338 338 
Adj. R2 0.120 0.059 0.285 0.218 
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I further analyze the effects subsidiary status changes may bring on parent banks’ 
subsequent financing decisions. A summary of the effects one year after is given by Table 3.5. 
In sharp contrast to the above case, BHCs with subsidiaries going bankrupt or engaging 
acquisition activities significantly lower their leverage in the following year. The effects on 
their financing decisions provide a more robust evidence for this change. The treated BHCs on 
average reduce more subsequent long-term debt by roughly 0.8% of lagged total assets than 
those without affiliates. The former turn to raise more equity. I, however, again find an 
insignificant effect on BHCs’ short-term debt changes, which reveals the BHCs’ preference of 
funding choices when information gap is most severe. 
The shift of financing from debt to equity after information asymmetry has arisen can be 
explained for several reasons. Firstly, BHCs try to reduce the information asymmetry at this 
moment in order to lower the cost of any forthcoming issuance. This means BHCs are keen to 
convey the favorable information to the market that their credit quality is improving in terms 
of the whole company. Equity financing can serve as a more transparent communication tool 
in the market than debt financing. Secondly, parent stock offerings carry advantageous 
information about subsidiary value and increase subsidiary wealth subsequently (Slovin and 
Sushka, 1997). By doing so, the parent bank can rebuild the market confidence across its 
subsidiaries, thus benefiting the whole parent-subsidiary governance structure. Thirdly, the 
parent raises equity to further secure its compliance to the capital requirement. Maintaining 
certain equity capital ratios acts as material protection for depositors, shareholders, and the 
government safety net. 
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Table 3. 5: BHCs’ capital structure changes in the year following subsidiary status change 
This table presents the regression estimates for the relation between subsidiary status change and BHCs’ capital structure changes in the following year. ΔLeverage is the 
change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the 
change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term 
debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; 
Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; 
Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income 
and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, 
which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All variables are yearly results and at the 
consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; and * = 
significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ΔLeverageBHC ΔLong-term debtBHC ΔShort-term debtBHC ΔEquityBHC 
SubChange -0.044*** -0.027*** 0.005 0.011*** 
 (-2.69) (-4.97) (0.98) (2.75) 
SizeBHC,t-1 -0.220*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.001 
 (-12.27) (-5.50) (-5.71) (-1.40) 
Market-to-book ratioBHC,t-1 0.256*** 0.060** 0.065*** 0.005** 
 (4.61) (2.34) (3.14) (2.24) 
ProfitabilityBHC,t-1 2.697*** 0.128 0.034 0.014 
 (5.50) (1.32) (0.50) (1.47) 
DiversificationBHC,t-1 -0.045 0.003 -0.005 -0.003** 
 (-0.94) (0.14) (-0.49) (-2.04) 
LiquidityBHC,t-1 -0.080* -0.015 -0.012 -0.002 
 (-1.81) (-1.16) (-0.98) (-1.37) 
MESBHC,t-1 0.002 -0.000 0.003* 0.000* 
 (0.31) (-0.03) (1.75) (1.73) 
Constant 2.839*** 0.157*** 0.136*** 0.008 
 (11.17) (3.15) (3.48) (0.90) 
BHC Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9719 8185 8185 8185 
Adj. R2 0.236 0.083 0.053 0.281 
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3.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses the relation between information asymmetry and bank capital 
structure decisions by introducing a new model which I term as information gap model. 
Relative to public investors, bank insiders possess better knowledge and precise predictions on 
BHCs’ next-period status. By specifically focusing on the information gap between these two 
parts, this study explores whether the superior information of bank managers may motivate 
them to alter their bank’s capital structure.  
I construct the information gap measure between BHCs and outside investors concerning 
the prediction of subsidiary circumstance change in the next year and present a model in which 
outsiders make the prediction based on the parent’s actions and all other publicly available 
information. The framework therefore explicitly accommodates the ability of outsiders to infer 
the conditions of subsidiaries by observing the parents’ actions on capital structure changes. 
The information gap is thus defined as the difference between the actual and the forecasted 
status of BHC subsidiaries. I then model the relation between the BHCs’ financing 
adjustments and the measure of the information gap, controlling for a set of conventional 
variables.  
The results show that the information gap significantly distorts BHCs’ external financing 
decisions. BHC managers who perceive superior inside information will have a preference to 
fund investment using debt when information asymmetry is most severe. The short-term debt 
issuance also exhibits drastic differences between normal and “troubled” BHCs. The findings 
thus have initial implications for the public to understand various incentives that banks may 
have in issuing securities. 
This chapter also serves as an introductive empirical chapter where I use subsidiary bank 
status change (bankruptcy or M&A) as a cut-off to discern the real effect of private 
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information on the financial policies of holding banks. This constitutes the most important 
setting in my thesis. The following empirical chapters will follow this setting and discuss the 
effect in the scenario of subsidiary failure and M&A, respectively. 
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Chapter IV: Capital structure adjustments of bank holding 
companies and subsidiary failure 
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4.1. Introduction 
 
A bank holding company (BHC, hereafter) owns a significant share of its subsidiaries’ 
equity capital and often has counterparty business relations with subsidiaries. Thus, the 
bankruptcy of a subsidiary bank, which we term ‘subsidiary failure’, may render the debt or 
equity of the subsidiary worthless and hence, brings substantial losses to its BHC and 
jeopardizes the BHC’s financial conditions.  
In this chapter, we consider the information advantage BHC managers have prior to the 
declaration of a subsidiary failure, and analyze the impact it may have on BHCs’ capital 
structure. We posit that, based on the better knowledge of a subsidiary’s up-to-date financial 
condition, managers in the parent bank are able to foresee the bankruptcy of a subsidiary in the 
near future with greater precision than outside investors. We examine whether bank holding 
companies exploit such an information advantage and adjust financing activities in their own 
interests surrounding the time when the subsidiaries go bankrupt.  
Due to costly subsidiary failures, BHCs facing limited internal funds have incentives to find 
external financing before their financial conditions deteriorate. It is plausible that, prior to the 
subsidiary bankruptcy, the BHC may want to raise more debt at relatively lower costs. Once 
the subsidiary bankruptcy is realized, BHCs come under great pressures from regulators and 
market participants to control their default risk (Ashcraft, 2008). Thus, they may wish to lower 
the leverage and have more equity capital to secure the capital requirement. 
In an event-study difference-in-differences (DID) framework, we first estimate the leverage 
changes among BHCs with subsidiary failure (“troubled” BHCs) around the time of their 
subsidiary failure relative to the changes during the same period among those BHCs without 
subsidiary failure (“healthy” BHCs). Using a large sample of U.S. banks from 1986 to 2015, 
we find that the subsidiary failure induces a 5.45 percentage point increase in leverage among 
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“troubled” BHCs during the year prior to their subsidiary failure. In contrast, we find a 
significant decrease in the leverage of those “troubled” BHCs in the year following subsidiary 
bankruptcy. We further separate the deposit and several non-deposit debt items from the 
leverage of BHCs, and find that the long-term debt financing of “troubled” BHCs exhibits a 
substantial increase before subsidiary failure and significant decrease afterwards.   
Our evidence suggests that the “troubled” BHCs foresee tightened credit market access and 
increased borrowing costs once the bankruptcy of subsidiary banks is realized. Thus, 
“troubled” BHCs increase debt financing in advance to take advantage of the presently 
cheaper debt financing and enjoy benefits. Our findings are consistent with the argument of 
Billett and Garfinkel (2004) that, with the existence of asymmetric information, bank 
securities could be priced remarkably differently in segmented markets, and that banks take 
most advantage of the pricing discrepancies and target the segment, which has the lowest 
access costs.   
For robustness checks, we further construct a measure of an information gap between 
BHCs and outside investors concerning the prediction of a subsidiary bankruptcy in the next 
year. We present a model in which outsiders predict whether a BHC will have a subsidiary 
failure based on the parent’s actions and all other publicly available information. Our 
framework explicitly accommodates the ability of outsiders to infer the financial conditions of 
subsidiaries by observing the parents’ actions on capital structure changes. The information 
gap is defined as the difference in the predicted probability of a subsidiary failure between the 
BHC insiders and outside investors. We then model the relation between the BHCs’ financing 
adjustments prior to their subsidiary failure and our measure of the information gap, 
controlling for a set of conventional variables. The results further confirm our hypothesis. 
Our paper emphasizes the information asymmetry arisen prior to the subsidiary bank 
failure, and investigates whether bank managers exploit such information asymmetry to adjust 
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their capital structure decisions accordingly. The core premise of our question is that banks 
have information advantage over market investors (i.e., the parent bank knows that one or 
some of its subsidiaries may go bankrupt, but investors do not have this information). To the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first to use subsidiary bank failure as a cut-off to discern the 
real effect of such private information on the financing actions of holding banks.  
We make the following contributions. First, prior research points out bank-specific 
information asymmetry. This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of information 
asymmetry on banks’ financial policies. Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) document that a 
great variety of bank activities may be difficult for outsiders to attain. Dell'Ariccia and 
Marquez (2004) argue that unfavorable private information of a bank, which is available only 
to insiders, may create morale hazard problems and result in a bank’s engagement in 
undesirable activities. Holod and Peek (2007) investigate the access of banks to information-
based external financial markets by comparing the behaviors of banks, including bank holding 
companies, with different transparency levels in response to exogenous shocks, and find that 
information asymmetry does affect their financing decisions. Morgan (2002) argues that the 
banking industry is more opaque than other industries, and finds that ratings from major 
agencies often disagree more over banks’ bond issues than issues by other types of firms. The 
veil between banks and outsiders makes investors unable to accurately quantify the risk of 
banking firms as well as their securities.  
Second, this paper is related to the market timing (or windows of opportunity) theory, 
which states that firms prefer equity financing when the cost of equity is low, and prefer debt 
otherwise. In other words, firms do not generally care whether they finance with debt or 
equity, but choose the form of financing which, at that point in time, appears to be more 
valued by financial markets. Baker and Wurgler (2002) claim that market timing is the first 
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order determinant of a corporate capital structure. Third, this paper is also related to the large 
strand of literature on risk-shifting. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 4.3 presents the methodology. Section 4.4 describes the data. Section 4.5 contains 
empirical tests. Section 4.6 concludes. 
  
4.2. Hypotheses development 
 
In this section, we first review the basics of bank insolvency, describe the process and 
timeline during bank failures, and summarize legal issues that commonly arise in a bank 
failure. We then describe how we reach our hypotheses. Whether changes in capital take the 
form of increases in debt (non-deposit) or equity depends not only on BHC managers’ 
incentives, but also on the cost of borrowing given the information asymmetry.   
 
4.2.1. The effects and regulation background of bank subsidiary failure 
 
A subsidiary failure can affect the financial standing of the holding company for several 
reasons. First, as argued by Wall and Peterson (1987), a BHC as the owner needs to provide 
financial assistance to its troubled subsidiary, which affects the balance sheet of the parent 
company. Second, Ashcraft (2008) notes that subsidiaries of a holding company often work 
together to process the data commonly available within the parent umbrella and provide 
financial products to customers. Thus, the failure of one subsidiary can bring down the whole 
product chain, hence impairing the holding company. Third, the traditional theory suggests 
that the negative effects of highly risky subsidiaries can be insulated by the “firewalls” built 
around other subsidiaries (Wall, 1987). However, Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993) cast doubt 
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on this argument and state that ‘firewalls’ may not provide the desired result. They report that 
banking-subsidiary resources will be employed to aid financially distressed subsidiaries if the 
activities of banking and nonbanking subsidiaries are not fully separated by laws. Fourth, Wall 
(1987) points out that the failure of one subsidiary may cause the public to suspect the 
management quality of the affiliates within the holding company, leading to a bank run in a 
worsened situation.  
Two federal laws enacted in the early 1990s are related to these concerns: one is the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), and the other is the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). The FDICIA passed by the 
US Congress in 1991 states that the BHC regulator has the authority to force a parent company 
to guarantee the performance of a troubled banking affiliate as part of a capital restoration plan, 
while it limits the liability of the parent to 5% of the problem bank’s assets (Ashcraft, 2008). 
As the ultimate failure of a subsidiary bank may harm the internal capital market of the 
holding company, the holding company acts as a “source-of-strength” to this troubled 
subsidiary. The FDICIA clarifies this “source-of-strength” principle, and grants the Federal 
Reserve the authority to take enforcement actions for the BHCs that fail to do so when 
resources are available. The other federal law, the FIRREA passed in 1989, authorizes the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to shift the expected losses of a failed 
subsidiary onto the capital of non-failing affiliates. Ashcraft (2005, 2008), among others, 
document the bailouts of distressed affiliations and the associated allocations of the internal 
capital in relation to these banking reforms.  
 
4.2.2. Subsidiary failure and BHCs’ financing actions 
 
72 
 
In this paper, we study whether and how the BHCs use external financing in the wake of 
the foreseeable subsidiary failure. Our focuses are that managers are able to anticipate the 
future subsidiary failure, and that managers have concerns about the BHCs’ financing 
circumstances. We posit that banks may exploit information asymmetry concerning a 
subsidiary failure and adjust their financing accordingly. 
Consider the situation where one or several of a BHC’s subsidiaries face severe financial 
deterioration and are anticipated to go bankrupt in the year to come. The financial market does 
not have this information and hence, may over-evaluate the BHC’s credit quality. Before a 
subsidiary goes bankrupt, the parent BHC may conceal the disadvantageous information and 
exploit the “window of opportunity” to conduct financing at relatively cheaper costs.  
A subsidiary bankruptcy will veritably reduce the market value of its BHC.10 With the 
existence of information asymmetry the financial market misprices the debt and equity of 
these “troubled” BHCs in advance of a subsidiary failure. Therefore, the BHC’s assets are 
overvalued if the BHC’s subsidiary is going to be bankrupt in the near future, while such 
information remains unrevealed to the market. Meanwhile, the BHC enjoys potential discrete 
benefits (see Kisgen, 2006) in its value from the presently better credit market access. Thus, 
when a BHC faces its subsidiary bankruptcy managers are in a position to decide whether to 
raise debt or equity at current time to exploit overvaluation.  
Managers are tempted to do so because they want to grasp currently greater and cheaper 
credit market access, which will be highly likely to vanish once the bankruptcy news becomes 
widely known. These BHCs may also have low liquidity positions, thus must find external 
financing before their troubled affiliates fail. Tang (2009) makes a similar assertion for this 
situation that “credit market imperfections such as information asymmetry significantly affect 
firms’ financing and investment decisions”. 
                                                          
10 Hung et al. (2017) provide a formal proof. 
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These BHCs, while taking actions, must determine the optimal financing vehicle through 
balancing the costs and benefits for either debt or equity issuances. We argue that BHC 
managers will prefer debt to equity. The current stock market price is overvalued relative to 
managers’ private information about the value of assets. The announcement of raising equity 
at current time is inferred by rational investors, who are aware of management’s decision rules, 
as that the BHC’s stock is overpriced, hence causing the stock price to drop significantly 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984; Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Fama and French, 2005). Furthermore, 
the stock price will fall even further once the news of subsidiary insolvency goes public. As a 
result, there will be limited benefits, but immediate costs for raising equity.   
On the contrary, by funding with debt before the news of subsidiary bankruptcy is publicly 
known, those “troubled” BHCs can obtain relatively cheaper financing and get leverage 
benefits beforehand. Informed managers thus try to exploit the mispricing. Flannery (1986) 
claims that firm insiders choose to issue certain types of securities that the market appears to 
overvalue the most. Myers (2001) describes such kind of “financing tactics” due to 
information asymmetry. Additionally, Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller (2005) 
summarize the implications of Flannery’s (1986) and Diamond’s (1991) theoretical models, 
and suggest that firms with unfavorable private information may prefer long-term debt 
because short-term debt has greater liquidity risk and may be difficult to roll over. 
Consequently, the “troubled” BHC is more likely to choose to enjoy the relatively cheaper cost 
of debt borrowing when balancing the benefits and costs of debt or equity financing choice 
before its subsidiaries fail. Thus, we arrive at the first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: BHCs tend to increase leverage before their subsidiaries going bankrupt. 
The subsidiary failure lowers the credit quality of the BHC, which tightens the BHC’s 
access to the credit market and raises its costs of debt financing (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997). 
Hence, going for debt financing is not a sensible choice once the subsidiary failure is realized. 
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Second, BHCs come under great pressures from regulators and market participants to control 
their default risks (Ashcraft, 2008). Creditors conjecture that subsidiary failure weakens the 
guarantees made by the BHCs and thus demand a higher risk premium for the BHCs’ 
obligations. Thus, the BHCs’ managers need to adjust their equity capital more closely in 
order to contain asset risk exposures in preference to paying large risk premium (Furlong and 
Keeley, 1989). Finally, funding with equity absorbs losses from the decrease in asset values 
and reduces the probability of financial distress. Moreover, raising more equity further secures 
the BHC’s capital requirement. Taking all together, we arrive at the second hypothesis:   
 Hypothesis 2: BHCs tend to lower leverage after their subsidiaries going bankrupt. 
 
4.3. Methodology 
 
We build our sample based on the group of BHCs that had subsidiary failures during 
specific years (treatment group) and the BHCs that did not have subsidiary failures around 
those years (control group). We identify the year in which a BHC declares a subsidiary failure 
as year iT . To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following event-study difference-in-
differences regression: 
3
, 0 , , -1 ,
2, 0
ii t i t T i t i t i t
Y D 
 
     
 
       vβ X               (4.1) 
where ,i tY  is the changes in bank total liability from year t - 1 to year t, scaled by the total 
book assets at year t – 1, ,i tD  is a group of DID estimators that identify the years prior to and 
following the subsidiary failure in year iT  for a treated BHC i, , 1i tX  is a set of control 
variables containing bank characteristics that may affect bank financial policy, and i , t  
specify BHC and year fixed effects that control for unobserved time-invariant differences 
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across BHCs and overall time trends, respectively.11 Standard errors are clustered at the BHC 
level to resolve heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of error terms (Petersen, 2009). Our 
tests focus on the capital structure of “troubled” BHCs in the year immediately prior to and 
following subsidiary failure (i.e., iT  – 1 and iT  + 1), while also include iT  – 2 and up to iT  + 3 
to allow for analyzing the effects over a wider range of years. Our base year is the year of 
subsidiary failure (year iT ) that has been omitted in this specification. The coefficients of 
interest are  , which capture the dynamic pattern of the impact of subsidiary failure on 
various dependent variables.  
The above specification has been used previously by Bertrand and Mullianathan (2003) and 
Chemmanur, He, and Nandy (2009), among others, to study firm performance around different 
events. As the time of subsidiary failure is spread over time, we control for year fixed effects 
to account for variations over time related to market circumstances that may lead to bank 
failure, such as the financial crisis period. The event year dummies ,i tD  capture residual 
changes in the dependent variables around subsidiary failure after controlling for the BHC and 
time fixed effects. More specifically, their coefficients measure the estimated changes in the 
difference between treated and control BHCs’ liability changes during the years prior to or 
after the subsidiary failure relative to the omitted subsidiary failure year (base year). These 
coefficients trace out the time path of differences between treated and control BHCs’ leverage 
changes. By choosing the subsidiary failure year as the omitted category, we make it easier to 
detect differential trends in pre- and after- failure leverage changes. 
It is worth noting that the regression framework of the specification (4.1) corresponds to an 
event-study difference-in-differences estimation strategy which is different from the general 
                                                          
11 In our tables, we use variable names Year 1 Before, Year 2 Before, etc., to represent these DID estimators. For 
example, Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in two years 
and zero otherwise.  
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DID technique. In the traditional quasi-natural experimental design, the validity of the general 
DID requires that in the absence of the treatment, the difference between the treatment and 
control group is constant over time. In other words, there should be no pre-treatment trends so 
that the parallel trend assumption is met. However, the event-study DID approach in this thesis 
is another different estimation model. The model is used to discover the time trends of the 
changes in outcomes before and after the treatment. In other words, the event-study DID is to 
investigate whether there exist pre-treatment trends or post-treatment trends, while the general 
DID technique should only be used after demonstrating that there are no pre-treatment trends. 
When examining BHCs’ capital structure, we mainly look at changes in bank leverage, 
which includes both debt and non-debt liabilities such as deposits. Bank capital structure is 
different from that in non-financial firms as a bank takes deposits, and non-deposit debt has 
become a more important source of bank funds over time (Gropp and Heider, 2010). Thus, we 
further decompose BHC leverage into non-deposit debt and deposits. Specifically, we look at 
changes in long-term debt, short-term debt, subordinate, and deposits, all scaled by the 
previous year’s total bank assets. We then test their relationships with subsidiary failures.  
Our choice of control variables follows Gropp and Heider (2010) and includes BHCs’ size, 
market-to-book ratio, and profitability. We also control for marginal expected shortfall 
(Acharya et al., 2017), diversification, and liquidity to mitigate the omitted variable bias.12  
  
4.4. Data 
 
We focus on the BHCs that are publicly listed financial firms in the United States. We only 
consider BHCs with the highest hierarchy positions, and collect consolidated financial 
information of BHCs from the FR Y-9C reports over the period from 1986 to 2015. The FR Y-
                                                          
12 The Appendix contains definitions of these variables. 
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9C is the consolidated financial statements for bank holding companies report. The report 
collects basic financial data from a domestic bank holding company (BHC), a savings and loan 
holding company (SLHC), a U.S intermediate holding company (IHC) and a securities holding 
company (SHC) on a consolidated basis in the form of a balance sheet, an income statement, 
and detailed supporting schedules, including a schedule of off balance-sheet items. The 
information is used to assess and monitor the financial condition of holding company 
organizations, which may include parent, bank, and nonbank entities. The FR Y-9C is a 
primary analytical tool used to monitor financial institutions between on-site inspections. The 
report is the most widely requested and reviewed at the holding company level and filed 
quarterly as of the last calendar day of March, June, September, and December. The FR Y-9C 
reports are widely used by the public, the regulatory authority, and the academic community. 
They can be accessed through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Some of the top 
papers using the reports are Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar (2011), Gopalan, Nanda, and 
Yerramilli (2011), Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), and Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013)13.  
We obtain data on BHCs’ changes in long-term and short-term debt from COMPUSTAT 
Bank. Compustat is a database of financial, statistical and market information on active and 
inactive global companies throughout the world. The service began in 1962 and is provided by 
Standard & Poor’s, a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies who supplies financial 
information and a variety of databases and software products for institutional investors, 
financial and corporate clients. The database covers 99,000 global securities, covering 99% of 
the world's total market capitalization with annual company data history available on income 
statement, balance Sheet, flow of funds and supplemental data items back to 1950 and 
quarterly data available back to 1962 (depending when that company was added to the 
database). With Compustat, I can customize the data output for virtually any financial 
                                                          
13 See Note 3 for Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013). 
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application. Several Compustat files are available in both annual and quarterly formats. The 
industrial annual formats offer both historical and restated data. The industrial quarterly 
formats offer restated data, which is standardized. The restated data allows analysts to 
compare current and prior years’ results on a comparable basis and determine financial trends 
and growth rates. Compustat is available on WRDS including North America daily, global 
daily, bank daily, historical segments daily, snapshot monthly updates, and Execucomp 
monthly updates. The Compustat bank fundamentals used by this chapter includes financial, 
statistical, and market information on the largest and most important banks in the United 
States, including a wide range of fundamental and technical data. Compustat is widely used by 
many corporate finance and capital market researchers. Some of the most famous are Myers 
and Majluf (1984), Asquith and Mullins (1986), and Fama and French (2005).14  
BHC stock price data come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) is a provider of historical stock market data. 
The Center is a part of the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago. CRSP 
maintains some of the largest and most comprehensive proprietary historical databases in 
stock market research. Academic researchers and investment professionals rely on CRSP for 
accurate, survivor bias-free information which provides a foundation for their research and 
analyses. CRSP is available on WRDS and a powerful tool used by many academic 
researchers and practitioners who would like the market stock and bond data. Some of the 
most famous researchers who ever used this database are Baker and Wurgler (2002), 
Donaldson (2000), Myers (1984), and Leary (2009).15 
We finally obtain subsidiary bank information from the Federal Reserve Report of 
Condition and Income (Call Reports), and then merge this data with our BHCs data. Call 
                                                          
14 For more information on Compustat, see the official website http://www.compustat.com. 
15 For more information on CRSP database, see http://www.crsp.com/. 
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Report data can be accessed through WRDS. Every national bank, state member bank, insured 
state nonmember bank, and savings association ("institution") is required to file Consolidated 
Reports of Condition and Income (a "Call Report") as of the close of business on the last day 
of each calendar quarter, i.e., the report date. The specific reporting requirements depend upon 
the size of the institution, the nature of its activities, and whether it has any foreign offices. 
Institutions submit Call Report data to the bank regulatory agencies each quarter for the 
agencies' use in monitoring the condition, performance, and risk profile of individual 
institutions and the industry as a whole. Call Report data serve a regulatory and public policy 
purpose by assisting the agencies in fulfilling their missions of ensuring the safety and 
soundness of financial institutions and the financial system and the protection of consumer 
financial rights, as well as agency-specific missions affecting national and state-chartered 
institutions, e.g., monetary policy, financial stability, and deposit insurance. Call Reports are 
the source of the most current statistical data available for identifying areas of focus for on-site 
examinations and off-site monitoring. The agencies use Call Report data to evaluate the 
corporate applications of institutions, and to calculate the deposit insurance assessments of 
institutions and the semiannual assessment fees of national banks and federal savings 
associations. Call Report data are also used by the public, state banking authorities, 
researchers, bank rating agencies, and the academic community. Some of the most famous 
researchers who ever used this database include Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013), Loutskina 
(2011), Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2016).16 
We focus on the BHCs who have subsidiary failure occurring only once during our sample 
period to avoid compound effects by more than one subsidiary bankruptcy in consecutive time 
periods. Our final treatment group sample thus restricts to 136 BHCs that have failed 
subsidiaries. 
                                                          
16 For more information on “Call Reports”, see https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/call/index.html. 
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Our analyses further require a control group to compare with the BHCs with subsidiary 
failure. We use two different procedures to obtain such control samples. The first procedure 
obtains a control group based on all BHCs that had no subsidiary failures. We use this sample 
to get the summary statistics and the baseline results. The second approach is based on a 
propensity score matching (PSM) procedure to match each treated BHC with a control one 
that is similar across all observable variables. We mainly use this matched sample throughout 
our regression analyses. The matched sample analysis allows us to more effectively control for 
differences in relevant dimensions between BHCs with bankrupt subsidiaries and BHCs 
without.17 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the whole sample. To reduce the influence of 
outliers, these variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentile. The average BHC in the 
sample has a market-to-book ratio of 0.93, a profitability ratio of 0.007, a diversification ratio 
of 0.154, and a liquidity ratio of 0.223. The average BHC also has a 10.2% increase of its 
lagged total assets in leverage, a 1% increase of its lagged total assets in long-term debt, a 0.6% 
increase of its lagged assets in short-term debt, and an 8.4% increase of its lagged assets in 
deposits. In terms of other real outcomes, the average BHC experiences relatively no change 
in subordinated debt, and contributes approximately to 1.4% of the loss during the worst days 
of the whole banking sector. 
                                                          
17 Appendix B presents detailed matching procedures. 
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Table 4. 1: Summary Statistics I 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis for the full sample. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of 
the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term 
debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt 
is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s 
total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s subordinate debt minus the previous year’s 
subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔDeposits is the change in deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total deposits minus the 
previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the 
ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value 
of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of 
cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss 
during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All variables are yearly results.  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BHCs’ changes in Capital 
Structure 
     
ΔLeverage 9907 0.102 0.177 -0.656 3.989 
ΔLong-term debt 7872 0.010 0.043 -0.284 0.693 
ΔShort-term debt 7872 0.006 0.044 -0.844 0.719 
ΔSubordinate 9907 0.001 0.007 -0.048 0.231 
ΔDeposits 7785 0.084 0.148 -0.610 3.280 
      
Determinants of Capital 
Structure 
     
Size 10889 14.369 1.554 11.193 21.668 
Market-to-book ratio 10889 1.045 0.073 0.890 3.425 
Profitability 10889 0.007 0.011 -0.204 0.068 
Diversification 10889 0.154 0.147 -1.528 10.967 
Liquidity 8427 0.223 0.114 0.000 0.941 
MES 8041 1.388 5.070 -6.304 45.263 
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Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis for “troubled” 
BHCs and “healthy” BHCs separately in the year prior to subsidiary failure (i.e., iT  – 1). From 
Table 4.2, we find that the BHCs with subsidiary failure in the next year, on average, have 
higher leverage ratio when compared with BHCs without subsidiary failure in the following 
year. BHCs with subsidiary failure in the next year tend to increase more long-term debt (5.9% 
versus 1.0% of lagged total assets), have more subordinate (0.4% versus 0.1% of lagged total 
assets), but rely less on short-term debt financing (0.1% versus 0.7% of lagged total assets) 
than those BHCs without subsidiary failure in the following year. In terms of control variables, 
“troubled” BHCs are less profitable than “healthy” ones in Year iT  – 1. The former also have 
lower market-to-book ratio and liquidity, and contribute more to the aggregate banking 
sector’s loss prior to subsidiary failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
Table 4. 2: Summary Statistics II 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis separately for “troubled” BHCs and “healthy” BHCs in the year prior to subsidiary failure (i.e., iT  – 1). 
ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is 
the change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the 
change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in 
subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s subordinate debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔDeposits is the change in deposits 
calculated as ratio of the current year’s total deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total 
assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value 
of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale 
securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking 
sector in that given year. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 BHCs with Bankrupt Subsidiaries BHCs without Bankrupt Subsidiaries   
 N Mean Median N Mean Median Difference t-statistics 
BHCs’ changes in Capital 
Structure 
        
ΔLeverage 136 0.161 0.104 9771 0.101 0.065 0.060*** 3.63 
ΔLong-term debt 136 0.059 0.040 7736 0.010 0.000 0.049*** 9.59 
ΔShort-term debt 136 0.001 -0.002 7736 0.007 0.000 -0.005* -1.76 
ΔSubordinate 136 0.004 0.000 9771 0.001 0.000 0.003*** 3.44 
ΔDeposits 124 0.101 0.063 7661 0.083 0.052 0.018 1.10 
         
Determinants of Capital 
Structure 
        
Size 136 15.172 14.659 9771 14.454 14.159 0.718*** 5.26 
Market-to-book ratio 136 0.950 0.936 9771 1.046 1.034 -0.096* -1.71 
Profitability 136 0.005 0.005 9771 0.007 0.009 -0.002*** -2.76 
Diversification 136 0.150 0.149 9771 0.158 0.136 -0.008*** -2.89 
Liquidity 125 0.117 0.109 7743 0.224 0.210 -0.107*** -8.27 
MES 125 1.530 1.591 7377 1.406 1.587 0.124** 1.96 
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We present summary statistics for the year following subsidiary failure (i.e., iT  + 1) in 
Table 4.3. As shown in the table, following subsidiary failure the “troubled” BHCs on average 
lower their leverage ratio relative to those “healthy” ones.  
When decomposing BHCs’ leverage, we find that, in contrast to the financing activities in 
Year iT  - 1, BHCs with failure subsidiaries in the previous year are more likely to reduce 
long-term debt financing. The comparison between the two types of BHCs for other control 
variables in Year iT  + 1 is similar to that in Year iT  – 1.  
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Table 4. 3: Summary Statistics III 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis separately for “troubled” BHCs and “healthy” BHCs in the year following subsidiary failure (i.e., iT  + 1). ΔLeverage is the 
change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt 
calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of 
the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s 
subordinate debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔDeposits is the change in deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total deposits minus the 
previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the 
book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income 
and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected 
equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 BHCs with Bankrupt Subsidiaries BHCs without Bankrupt Subsidiaries   
 N Mean Median N Mean Median Difference t-statistics 
BHCs’ changes in Capital 
Structure 
        
ΔLeverage 136 0.041 0.032 9771 0.103 0.066 -0.061*** -5.52 
ΔLong-term debt 136 -0.024 -0.017 7736 0.011 0.000 -0.035*** -13.55 
ΔShort-term debt 136 0.008 0.000 7736 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.33 
ΔSubordinate 136 0.002 0.000 9771 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.33 
ΔDeposits 128 0.066 0.042 7657 0.084 0.052 -0.018** -2.02 
         
Determinants of Capital 
Structure 
        
Size 136 15.297 14.777 9771 14.453 14.157 0.844*** 5.12 
Market-to-book ratio 136 0.978 0.967 9771 1.046 1.034 -0.068** -2.35 
Profitability 136 0.004 0.009 9771 0.007 0.009 -0.003** -2.02 
Diversification 136 0.191 0.169 9771 0.158 0.136 0.033*** 3.89 
Liquidity 129 0.159 0.162 7739 0.224 0.210 -0.065*** -4.49 
MES 123 1.471 1.589 7379 1.406 1.587 0.065 1.62 
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Table 4.4 provides the pair-wise correlations between BHCs’ capital structure and various 
financial characteristics. We use the superscript “*” to denote statistical significance at the 5% 
level. The results show that most of the correlations are modest and the multi-collinearity 
problem should be limited.  
To provide a more intuitionistic pattern of BHC leverage around the subsidiary failure year, 
we conduct the univariate analysis for the dynamic changes of various BHC liability items 
from three years prior to subsidiary failure to three years after that occurring. We report the 
results in Figures 4.1-4.5. Note that these figures only show various liability items of BHCs 
that had subsidiary failure. In Figure 4.1, we can apparently see that these “troubled” BHCs 
had dramatically increased their leverage before the bankruptcy of their subsidiaries, while 
lowered it after the bankruptcy of their subsidiaries.  
Overall, the results support our hypotheses. However, these comparisons are based on 
simple univariate analyses. In the next section, we employ more rigorous regression analyses 
to test our hypotheses.  
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Table 4. 4: Correlation Matrix  
This table presents pair-wise correlations among all the key variables used in our analysis. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total 
liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s 
total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the 
change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s subordinate debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔDeposits is the change in deposits calculated as ratio 
of the current year’s total deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the 
market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum 
of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's 
expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. We use * to denote statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 ΔLeverage ΔLong-term 
debt 
ΔShort-term 
debt 
ΔSubordinate ΔDeposits Size Market-to-
book ratio 
Profitability Diversification Liquidity MES 
ΔLeverage 1.000           
ΔLong-term debt 0.416* 1.000          
ΔShort-term debt 0.308* -0.084* 1.000         
ΔSubordinate 0.220* 0.152* 0.051* 1.000        
ΔDeposits 0.945* 0.235* 0.114* 0.201* 1.000       
Size 0.020* 0.006 0.036* 0.087* -0.010 1.000      
Market-to-book 
ratio 
0.132* 0.166* 0.066* 0.082* 0.111* 0.127* 1.000     
Profitability 0.155* 0.090* 0.082* 0.047* 0.136* 0.052* 0.350* 1.000    
Diversification -0.024* -0.033* 0.009 0.013 -0.031* 0.320* 0.128* 0.040* 1.000   
Liquidity -0.008 0.029* 0.072* -0.089* -0.048* -0.051* 0.073* 0.144* -0.022* 1.000  
MES -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 0.007 -0.003 0.065* 0.003 -0.002 0.025* -0.052* 1.000 
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Figure 4. 1: Dynamic pattern of ΔLeverage around subsidiary failure 
 
 
Figure 4. 2: Dynamic pattern of ΔLong-term debt around subsidiary failure 
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Figure 4. 3: Dynamic pattern of ΔShort-term debt around subsidiary failure 
 
 
Figure 4. 4: Dynamic pattern of ΔSubordinate around subsidiary failure 
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Figure 4. 5: Dynamic pattern of ΔDeposit around subsidiary failure 
 
 
4.5. Empirical results 
 
4.5.1. BHCs’ leverage changes around subsidiary failure 
 
Table 4.5 presents the results from estimating Equation (4.1) by using Leverage  as the 
outcome variable. We report the coefficient estimates of   for each of the two years before 
and three years after subsidiary failure. Column (1) reports the results from estimating the 
model without including control variables using the full sample. Column (2) adds additional 
controls that may affect BHCs’ leverage changes. Columns (3) and (4) give the results using 
the matched sample. Across all columns in Table 4.5, the coefficients on Year 1 Before are all 
positive and statistically significant. When controlling for BHC characteristics, the estimates 
based on the full sample imply an absolute increase of 5.45 percentage points in the leverage 
of BHCs with subsidiary failure, relative to the control group, during the year prior to their 
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subsidiary failure. The coefficients on Year 1 Before are also economically significant and 
large. For instance, the point estimate for Year 1 Before on Leverage in column (2) implies 
257.08% estimated changes in the difference between treated and control BHCs’ leverage 
changes during the year prior to the subsidiary failure relative to the sample average 
Leverage of 2.12%. Contrarily, the consistently negative and significant coefficients on Year 
1 After in Table 4.5 suggest a significant decrease in the leverage of those “troubled” BHCs in 
the one year following subsidiary bankruptcy.  
In terms of control variables, we find that BHC leverage is positively associated with 
market-to-book ratio and profitability, and negatively related with size. These findings are 
generally in line with prior studies on bank capital structure (e.g., Gropp and Heider, 2010), 
suggesting that our sample is representative.  
Overall, these findings support our hypotheses that BHCs are more likely to be more-
levered in the year prior to subsidiary failure, and less levered in the year after. Additionally, 
because the significance of the subsidiary failure effect does not vary widely across all 
columns, we restrict our attention to the matched sample with a full set of controls in the 
analyses in later sections.  
 
4.5.2. The reverse causality issue 
 
The main concern in this paper is the reverse causality issue. One may argue that it’s the 
substantial increase in leverage of parent BHCs that leads to the subsequent subsidiary failure, 
and that the main argument that the parents intentionally increase leverage when foreseeing 
the defunct among their children, is not true. To address this concern, we employ the 
following test.  
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We construct a new binary response variable 
,i tFailure  which indicates if a particular 
individual bank i goes bankrupt at time t. It is important to note that these individual banks are
93 
 
Table 4. 5: Subsidiary Failure and BHC Leverage Changes 
This table reports estimates of Equation (1) for US BHCs from 1986 to 2015. Columns (1) and (2) estimate the model using the full 
sample. Columns (3) and (4) estimate the model using the matched sample. Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
BHC will have subsidiary failure in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will 
have subsidiary failure in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure 
one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure two years ago and 
zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure three years ago and zero otherwise. 
ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to 
the previous year’s total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the 
market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book 
value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity 
is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected 
Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given 
year. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 Full sample Matched sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLeverage ΔLeverage ΔLeverage 
Year 2 Before -0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.004 
 (-0.41) (0.29) (-0.24) (0.27) 
Year 1 Before 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 
 (3.56) (3.63) (3.44) (3.41) 
Year 1 After -0.052*** -0.040** -0.056*** -0.027** 
 (-4.50) (-2.52) (-4.58) (-2.15) 
Year 2 After -0.008 0.016 -0.010 0.012 
 (-0.60) (1.24) (-0.66) (0.81) 
Year 3 After -0.007 0.006 0.001 0.004 
 (-0.53) (0.46) (0.04) (0.32) 
Size  -0.220***  -0.211*** 
  (-12.24)  (-13.14) 
Market to book ratio  0.255***  0.355*** 
  (4.61)  (4.61) 
Profitability  2.693***  2.100*** 
  (5.50)  (6.22) 
Diversification  -0.048  -0.004 
  (-0.99)  (-0.08) 
Liquidity  -0.078*  -0.067 
  (-1.77)  (-1.33) 
MES  0.002  -0.002 
  (0.29)  (-0.28) 
Constant 0.123*** 2.850*** 0.134*** 2.629*** 
 (12.43) (11.15) (7.56) (11.30) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9907 6779 338 338 
Adj. R2 0.082 0.243 0.095 0.246 
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at the subsidiary level. We regress the variable 
,i tFailure  on the leverage changes of the 
subsidiary itself and its BHC. Apart from this, we also include a group of bank characteristics’ 
variables at the both parent and subsidiary level containing: size, market-to-book ratio, 
profitability, marginal expected shortfall, diversification and liquidity, all of which are 
considered related to bank risk. Using BHCs’ leverage changes as a key explanatory variable, 
this test examines whether BHCs’ capital structure decisions would affect the survivorship of 
their subsidiaries in the following year. If the reverse causality concern holds, the increase in 
leverage of parent BHCs should have a significant impact on their subsidiary failure.  
Table 4.6 presents the results of the test. It shows that the subsidiary bank failure is not 
significantly correlated to prior changes of the parent BHC’s capital structure. The evidence 
suggests that the increase in the leverage of the parent BHC does not increase the chance of its 
subsidiaries being bankrupt, which is counterfactual to the prediction arisen from the reverse 
causality concern.  
 
4.5.3. Decomposing BHC leverage 
 
In the above analysis, we calculate BHC leverage by using bank total liabilities divided by 
total assets and examine its changes around subsidiary failure. In this section we decompose 
BHC liabilities into deposit and several non-deposit debt items, consisting of long-term, short-
term, and subordinated debt, and run regressions against each liability item using equation (4.1) 
to show which item primarily leads to relative leverage changes of “troubled” BHCs
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Table 4. 6: Logit test of the effect of BHCs’ leverage changes on subsidiary failure 
This table examines the impact of BHCs’ leverage changes on each of their subsidiaries based on the individual subsidiary sample. The 
dependent variable Failure is a dummy variable indicating if the individual subsidiary bank goes bankrupt in the current calendar year. 
ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the 
previous year’s total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value 
of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; 
Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash 
and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity 
loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All variables are yearly results and classified as 
two groups including BHC and subsidiary level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 
10%.  
 Failure 
ΔLeverageBHC,t-1 2.136 
 (0.44) 
SizeBHC,t-1 0.586* 
 (1.83) 
Market-to-book ratioBHC,t-1 -0.849 
 (-0.88) 
ProfitabilityBHC,t-1 -2.701** 
 (-2.54) 
DiversificationBHC,t-1 0.262 
 (0.80) 
LiquidityBHC,t-1 -2.106 
 (-0.35) 
MESBHC,t-1 0.070** 
 (2.19) 
ΔLeverageSub,t-1 0.091 
 (0.85) 
SizeSub,t-1 -0.231
** 
 (-2.14) 
Market-to-book ratioSub,t-1 -2.656
*** 
 (-4.67) 
ProfitabilitySub,t-1 -2.765
*** 
 (-3.44) 
DiversificationSub,t-1 -0.017
* 
 (-1.55) 
LiquiditySub,t-1 -3.858*** 
 (-5.78) 
Constant -2.762*** 
 (-5.33) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
N 59201 
Pseudo R2 0.657 
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surrounding their subsidiary failure.18 Table 4.7 reports the results. In column (1), we observe 
a substantial pre-failure increase and post-failure decrease in “troubled” BHCs’ relative long-
term debt. Specifically, the positively significant coefficient on Year 1 Before in column (1) 
suggests that long-term debt of BHCs with subsidiary failure increases by 4.97 percentage 
points during the year prior to their subsidiary failure, on average. The negative and significant 
coefficient on Year 1 After indicates that BHCs with subsidiaries going bankrupt in the 
previous year significantly lower the long-term debt relative to those without subsidiary failure. 
In columns (2) and (3), we find that “troubled” BHCs also reduce their short-term debt 
financing and issue more subordinated debt one year before their subsidiary failure. The 
increase in subordinated debt reflects its relatively lower issuing costs (Sironi, 2003). The 
coefficients in column (4) indicate that there is no substantial relative deposit change for those 
“troubled” BHCs around their subsidiary failure. These findings are mutually supportive and 
show that “troubled” BHCs prefer to adjust their long-term debt financing around their 
subsidiary failure. Our results are consistent with the findings from prior research that long-
term debt acts as a cheaper financing resort and serves as a preferred choice for external 
financing (Flannery, 1986; Berger et al., 2005). The evidence suggests that BHCs would like 
to avoid costly equity financing and exploit the temporarily better creditworthiness to obtain 
funds through long-term debt at a relatively lower cost, knowing that they will have to 
undertake the forthcoming loss incurred by the subsidiary failure. This process therefore yields 
a higher leverage for these “troubled” BHCs prior to their subsidiary failure. 
 
 
                                                          
18  Bank non-deposit liabilities can be viewed as debt for firms. They consist of senior long term debt, 
subordinated debt and other debenture notes.  
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Table 4. 7: Decomposing BHC Leverage 
This table reports estimates of Equation (1) after decomposing BHC leverage into long-term debt, short-term debt, 
subordinated debt, and deposits based on the matched sample. Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC 
will have subsidiary failure in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC 
will have subsidiary failure in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had 
subsidiary failure one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary 
failure two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure 
three years ago and zero otherwise. ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s 
long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change 
in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the 
previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s 
subordinate debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔDeposits is the change in 
deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s 
total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market 
value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the 
book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest 
income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is 
the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of 
the banking sector in that given year. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at 
the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔSubordinate ΔDeposits 
Year 2 Before 0.009*** 0.002 -0.000 -0.008 
 (2.87) (0.56) (-0.44) (-0.64) 
Year 1 Before 0.050*** -0.010** 0.002*** 0.010 
 (9.01) (-2.44) (2.60) (0.91) 
Year 1 After -0.030*** 0.007 -0.001 -0.004 
 (-8.33) (1.59) (-1.42) (-0.40) 
Year 2 After 0.001 0.004 -0.000 0.006 
 (0.26) (0.57) (-0.01) (0.60) 
Year 3 After -0.004 -0.005 0.000 0.011 
 (-1.00) (-1.31) (0.08) (1.00) 
Size -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.001 -0.174*** 
 (-5.03) (-5.75) (-1.15) (-12.66) 
Market to book ratio 0.060** 0.066*** 0.008*** 0.241*** 
 (2.22) (2.97) (2.69) (3.77) 
Profitability 0.113 0.022 0.012 1.917*** 
 (1.14) (0.30) (1.24) (6.99) 
Diversification 0.008 -0.009 -0.002 0.009 
 (0.41) (-0.85) (-1.30) (0.23) 
Liquidity -0.012 -0.007 -0.002 -0.047 
 (-0.86) (-0.59) (-0.91) (-1.10) 
MES -0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.005 
 (-0.12) (1.37) (1.21) (-0.80) 
Constant 0.169*** 0.154*** 0.006 2.221*** 
 (2.99) (3.75) (0.48) (11.41) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 338 338 338 338 
Adj. R2 0.120 0.059 0.285 0.218 
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4.5.4. Placebo control approach 
 
The baseline results, however, could also overstate the effect of subsidiary failure on capital 
structure decisions of parent BHCs if unobservable BHC characteristics are correlated with the 
failure of subsidiary banks and with the changes of BHC capital. There is evidence that 
subsidiary performance is related to the background financial characteristics of parent BHCs 
(Ashcraft, 2008). Financially fragile BHCs may be more prone to suffer subsidiary failure. 
The financial management and risk preferences of senior managers of parent BHCs could also 
simultaneously elevate the probability of capital adjustments and a subsidiary failure. All these 
imply that BHCs having subsidiary failure is endogenous to their underlying characteristics.  
To address this bias in tests that seek to discover changes in BHCs’ capital structure around 
subsidiary failure time, we exploit the variation in the failure time of subsidiary banks among 
BHCs with subsidiary failure. We treat BHCs with later subsidiary failure as a control group 
for BHCs with earlier subsidiary failure. Specifically, we match the BHCs who have 
subsidiary failure in year  (treatment group) with the BHCs that suffer subsidiary failure in 
the future year  (placebo control group). Both groups of BHCs have subsidiary failure 
and hence would potentially share certain common characteristics. However, because the 
BHCs in the control group did not have subsidiary failure in year , their capital structure 
changes from  to  serve as a comparison with the treatment group. This approach 
allows us to control for potential common characteristics when we test the capital structure 
changes of BHCs around the year of subsidiary failure. 
To this end, for each BHC in the control group, we create a placebo subsidiary failure date 
equal to the actual failure date of their subsidiary banks minus n years. We then compare the 
capital structure changes of the treatment and the control groups from  to . We 
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want to ensure that, during this period (i.e., from 2iT   to 3iT  ), while BHCs in the 
treatment group experience subsidiary bankruptcy, BHCs in the control group do not. This 
requires certain restrictions on our original sample data: the treatment group is comprised of 
all BHCs that had subsidiary failure during 1988 – 1999, and the control group consists of 
BHCs whose subsidiary failure occurred during 2005 – 2016. The five-year gap in between is 
to minimize the correlation between post-placebo subsidiary failure window and actual 
subsidiary failure event for each control BHC. Finally, there are 112 BHCs included into the 
treatment and control group, and we include all their yearly data from 1986 – 2016, which 
finally form the subsample for the use of this approach. In this subsample, both the treatment 
and control groups experience subsidiary failure, however, only the treatment group 
experiences a subsidiary failure in the estimation window. 
Applying this placebo control strategy, we estimate the following specification:  
3 3
, 0 , ,
2, 0 2, 0
, 1 ,
i ii t i t T i i t T
i i t i t i t
Y D Treat D
Treat
   
   
  
   
   
   

     
     
 
v
β X
               (4.2) 
where iTreat  is a dummy variable that equals one if BHC i belongs to the treatment group 
defined in this section. The coefficients of interest are , which are difference-in-differences 
estimators, measuring the difference between treatment and placebo control BHCs with 
respect to the changes in capital structure from two years prior to subsidiary failure to three 
years after the failure.  
Based on this identification strategy, if a BHC’s capital structure changes prior to or 
following its subsidiary failure, that change will be captured by the coefficients   estimated 
before or after the failure. These coefficients indicate whether the capital structure of the 
BHCs in the treatment group (who experience a subsidiary failure at time iT ) deviates from 
m
t
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that of their counterparts in the placebo control group (who experience a subsidiary failure at a 
future time ) during the years prior to or following iT .  
Table 4.8 reports estimates from specification (4.2). The dummy variable Treat is dropped 
from the regression because of the inclusion of BHC fixed effects. We observe similar pre-
failure and post-failure trends of capital structure changes compared with those reported in 
Table 4.5 and Table 4.7. For instance, the positive (negative) and significant coefficient on 
Year 1 Before  Treat (Year 1 After  Treat) in column (1) indicates that, relative to the 
placebo control group, the leverage of the BHCs in the treatment group increases (decreases) 
during the year prior to (following) the subsidiary failure. All the other columns are largely 
consistent with the event-study specification (4.1). The results confirm that “troubled” BHCs 
increase leverage ratio as early as one year prior to the failure of their subsidiaries, and that 
leverage increase is significantly reversed following the subsidiary failure. 
 
4.5.5. Subsidiary failure effect by BHC size and capital ratio 
  
The results in Table 4.7 show a marked pre-failure increase in “troubled” BHCs’ relative 
long-term debt as well as their subordinate debt issuance. This could reflect strategic behavior, 
or it could reflect an increased financing demand by BHCs who were already in financial 
distress. We address this concern by identifying subsets of BHCs with different sizes. Large 
banks may have greater flexibility to withstand a short-term liquidity shortage (Vazquez and 
Federico, 2015). If BHCs’ financial distress is the key driver of the leverage changes around 
subsidiary failure, we would expect that this change is more significant for small banks 
compared to large banks. In addition, the impact of subsidiary failure on bank capital structure 
could also be shaped by the regulatory frameworks. Banks may hold discretionary capital, 
above the regulatory minimum in order to avoid the costs of having to issue fresh equity at 
T
i
+ n
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short notice (Peura and Keppo, 2006). Thus, we examine the differential effects of subsidiary 
bankruptcy on financing decisions across the BHCs that might be subject to different 
regulatory requirements for capital adequacy. To evaluate these conjectures, we implement 
several tests as follows.  
First, we separate BHCs into two groups based on the BHC’s tier 1 capital ratio. Since the 
minimum tier 1 capital ratio specified in the Basel III is 6%, we classify the BHCs with tier 1 
ratio greater than 6% as well capitalized and those with tier 1 less than 6% as lowly capitalized. 
Table 4.9 reports the sub-sample results. We find that in the year prior to subsidiary failure, 
well capitalized BHCs significantly increase long-term debt and leverage, and reduce short-
term debt while lowly capitalized BHCs only significantly raise their long-term debt financing. 
One year after subsidiary bankruptcy, both well and lowly capitalized BHCs significantly 
lower their long-term debt financing and leverage ratio.  
Second, we define a dummy variable Small as one if the total assets of a BHC in that year 
are below $10 billion, and zero otherwise. The $10 billion size cutoff is important since the 
BHCs which are above this asset threshold are subject to stress testing and large-bank deposit 
pricing rules (Bennett, Güntay, and Unal, 2015). Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) among others, 
use the same cut-off value to separate large BHCs from small ones. We then interact it with 
the DID estimators in equation (4.1) to examine the size effect. Table 4.10 presents the results 
from our main specification. The positive and significant coefficient on Year 1 Before × Small 
in column (1) shows that small BHCs have relatively more leverage increase than large BHCs 
do in the year prior to subsidiary failure. We also find that small BHCs have more long-term 
and subordinated debt increases, and more short-term debt decrease as indicated by the 
significant coefficients on the interaction term Year 1 Before × Small in columns (2) through 
(4).
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Table 4. 8: Subsidiary Failure and BHC Capital Structure Changes Using Placebo Control Approach 
This table reports estimates of Equation (4.2). Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary 
failure in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in 
one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure one year ago and zero 
otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 
3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure three years ago and zero otherwise. Appendix A 
provides all other variable definitions. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the 
BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔSubordinate ΔDeposits 
Year 2 Before 0.067 0.006 0.071 -0.001 0.029** 
 (1.15) (0.67) (1.39) (-0.45) (2.09) 
Year 1 Before 0.106* 0.014* 0.025 0.001 0.005 
 (1.90) (1.81) (1.15) (0.42) (0.43) 
Year 1 After -0.039* 0.008 -0.069*** -0.008 0.051*** 
 (-1.91) (0.94) (-2.78) (-1.17) (6.23) 
Year 2 After -0.018 0.145 -0.209 0.001 0.024 
 (-0.94) (1.51) (-1.52) (0.89) (0.41) 
Year 3 After -0.107 -0.072 -0.066** -0.000 0.036*** 
 (-1.23) (-1.26) (-1.98) (-0.16) (3.90) 
Year 2 Before × Treat -0.012 0.009 -0.071 0.001 -0.031 
 (-1.53) (0.73) (-1.37) (0.26) (-1.20) 
Year 1 Before × Treat 0.037*** 0.035** -0.031 0.002 0.052 
 (3.62) (2.56) (-1.34) (0.87) (1.02) 
Year 1 After × Treat -0.020** -0.030*** 0.081*** 0.007 -0.078*** 
 (-2.23) (-2.90) (3.18) (1.02) (-3.65) 
Year 2 After × Treat 0.025 -0.147 0.203 -0.002 -0.028 
 (0.89) (-1.53) (1.47) (-1.07) (-0.44) 
Year 3 After × Treat 0.120 0.072 0.064* 0.001 -0.022 
 (1.32) (1.25) (1.90) (0.29) (-0.89) 
Constant 2.636*** 0.176*** 0.154*** 0.006 2.221*** 
 (11.30) (3.09) (3.74) (0.50) (11.42) 
BHC Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2738 2738 2738 2738 2738 
Adj. R2 0.243 0.097 0.068 0.284 0.217 
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Table 4. 9: Subsidiary Failure Effect Stratified by BHC Capital Ratio 
This table reports estimates of Equation (4.1) for US BHCs from 1986 to 2015, but stratifies the matched sample by BHC capital ratio. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage 
calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-
term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change 
in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; Year 2 Before is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have 
subsidiary failure in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 
After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had 
subsidiary failure three years ago and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of 
total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of 
noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total 
asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given 
year. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = 
significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔShort-term debt 
 Well capitalized 
(Tier 1 ≥ 6%)  
Low capitalized (Tier 
1 < 6%) 
Well capitalized 
(Tier 1 ≥ 6%)  
Low capitalized (Tier 
1 < 6%) 
Well capitalized 
(Tier 1 ≥ 6%)  
Low capitalized (Tier 
1 < 6%) 
Year 2 Before -0.002 0.025 0.008*** 0.011 0.003 -0.010 
 (-0.16) (0.93) (2.87) (0.41) (0.92) (-0.49) 
Year 1 Before 0.070*** 0.011 0.048*** 0.090** -0.008** -0.025 
 (3.37) (0.51) (9.28) (2.35) (-1.97) (-1.44) 
Year 1 After -0.024* -0.094** -0.029*** -0.063** 0.006 0.029 
 (-1.75) (-2.07) (-8.10) (-2.10) (1.21) (0.97) 
Year 2 After 0.012 0.057 -0.001 0.021 0.009 -0.039 
 (0.77) (1.36) (-0.27) (0.42) (1.52) (-0.75) 
Year 3 After 0.009 -0.005 -0.002 -0.067* -0.003 0.013 
 (0.66) (-0.13) (-0.60) (-1.79) (-0.83) (0.70) 
Size -0.216*** -0.223*** -0.014*** -0.054** -0.016*** -0.030 
 (-12.89) (-3.22) (-4.34) (-2.20) (-6.14) (-1.39) 
Market to book ratio 0.328*** 1.179*** 0.073** 0.096 0.046** 0.455*** 
 (4.15) (4.38) (2.57) (1.03) (2.02) (3.11) 
Profitability 2.115*** 0.510 0.246** -0.441 -0.001 0.203 
 (5.22) (0.86) (2.24) (-1.32) (-0.01) (0.72) 
Diversification -0.053 0.354*** -0.012 0.065 -0.002 0.061 
 (-0.82) (3.78) (-0.52) (1.50) (-0.16) (1.22) 
Liquidity -0.086 0.001 -0.025* 0.014 0.004 -0.075 
 (-1.62) (0.01) (-1.81) (0.20) (0.36) (-1.03) 
MES -0.004 0.006 -0.000 -0.005 0.001 0.022 
 (-0.47) (0.19) (-0.02) (-0.31) (0.46) (1.34) 
Constant 2.733*** 1.996** 0.125** 0.629* 0.167*** -0.010 
 (11.42) (2.09) (2.23) (1.73) (4.12) (-0.03) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 514 224 514 224 514 224 
Adj. R2 0.231 0.358 0.121 0.231 0.061 0.136 
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We, however, find that the leverage of small BHCs decreases significantly more than that of 
large BHCs in the year immediately following subsidiary bankruptcy. Moreover, the negative 
and significant coefficient on Year 1 After × Small in column (2) shows that the long-term debt 
of small BHCs also significantly decreases more during this period. This suggests an even 
higher debt financing cost for small BHCs as their financial conditions deteriorate more 
severely due to the assets constraint.19  
Third, we define a dummy variable Well Capitalization as one if the BHC’s tier 1 capital 
ratio is greater than 6%, and zero otherwise.20 We then interact it with the DID estimators in 
equation (4.1) to examine the regulatory effect. Table 4.11 reports the results. We find that in 
the year prior to subsidiary failure, well capitalized BHCs have significantly more increase in 
leverage. Specifically, they increase more in long-term and subordinated debt, and reduce 
more in short-term debt financing compared to lowly capitalized BHCs. One year after 
subsidiary bankruptcy, well capitalized BHCs have significantly more decrease in their long-
term debt financing and leverage ratio.  
Overall, these results support our hypotheses that subsidiary failure induces substantial 
leverage changes of their parent BHCs surrounding the failure time. We find significant 
evidence of differential effects of subsidiary bankruptcy on financial policy for different
                                                          
19 I obtain qualitatively similar results when using $50 billion and $100 billion as two alternative cut-off points. 
Table A.2 and A.3 in the appendix report their respective results. 
20 The minimum tier 1 capital ratio specified in the Basel III is 6%. 
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Table 4. 10: Subsidiary Failure Effect by BHC Size 
This table estimates the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) effect of subsidiary failure by BHC size for US BHCs from 1986 
to 2015. Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 
Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
BHC had subsidiary failure three years ago and zero otherwise. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current 
year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-
term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total 
assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous 
year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current 
year’s subordinate debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; and ΔDeposits is the change in 
deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s total assets. 
All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** 
= significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔSubordinate ΔDeposits 
Year 2 Before   -0.000 0.008** -0.001 0.000 -0.00901 
 (-0.00) (2.03) (-0.17) (0.14) (-0.61) 
Year 1 Before 0.059** 0.050*** -0.017*** 0.001 0.0244 
 (2.21) (7.48) (-3.56) (1.41) (1.09) 
Year 1 After -0.039*** -0.030*** 0.007 -0.000 -0.0164 
 (-2.75) (-7.13) (1.20) (-0.32) (-1.38) 
Year 2 After  0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.000 -0.00469 
 (0.09) (0.20) (0.94) (-0.02) (-0.38) 
Year 3 After -0.018 -0.003 -0.008 0.000 -0.00903 
 (-1.43) (-0.53) (-1.62) (0.42) (-0.76) 
Year 2 Before × Small   0.001 0.011** 0.007 -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.08) (2.49) (1.18) (-1.35) (-0.69) 
Year 1 Before × Small 0.062** 0.049*** -0.009* 0.003** 0.027 
 (2.14) (4.97) (-1.71) (2.21) (1.05) 
Year 1 After × Small -0.054* -0.027*** 0.005 0.001 0.035 
 (-1.82) (-3.30) (0.85) (1.02) (1.56) 
Year 2 After × Small -0.048 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.033 
 (-1.52) (0.18) (-0.16) (0.08) (1.25) 
Year 3 After × Small -0.050* -0.011 0.000 0.000 0.065*** 
 (-1.74) (-1.20) (0.01) (0.42) (2.98) 
Small 0.008 0.016*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.38) (3.75) (0.06) (-0.70) (-0.53) 
BHC Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 338 338 338 338 338 
Adj. R2 0.295 0.183 0.120 0.286 0.220 
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Table 4. 11: Subsidiary Failure Effect by BHC Capital Ratio 
This table estimates the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) effect of subsidiary failure by BHC capital ratio for US BHCs 
from 1986 to 2015. Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in two years and zero 
otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in one year and zero otherwise. Year 
1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one 
if a BHC had subsidiary failure three years ago and zero otherwise. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current 
year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-
term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total 
assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous 
year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the 
current year’s subordinate debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; and ΔDeposits is the 
change in deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s 
total assets. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔSubordinate ΔDeposits 
Year 2 Before 0.064** 0.018 -0.013 0.002 0.051*** 
 (2.46) (0.85) (-0.91) (0.54) (2.77) 
Year 1 Before 0.051 0.072** -0.032** -0.002 0.008 
 (1.38) (1.98) (-2.44) (-1.35) (0.37) 
Year 1 After -0.074* -0.057** 0.026 -0.003 -0.045 
 (-1.76) (-2.40) (1.35) (-1.17) (-1.46) 
Year 2 After -0.007 0.018 -0.048 -0.001 0.022 
 (-0.38) (0.56) (-1.15) (-0.52) (0.82) 
Year 3 After -0.076 -0.047 -0.022 0.001 0.008 
 (-1.46) (-1.41) (-1.51) (1.04) (0.21) 
Year 2 Before × Well Capitalization   -0.002 0.025 0.003 -0.000 -0.012 
 (-0.16) (0.93) (0.72) (-0.73) (-0.99) 
Year 1 Before × Well Capitalization 0.070*** 0.048*** -0.008* 0.002*** 0.009 
 (3.37) (9.15) (-1.95) (2.77) (0.76) 
Year 1 After × Well Capitalization -0.024* -0.029*** 0.006 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.75) (-8.48) (1.26) (-1.18) (-0.20) 
Year 2 After × Well Capitalization 0.012 -0.001 0.009 -0.000 0.004 
 (0.77) (-0.30) (1.44) (-0.01) (0.35) 
Year 3 After × Well Capitalization 0.009 -0.002 -0.004 -0.000 0.011 
 (0.66) (-0.58) (-1.05) (-0.03) (0.94) 
Well Capitalization -0.022** -0.006 -0.009*** -0.001 -0.008 
 (-1.97) (-1.62) (-2.77) (-1.48) (-0.79) 
BHC Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 338 338 338 338 338 
Adj. R2 0.246 0.115 0.058 0.285 0.219 
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groups of BHCs, which is consistent with our previous argument that BHCs’ leverage changes 
are mainly due to the internal financial deterioration. We also find a shift from debt to equity 
financing for BHCs after subsidiary bankruptcy due to their significant leverage drop. It is 
mainly because that the parent BHC raises equity to further secure its compliance to the capital 
requirement as subsidiary bankruptcy may tighten the regulatory watch. Maintaining certain 
equity capital ratios acts as material protection for depositors, shareholders, and the 
government safety net.  
 
4.5.6. The effect of subsidiary failure on BHCs’ liquidity and lending 
 
We next analyze the dynamic pattern of BHCs’ liquidity and lending around the subsidiary 
failure time. The above results show that BHCs’ external borrowing has significantly 
increased prior to the subsidiary failure time. We have argued that this action is incentivized 
by the managers’ anticipation of failure. If the subsidiary bank failure leads to the parent BHC 
not having surplus capital to distribute among its various other affiliates, and if the capital 
requirement limits the BHC’s ability to use insured deposits, then it follows that these 
“troubled” BHCs expecting limited internal funds may be forced to hoard more cash or 
liquidity assets, and curtail loans to ease the financial difficulties. Therefore, we expect more 
increase in cash and liquidity assets, and more decrease in lending of “troubled” BHCs relative 
to the “healthy” ones, prior to the time of subsidiary failure.  
To test this conjecture, we estimate the same specification as Equation (4.1) by substituting 
the following three dependent variables: ΔCash/assets, ΔLiquidity/assets, and ΔTotal 
loans/assets. Table 4.12 reports the results. As shown in columns (1) and (2), the coefficients 
on Year 1 Before are significant and positive for dependent variables ΔCash/assets and 
ΔLiquidity/assets, which implies that cash and liquidity assets of “troubled” BHCs 
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significantly climb one year before subsidiary failure. The significant and negative coefficient 
on Year 1 Before for the dependent variable ΔTotal loans/assets suggests that loans of 
“troubled” BHCs on average decline prior to the subsidiary failure time.  
We further exploit the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) regression model to 
explore which type of “troubled” BHCs are more affected by the bankruptcy of subsidiary 
banks. Similar as we do in Table 4.10, we interact the size dummy variable Small with the 
DID estimators in equation (4.1) to capture the size effect. Columns (4) and (5) in Table 4.12 
show that “troubled” BHCs with smaller size tend to hoard more cash and liquidity assets prior 
to the time of subsidiary failure, as shown by the positive and significant coefficients on the 
interaction term Year 1 Before × Small. Similarly, column (6) shows that smaller BHCs with 
subsidiary failure in the following year have more cut in lending. These results are reasonable 
as small BHCs are more vulnerable to capital shortage and thus have more adjustments in both 
their asset and liability parts.  
We next define a dummy variable Low Capitalization as one if the BHC’s tier 1 capital 
ratio is less than 6%, and zero otherwise. We then interact it with the DID estimators in 
equation (1) to capture the regulatory effect. Columns (7) to (9) in Table 4.12 show that in the 
year prior to the subsidiary failure, the increase in cash and liquidity assets and decrease in 
total loans for “troubled” BHCs are even more intensified for those lowly capitalized ones, as 
shown by the significant coefficients on the interaction term Year 1 Before × Low 
Capitalization. The findings suggest that lowly capitalized BHCs face more severe financial 
deteriorations prior to their subsidiary failure.  
Overall, the results show that the parent BHCs will conduct a selection of activities in 
advance to avoid further liquidity and financial constraint problems after their subsidiary 
failure. They are not just to increase debt borrowing, but also to increase liquidity and curtail 
lending. 
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Table 4. 12: Subsidiary Failure Effect on BHCs’ Liquidity and Lending 
This table reports the dynamic effects of subsidiary failure on BHCs’ liquidity and lending based on the matched sample. ΔCash/Assets is calculated as ratio of the current year’s total cash minus the previous year’s total cash to the 
previous year’s total assets; ΔLiquidity is calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liquidity assets minus the previous year’s total liquidity assets to the previous year’s total assets; ΔTotal Loans/Assets is calculated as ratio of the 
current year’s total loans minus the previous year’s total loans to the previous year’s total assets; Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is 
an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure three years ago and zero otherwise. The control variables 
include the following: Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the 
book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All control variables are at the 
consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 ΔCash/Assets ΔLiquidity ΔTotal 
Loans/Assets 
ΔCash/Assets ΔLiquidity ΔTotal 
Loans/Assets 
ΔCash/Assets ΔLiquidity ΔTotal 
Loans/Assets 
Year 2 Before 0.003 -0.045 -0.003 -0.002 -0.036 -0.003 0.000 0.049 -0.020 
 (0.96) (-1.37) (-0.33) (-0.55) (-0.85) (-0.26) (0.04) (0.68) (-0.70) 
Year 1 Before 0.005** 0.043* -0.062*** 0.014** 0.072* -0.076** 0.006* 0.060** -0.049** 
 (1.98) (1.69) (-3.63) (2.13) (1.68) (-2.44) (1.86) (2.07) (-2.52) 
Year 1 After -0.001 0.0124 0.009 -0.012*** 0.077 0.009 -0.004 -0.033 -0.034 
 (-0.46) (0.56) (0.88) (-2.66) (1.48) (0.49) (-0.31) (-0.55) (-1.11) 
Year 2 After -0.002 0.0287 0.009 -0.003 0.036 0.015 0.029 -0.094 -0.006 
 (-0.58) (1.26) (0.97) (-0.98) (1.00) (1.02) (1.48) (-0.98) (-0.27) 
Year 3 After 0.001 0.038 0.012 0.007 0.013 0.049*** 0.026* 0.124 -0.027 
 (0.39) (1.53) (1.27) (1.52) (0.23) (2.66) (1.87) (1.32) (-1.06) 
Year 2 Before × Small      0.006 -0.011 0.004    
    (1.12) (-0.19) (0.27)    
Year 1 Before × Small    0.018*** 0.087* -0.052**    
    (2.62) (1.76) (-2.49)    
Year 1 After × Small    -0.009* -0.078 -0.027    
    (-1.74) (-1.38) (-1.24)    
Year 2 After × Small    0.002 -0.010 -0.010    
    (0.40) (-0.23) (-0.55)    
Year 3 After × Small    -0.008 -0.057 -0.022    
    (-1.53) (-1.02) (-0.60)    
Year 2 Before × Low Capitalization         0.003 0.041 -0.035 
       (0.79) (1.28) (-0.74) 
Year 1 Before × Low Capitalization       0.008** 0.055* -0.061*** 
       (1.97) (1.81) (-3.22) 
Year 1 After × Low Capitalization       -0.001 0.048 0.026 
       (-0.07) (0.80) (0.80) 
Year 2 After × Low Capitalization       -0.033* -0.029 0.017 
       (-1.73) (-1.03) (0.71) 
Year 3 After × Low Capitalization       -0.027* -0.026 0.042 
       (-1.89) (-0.88) (1.54) 
Small    0.002 -0.004 -0.061***    
    (0.78) (-0.56) (-4.22)    
Low Capitalization       -0.004** -0.022 0.008 
       (-2.36) (-1.42) (0.96) 
BHC Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 
Adj. R2 0.065 0.347 0.247 0.069 0.354 0.253 0.070 0.352 0.248 
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4.5.7. BHC performance transition around subsidiary failure 
 
In this section, we check the performance of “troubled” BHCs which increase long-term 
debt one year before subsidiary failure relative to those which do not around the failure time. 
As we have shown in the above section that “troubled” BHCs tend to increase borrowing and 
liquidity, and cut lending beforehand to smooth out the negative impact, we expect that 
following the subsidiary failure, these BHCs should have a more smooth transition in 
performance and suffer less in operating and market performance than those “troubled” BHCs 
which do not make such adjustments in advance. To test this hypothesis, we further analyze 
the dynamic patterns of BHC performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) and risk (MES) around the 
year of subsidiary failure.  
Table 4.13 first re-estimates the main specification, but changes the dependent variables to 
ROA, Market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q), and MES. Across all three columns, we observe no 
apparent effect of subsidiary failure on the relative operating and market performance, and risk 
of “troubled” BHCs around the failure year.  
In Table 4.14, we define a dummy variable Debt increase 1 year before as one if ΔLong-
term debt for the “troubled” BHC is greater than zero one year before subsidiary failure, and 
zero otherwise. We then employ the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimation 
strategy by interacting the event DID estimators in the main specification with Debt increase 1 
year before dummy to capture the dynamics of the performance of “troubled” BHCs who 
increase long-term debt borrowing in the year prior to subsidiary failure. It is worth noting that 
the dummy variable Debt increase 1 year before is dropped from the regression because of the
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Table 4. 13: The Dynamic Patterns of BHC Performance around Subsidiary Failure 
This table reports the dynamic effects of subsidiary failure on BHCs’ performance and risk based on the matched sample. The dependent variables are Profitability, Market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q), and MES 
(Marginal Expected Shortfall). Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC 
will have subsidiary failure in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal 
to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure three years ago and zero otherwise. The control variables 
include the following: Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and 
available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in 
that given year. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 
10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Profitabilityt Market to book ratiot MESt 
Year 2 Before 0.001* -0.001 0.002 
 (1.82) (-0.34) (0.09) 
Year 1 Before 0.001* -0.004 -0.011 
 (1.92) (-1.05) (-0.50) 
Year 1 After -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.68) (-0.20) (-0.00) 
Year 2 After 0.000 0.006** 0.040* 
 (0.19) (2.16) (1.92) 
Year 3 After 0.000 0.001 -0.014 
 (0.34) (0.22) (-0.55) 
Sizet - 1 -0.002
*** -0.008*** 0.088*** 
 (-3.79) (-2.98) (4.39) 
Market to book ratiot - 1 0.024
*** 0.503*** 0.346*** 
 (3.54) (7.85) (3.69) 
Profitabilityt - 1 0.301
*** 0.118 -0.070 
 (6.47) (1.27) (-0.18) 
Diversificationt - 1 0.005
* 0.001 -0.088 
 (1.72) (0.09) (-0.92) 
Liquidityt - 1 0.003 0.004 -0.126
* 
 (1.58) (0.43) (-1.67) 
MESt - 1 -0.001
** 0.001 0.106*** 
 (-2.43) (0.46) (5.20) 
Constant 0.013 0.625*** -0.470 
 (1.32) (7.92) (-1.57) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
N 395 395 395 
Adj. R2 0.344 0.596 0.125 
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inclusion of BHC fixed effects. As shown in columns (1) and (2), the positive and significant 
coefficients on Year 1 After × Debt increase 1 year before indicate that the operating and 
market performance of “troubled” BHCs who increase long-term borrowing one year before 
increases more compared to those who do not in the one year following the subsidiaries filing 
for bankruptcy. The negative and significant coefficient on Year 1 After × Debt increase 1 
year before in column (3) indicates that the “troubled” BHCs who increase long-term 
borrowing one year before contribute less to the systemic risk following the subsidiary failure.  
Overall, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis and further imply that the 
activities taken by the parent BHCs including changes in liquidity, capital structure, and 
lending all aim to alleviate the concerns on financial constraints, stabilize the performance, 
and lower the risks.  
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Table 4. 14: The DDD Estimation of the Dynamic Patterns of BHC Performance around Subsidiary Failure 
This table reports the dynamic effects of subsidiary failure on BHCs’ performance and risk based on the matched sample using the difference-in-difference-
in-differences (DDD) estimation strategy. The dependent variables are Profitability, Market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q), and MES (Marginal Expected 
Shortfall). Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
BHC had subsidiary failure one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure two years ago 
and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure three years ago and zero otherwise. The control 
variables include the following: Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total 
assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the 
ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to 
the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall 
return of the banking sector in that given year. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-
statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Profitabilityt Market to book ratiot MESt 
Year 2 Before 0.002 -0.006 0.020 
 (0.48) (-1.02) (0.46) 
Year 1 Before -0.004** 0.007 0.019 
 (-2.33) (1.51) (0.48) 
Year 1 After 0.001 -0.009 0.028 
 (0.79) (-1.41) (0.70) 
Year 2 After 0.000 0.001 0.013 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.23) 
Year 3 After 0.000 0.007 0.082* 
 (0.03) (0.98) (1.82) 
Year 2 Before × Debt increase 1 year before -0.001 0.006 -0.020 
 (-0.22) (0.85) (-0.40) 
Year 1 Before × Debt increase 1 year before -0.002 -0.011* -0.033 
 (-1.08) (-1.92) (-0.71) 
Year 1 After × Debt increase 1 year before 0.005*** 0.018** -0.102* 
 (2.83) (2.37) (-1.92) 
Year 2 After × Debt increase 1 year before 0.004* 0.006 0.028 
 (1.65) (0.70) (0.47) 
Year 3 After × Debt increase 1 year before 0.004 -0.007 -0.031 
 (1.39) (-0.88) (-0.64) 
Sizet - 1 -0.002*** -0.008*** 0.088*** 
 (-3.80) (-2.99) (4.39) 
Market to book ratiot - 1 0.024*** 0.503*** 0.346*** 
 (3.54) (7.84) (3.70) 
Profitabilityt - 1 0.301*** 0.119 -0.069 
 (6.46) (1.27) (-0.18) 
Diversificationt - 1 0.005* 0.002 -0.088 
 (1.74) (0.10) (-0.91) 
Liquidityt - 1 0.004 0.004 -0.126* 
 (1.60) (0.42) (-1.66) 
MESt - 1 -0.001** 0.001 0.106*** 
 (-2.43) (0.47) (5.20) 
Constant 0.013 0.626*** -0.471 
 (1.32) (7.92) (-1.58) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
N 395 395 395 
Adj. R2 0.344 0.596 0.126 
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4.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we explore capital structure adjustments of BHCs that have subsidiary 
bankruptcy. Relative to public investors, bank insiders possess better knowledge and precise 
predictions on BHCs’ next-period status. By specifically focusing on the information 
asymmetry between these two parts, we examine whether and how bank managers adjust the 
financial policy before and after their subsidiaries going bankrupt.  
We find that BHCs tend to exploit better capital market access and cheaper borrowing costs 
to increase leverage before subsidiaries fail. Subsequent to subsidiary failures, however, these 
BHCs significantly lower the leverage. We additionally construct a measure of the information 
gap between BHCs and outside investors concerning the prediction of subsidiary bankruptcy 
in the next year to check the robustness of our conclusions. We present a model in which 
outsiders predict the failure of a BHC’s subsidiary based on the parent’s publicly available 
information. Our framework therefore explicitly accommodates the ability of outsiders to infer 
the conditions of subsidiaries. The information gap is thus defined as the difference between 
the actual and the forecasted status of subsidiaries. We then model the relation between the 
BHCs’ capital structure adjustments prior to their subsidiary failure and our measure of the 
information gap, controlling for a set of conventional variables. The results further validate our 
hypothesis.  
The adjustment in capital structure can be ascribed to several factors. The study documents 
these factors including BHCs’ internal capital risk and most importantly, the information 
asymmetry/gap between BHCs and the outside market. Our findings have important 
implications for the public to understand various incentives that banks may have in adjusting 
their capital structure.  
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Chapter V: Capital structure adjustments of bank holding 
companies and subsidiary M&A 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
How do the costs associated with subsidiary banks engaging in acquisition activities affect 
capital structure decisions of their parent bank holding companies (BHCs)? Prior literature 
shows that those BHCs operate internal capital markets where they allocate capital and 
liquidity to and between subsidiary banks (Houston, James, and Marcus, 1997; Houston and 
James, 1998). Therefore, they provide an effective mechanism through which subsidiary banks 
affect the cash flow, capital position, and liquidity of parent holding companies. As many 
costs are involved in acquisition activities such as underwriter fees, consultancy fees, and 
distribution costs, these costs could have a significant impact on the capital allocations and 
operational activities for the whole organization. BHCs facing such scarce internal capital 
problems have incentives to take actions to avoid the further financial constraints. One of the 
most popular actions BHCs can take in the capital market is to change their financing 
decisions.  
During the past decades, we have witnessed substantial bank consolidations through 
acquisitions in the US banking industry. This leads to the significant drop in the numbers of 
banks and the emergence of some whopping banks. Researchers have argued that bank 
consolidations fundamentally alter the traditional role for banks as financial intermediaries, by 
affecting both how banks find sources other than deposits to fund their expanded businesses 
and how banks lend to firms, diversify the services, and securitize the products (e.g., Amel, 
Barnes, Panetta, and Salleo, 2004; DeYoung, Evanoff, and Molyneux, 2009; Chen and 
Vashishtha, 2017). If these consolidations through acquisitions occur to subsidiary banks that 
form part of their respective BHCs, then the activities would ultimately impact the parents’ 
financing and lending decisions, and change the products and services that the BHCs could 
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offer. In this chapter, we focus on the financing decisions (i.e., capital structure decisions) of 
the parent BHCs that could be shaped by the consolidations happening at the subsidiary level.  
From a theoretical perspective, the impact of subsidiary bank consolidations on the parents’ 
capital structure decisions is twofold. For one thing, banks make the decisions of merges often 
for the consideration of efficiency gains. While these gains may benefit the merging 
subsidiaries, they are not necessarily improving the welfare to the parent BHCs. Some holding 
companies may be adversely affected by these changes and experience reduced capital 
available to allocate among the internal capital market. The reduced capital and liquidity may 
prompt the parent BHCs to take advantage of the information advantage beforehand to 
improve their access to alternative financing sources (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004). In this 
vein, subsidiary acquisition activities could lead to higher financial leverage ratios and worse 
capitalization for the holding banks.  
For another, firm acquisitions are often perceived by the market as having some synergies 
which can enhance cash flows and the firm value. However, empirical findings do not seem to 
show support for this view for the bank setting. Some researchers even report the negative 
short-term market reactions to the share price for the merged banks around deal 
announcements (Houston, James, and Ryngaert, 2001). Further, bank mergers at the subsidiary 
level could tremendously strength the market power of the whole holding company, lessen the 
pressure of competition from other banks, and achieve greater merger gains (Penas and Unal, 
2004). In anticipation of the reduced risk of being financially distressed, the parent BHCs 
could lower the debt ratios and increase the capital reserve.  
A key factor affecting this trade-off, at lease from the perspective of parent banks, is the 
extent to which subsidiary banks’ engagement in acquisition activities affects the internal 
capital flows within the established internal capital market by the BHCs. This is an open 
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empirical question as subsidiary acquisition activities can lead to the additional costs for the 
parent BHCs as subsidiary failure does as discussed in the last chapter. BHCs with huge 
capital evaporation during acquisition deals of subsidiary banks, for instance, face higher costs 
of accessing cheap external financing in the future. Additionally, moral considerations may 
further reduce the ability of parent BHCs to default on their existing obligations to relieve the 
financial burden and maintain the liquidity.    
To disentangle the real effects on parent BHCs’ financing decisions, in this chapter we 
focus on the BHCs that are publicly listed financial firms in the United States and have 
subsidiary acquisitions over the period from 1986 to 2015. We analyze the dynamic patterns of 
various capital structure variables of BHCs that have subsidiary acquisitions using the BHCs 
that do not have any subsidiary acquisitions through our sample period as a benchmark. 
Specifically, we employ a standard event-study difference-in-differences (DID) approach to 
study the dynamics of BHC capital structure and various financing decisions from two year 
prior to subsidiary acquisitions to three years after the acquisitions. This estimation strategy 
has been previously used by Schoar (2002), Autor (2003), and Almond, Hoynes, and 
Schanzenbach (2011), among others, to study firm performance around different events. In 
this event-study DID framework, we again estimate the leverage changes among BHCs with 
subsidiary acquisitions (treated BHCs) around the time of their subsidiary banks engaging in 
acquisition activities relative to the changes during the same period among those BHCs 
without subsidiary acquisitions (control/benchmark BHCs). Using a large sample of U.S. 
banks from 1986 to 2015, we find that a subsidiary acquisition induces an average 8.5 
percentage point increase in leverage among treated BHCs during the year prior to their 
subsidiary acquisitions. In contrast, we find a significant decrease in the leverage of those 
treated BHCs in the year following subsidiary acquisitions. We further separate the deposit 
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and several non-deposit debt items from the leverage of BHCs, and find that the long-term 
debt financing of treated BHCs exhibits a substantial increase before subsidiary acquisitions 
and significant decrease afterwards.  
The baseline results could reflect strategic behavior, or they could reflect a protective 
financing demand by BHCs who are uncertain about the future internal capital sufficiency. 
The study addresses this concern by identifying subsets of BHCs with different sizes and 
different capital adequacy. The results reveal significant differential effects of subsidiary 
acquisitions on financial policies of different groups of BHCs. Specifically, small or well 
capitalized BHCs have relatively more leverage increases than large or lowly capitalized 
BHCs do in the year prior to subsidiary acquisitions, respectively. The former also have more 
long-term and subordinated debt increases. Noticeably, one year after deal announcements of 
subsidiary acquisition activities, small or well capitalized BHCs substantially retire more 
subordinated debt from the outside market relative to large or lowly capitalized counterparts. 
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that higher leverage ratios take place in 
anticipation of subsidiary acquisitions and BHCs’ leverage changes are mainly due to the 
deterioration of internal capital markets where scarce capital is allocated.  
This chapter also analyzes the dynamic pattern of BHCs’ liquidity and lending around the 
subsidiary acquisition time. The idea is to test whether the parent BHCs of subsidiaries 
experiencing acquisition deals facing limited internal funds are forced to hoard more cash or 
liquidity assets, and curtail loans to ease the financial constraints before acquisition deals 
taking place. The results validate this conjecture with the effect being stronger for smaller and 
less well capitalized BHCs, which suggests they are more vulnerable to internal capital 
fluctuation and thus have more adjustments in both asset and liability parts on their balance 
sheet.  
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Further check on the performance of treated BHCs which increase long-term debt one year 
before subsidiaries engaging in acquisition activities relative to those which do not around 
acquisition deals shows that the treated BHCs have a more smooth transition in performance 
and suffer less in operating and market performance than those control BHCs which do not 
make such adjustments in advance. This chapter also documents several mechanisms through 
which subsidiary banks’ engagement in acquisition activities affects parent BHCs’ capital 
structure decisions including the following two findings: 1. Information asymmetry induced 
by subsidiary acquisition activities affects BHCs’ capital structure decisions by increasing the 
adjustment speed to the target leverage ratio; 2. Around the time of subsidiary banks engaging 
in acquisition activities, the more quickly the BHCs close the gap between the last year’s 
leverage and this year’s target, the less risk they contribute to the whole system.  
Overall, this article, for the first time in the literature, systematically examines the dynamic 
aspects of various BHC capital structure decisions around the time of subsidiary bank 
acquisition deals and their effects on BHC performance, liquidity, lending, and risk. This study 
thus broadly contributes to the literature examining the determinants of firm and bank capital 
structure decisions (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008; Gropp 
and Heider, 2010; Marcus, 1983).  
This chapter also adds to the literature that examines bank mergers and acquisitions. For 
example, DeYoung et al. (2009) document the fundamental change of banks as the roles of 
financial intermediaries through the consolidations over the past decades, and evaluate the 
economic consequences of this ongoing trend, Karolyi and Taboada (2015) study cross-border 
acquisitions and argue that they provide a mechanism through which banks can change their 
regulatory environment from a stronger supervision environment to a much weaker one, and 
Chen and Vashishtha (2017) explore the effects of bank acquisitions on corporate information 
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disclosure and find that corporate borrowers significantly increase information disclosure after 
their lending banks engage in acquisitions. The main focus of this study is trying to build the 
link between subsidiary bank mergers and the parent BHC’s capital structure decisions.  
This study also extends prior work that focuses largely on the real effects of information 
asymmetry, such as financing arrangements (Sufi, 2007), equity issues (Dierkens, 1991), asset 
prices (Chan, Menkveld, and Yang, 2008), and competition, adverse selection, and 
information dispersion in the banking industry (Marquez, 2002). One implication of this 
chapter is that some results in these papers could be associated with the role information 
asymmetry plays in banks’ capital structure decisions.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the institutional 
background of subsidiary bank acquisition activities and their effects on parent BHCs. Section 
5.3 and 5.4 describe the empirical methodology and data. Section 5.5 reports the results. 
Section 5.6 conducts additional tests. Section 5.7 concludes. 
 
5.2. Institutional background and hypotheses 
 
In this section, we fist describe the background on the subsidiary merger and acquisition 
(acquisition) of US bank holding companies (BHCs) and the related regulatory environment. 
We then develop the hypotheses about the effect of subsidiary acquisition on the parent BHC’s 
capital choices. 
 
5.2.1. The effect and regulation background of bank M&A 
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The banking industry has experienced a fast consolidation in the past decades. During the 
process of the integration, the lines between traditional banking activities have become hazier. 
Technology innovations and steady-going deregulations from the government induce banks to 
engage in many unconventional financial activities such as asset management, investment 
banking, insurance, etc.21 Meanwhile, banks also strive to expand their sizes in the face of 
mounting pressure of competition from other peers. This is mostly done by engaging in M&A 
transactions with competitors. For the two parties involved in the M&A activity, the literature 
has argued whether it is value-enhancing (e.g., Berger, 1998; Pilloff and Santomero, 1998; 
Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999; Focarelli, Panetta, and Salleo, 2002). The evidence is 
mixed. There are still no conclusive results on the benefits or costs of bank mergers and 
acquisition. We broadly review some findings below.  
Focarelli, Panetta, and Salleo (2002) explore the M&A among the Italian banks over the 
period of 1985-2006 and find that mergers and acquisitions have different motivations (selling 
more services for mergers and better credit management for acquisitions). They argue that 
these different motivations lead to separated consequences, most remarkably, with an increase 
in return on equity following mergers and a long-run decrease in bad loans for acquired banks. 
Zollo and Singh (2004) study the relationship between the post-acquisition performance and 
management levels of US banks. They point out that the acquiring bank can either implicitly 
gather acquisition experience or explicitly put it in manuals (called codification in their paper), 
to learn to increase the management during the post-acquisition integration process. 
Particularly, they argue that the integration capability, which is developed by the acquiring 
firm to manage the takeover process, is at least, as important as to identify a potential target. 
The results show that codification significantly influences the post-acquisition performance of 
                                                          
21 One of the most notable events in banking deregulation and financial liberalization is the passage of the 
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) by the US Congress in 1999, which repealed part of the Glass–Steagall Act 
that prohibited commercial banks from operating in other investment or insurance-related services.  
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acquiring banks. More importantly, they interact the degree of codification and the level of 
integration to investigate the mechanisms behind the co-evolution of integration decisions and 
capability building processes, and find that the interaction positively impacts the acquisition 
performance, which demonstrates that the advantages of knowledge-learning processes from 
the codification outweigh the costs of time and money spent on engaging these activities.  
Molyneux, Schaeck, and Zhou (2014) argue that banks can grow substantially via M&As 
and become ‘too-systemically-important-to-fail’ (TSITF), and that the M&As between banks 
or other financial institutions may pose systemic risk to the whole financial industry, and 
affect the stability of the financial system. To support this argument, they point out several 
reasons. First, the banking structure is flattened to be more monotonic during the consolidation, 
and banks become more interdependent as a result of sharing similar business models and 
investment products, and exposing to common risks. Such interdependence increases systemic 
risk dramatically with the failure of one bank resulting in contagious consequences among 
other peers. Second, more complexity for banks after M&As reduces their transparency and 
tempts them to exploit the regulatory loophole. Third, coordination problems between 
regulators of different countries further complicate the issues involved in the cross-border 
M&As, which may exacerbate the TSITF effects. Overall, by exploring the motivations of 
bank M&As to obtain safety net subsidies and their implications for systemic risk, they find 
strong evidence that gaining government subsidies via M&As significantly increases the 
rescue probability in the crisis and the increased interdependence between TSITF banks during 
the post-merger period increases the instability of the whole financial system.  
Karolyi and Taboada (2015) study how different regulations in different countries drive 
banks to engage in cross-border M&A activities and find that acquirers are more from 
countries with stricter regulatory environments and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
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around deal announcements for targets are more positive for the targets of these acquirers. 
They refer to these cross-border activities as banks engaging in “regulatory arbitrage” and 
point out that regulatory arbitrage may have both positive and negative effects. One the one 
hand, acquirers from rigorously regulated countries can have more freedom to pursue higher 
profitable investment opportunities if their targets are from countries with relatively slack 
regulations. Targets can further benefit from this “bonding connections” when they are bonded 
with acquirer banks from countries with stronger supervision while adopting the governance 
system of these countries (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008).  
On the other hand, acquirers may engage in more risk-taking activities in countries of their 
targets that have loose regulatory environment. This harmful form of regulatory arbitrage 
could weaken the bank performance and damage the shareholder value, which ultimately 
brings adverse consequences for the whole financial system and drives up systemic risk.  
This paper is also related to two streams of previous literature. One branch is to investigate 
the new capital and liquidity requirements of Basel III and their impact on banks as well as the 
whole financial system. The other is about correlations among bank capital, liquidity and 
systemic risk.  
It’s widely observed that there are many limitations in both Basel I and II such as excessive 
procyclicality and lack of liquidity regulation (Gordy and Howells, 2006; Schmaltz, Pokutta, 
Heidorn, and Andrae, 2014). The latter exactly lead to the drying up of liquidity during the 
latest financial crisis which brought many financial institutions down (Brunnermeier, 2009). 
Therefore, the recent crisis has provided an explicit rationale that banks need more regulations 
on their liquidity assets. As a result of this, the new Basel III improves in many aspects and 
especially imposes liquidity requirements which are huge gaps in the previous Basel 
framework. As pointed out by Schmaltz et al. (2014), the introduction of Basel III will fill 
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many regulation loopholes having been existent heretofore and ultimately facilitate the 
stability of the whole financial system. It should be evident that the sounder is the financial 
environment, the lower is systemic risk.  
Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) analyze the framework of systemic risk in their 
theoretical paper. They point out interbank networks expose the banking system to the danger 
of coordination failure and the insolvency of one bank will have contagious effects on the 
system leading to the inefficient liquidation of the rest solvent banks. In the similar work, 
Allen and Gale (2000) discuss liquidity shocks deteriorate the stability of financial system and 
emphasize chain reactions resulting from linkages among financial intermediaries.  
Tarashev and Zhu (2008) regard the banking sector as a portfolio of banks and study the 
relationship between the bank capital and systemic risk. They conclude that an increase in 
capital ratios, with liquidity being settled, decreases the probability of banking crisis. Barrell et 
al. (2009) show that raising capital adequacy and introducing liquidity requirements can have 
beneficial effects on reducing the likelihood of a bank crisis. However, they also mention the 
average influence of liquidity on crisis still needs checking. Cornett et al. (2011) argue that 07-
08 global financial crisis was more like a liquidity crisis and banks with more illiquid assets on 
their balance sheets made more efforts to overcome the liquidity shortage thus tightening the 
credit supply.  
Shin (2008) focuses on the liquidity of the financial system as a whole and theoretically 
proposes that the shortage of aggregate liquidity can generate series of failures in the banking 
system. Diamond and Rajan (2011) stress that capital holdings determine the probability of 
potential bank asset fire sales in times of trouble. The latter plays an essential part in systemic 
risk in financial system.  
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Perotti and Suarez (2011) theoretically demonstrate the proposition that a binding net stable 
funding requirement (NSFR) will reduce the aggregate systemic risk.  
Although all the above paper have surveyed systemic risk and its several contributors, the 
specific issue about the impact of liquidity on banking system has drawn little attention. 
Especially in the most recent financial crisis, we witnessed the extensive liquidity crisis with 
the collapse of financial institutions and several huge government bailouts. Additionally, in 
response to the deficiency in regulation, the newest Basel III has further strengthened capital 
requirements and more importantly, introduced two essential liquidity ratios: Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) which we will use later in this 
paper. This means banks are now required to have more stable and high quality funding to 
withstand liquidity shocks. Therefore, the lesson learnt from the 07-08 financial crisis has 
made regulators realize the importance of bank liquidity assets (Klomp and De Haan, 2012). 
However, if banks react relatively slow when their liquidity fall under the target ratio imposed 
by Basel III, will this also drive up systemic risk and even at last lead to the full-scale crisis in 
banking system?  
To the best of my knowledge, this idea has not been formally investigated to date. This 
paper aims to fill this gap and bring some novel empirical results about subsidiary banks 
engaging in M&A activities and its impact on their parent banks’ capital structure, 
performance, and risk.   
 
5.2.2. Subsidiary M&A and BHCs’ changes in capital structure 
 
Why would subsidiary banks engaging in M&A activities affect their parent BHCs’ capital 
structure decisions? As discussed above, most of the subsidiary banks that make M&A 
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decisions are involved in cross-state or cross-border deals. Such deals represent one of the 
most important motives banks have in making various investment decisions – regulatory 
arbitrage, where banks can pursue excessive risk-taking activities and escape from costly 
regulation areas. The reason is that the profit of banks that undertake major business in 
rigorous supervision systems will be cut due to the less tolerance of the excess risk-taking 
activities. These banks are more likely to pursue the higher-profit business by acquiring or 
being merged with those banks headquartered in those more forbearance regimes (Acharya, 
2003; Dell’ Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Morrison and White, 2009; Agarwal et al., 2012). 
Karolyi and Taboada (2015) call this as value-destroying regulatory arbitrage and argue that 
bank M&A of this form may receive negative market reaction and have adverse consequences 
for bank performance and shareholder value. Bank M&A of this form could be more harmful 
if it increases the fragility of the internal capital market established by the BHC and the 
involved subsidiary bank extracts subsidies from the holding company, or other subsidiaries 
for losses from its high exposure to unmonitored risks.  
The influence is not limited to above. As Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) point out that 
bank holding companies manage their capital and liquidity on a consolidated basis and transfer 
excess capital within subsidiaries to the parents as dividends, substantial cash flow changes of 
subsidiary M&A activities would impede the parents’ abilities to manage capital within the 
organization in an efficient way. What is more, as discussed in Chapter IV, the Federal 
Reserve Regulation Act Y12 CFR (Section 225.4(a)(1)) states that: “A bank holding company 
shall serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiaries...". Based on this 
regulation, BHCs have the obligation to infuse capital to those subsidiaries with significant 
losses and may not have additional funds to inject into the projects of other subsidiaries with 
the high net present values (NPVs), which impedes the investment efficiency of the whole 
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organization. Last but not least, Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act place the 
limitations on inter-subsidiary transactions and asset sales, these restrictions further impede 
the holding company’s ability to allocate capital to the most profitable projects. Arguably, one 
important factor to influence banks’ efficient investment is liquidity. Since subsidiary banks’ 
engagement in M&A activities bring much uncertainty and potential value-destroying 
outcomes to the internal capital market, and the regulation limits the BHCs’ ability to allocate 
surplus capital, it follows that these BHCs may take actions to make capital structure changes 
to find external financing source beforehand to strengthen their liquidity.  
In addition, if it is of a high price for parent BHCs to have subsidiary banks engaging M&A 
activities, BHCs are less likely to adjust their investment activities in response to prevailing 
economic conditions, as doing so will contract their profitable opportunities. This result has 
been documented in several previous empirical works. For instance, Bucă and Vermeulen 
(2017) analyze the credit tightening indexes of the banks from Germany, France, Italy, Spain, 
Belgium and Portugal, and find that banks in these countries are less likely to tighten their 
credit in periods when their subsidiary banks are making M&A deals. Allen, Carletti, and 
Marquez (2015), in their theoretical paper, adds support to this argument and show that banks 
could intentionally reduce their investment in risky assets, however, they will invest more 
capital to lend to firms and leave the deposits untouched as they are insured. Therefore, the 
only resort left for BHCs is to find efficient external funding channel. Especially, the low cost 
in nature for debt financing might ease BHCs’ likelihood of being financially distressed and 
thereby increase their optimal leverage ratio according to the classic trade-off theory.  
 
5.3. Methodology 
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Much similar to what we did in Chapter IV, in this chapter we build our sample based on 
the group of BHCs that had subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities during specific years 
(treatment group) and the BHCs that did not have subsidiaries engaging in M&A around those 
years (control group). We again identify the year in which one or several subsidiaries of a 
BHC i announce a M&A deal as year iT . To test our hypotheses, we implement a standard 
event-study difference-in-differences (DID) specification as in Autor (2003) and Almond, 
Hoynes, and Schanzenbach (2011): 
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where ,i tY  is the changes in bank total liability from year t - 1 to year t, scaled by the total 
book assets at year t – 1, ,i tD  is a group of DID estimators that identify the years prior to and 
following the subsidiary M&A in year iT  for a treated BHC i, , 1i tX  is a set of control 
variables containing bank characteristics that may affect bank financial policy, and i , t  
specify BHC and year fixed effects that control for unobserved time-invariant differences 
across BHCs and overall time trends, respectively.22 Standard errors are clustered at the BHC 
level to resolve heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of error terms (Petersen, 2009). Our 
tests focus on the capital structure of treated BHCs in the year immediately prior to and 
following subsidiary M&As (i.e., iT  – 1 and iT  + 1), while also include iT  – 2 and up to iT  + 
3 to allow for analyzing the effects over a wider range of years. We do not focus on year iT  
itself because how soon after the deal announcement the BHC board of directors and managers 
make responses to adjust the capital after subsidiary M&A is unclear.  
                                                          
22 In the empirical tables of this chapter, we still use variable names Year 1 Before, Year 2 Before, etc., to 
represent these DID estimators. For example, Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will 
have subsidiary M&A in two years and zero otherwise. 
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The coefficients of interest are  , which measure the estimated changes in the difference 
between treated and control BHCs’ liability changes during the years prior to or after the 
subsidiary M&A relative to the omitted subsidiary M&A year. These coefficients trace out the 
time path of differences between treated and control BHCs’ leverage changes. By choosing the 
subsidiary M&A year as the omitted category, we make it easier to detect differential trends in 
pre- and after- M&A leverage changes. 
When examining BHCs’ capital structure, we mainly look at changes in bank leverage, 
which includes both debt and non-debt liabilities such as deposits. Bank capital structure is 
different from that in non-financial firms as a bank takes deposits, and non-deposit debt has 
become a more important source of bank funds over time (Gropp and Heider, 2010). Thus, we 
further decompose BHC leverage into non-deposit debt and deposits. Specifically, we look at 
changes in long-term debt, short-term debt, subordinate, and deposits, all scaled by the 
previous year’s total bank assets. We then test their relationships with subsidiary M&As.  
Our choice of control variables follows Gropp and Heider (2010) and includes BHCs’ size, 
market-to-book ratio, and profitability. We also control for marginal expected shortfall (see 
Acharya et al., 2017), diversification, and liquidity to mitigate the omitted variable bias.  
 
5.4. Data 
 
We again focus on the BHCs that are publicly listed financial firms in the United States. 
We only consider BHCs with the highest hierarchy positions, and collect consolidated 
financial information of BHCs from FR Y-9C reports over the period from 1986 to 2015. We 
also obtain data on BHCs’ changes in long-term and short-term debt from COMPUSTAT 
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Bank. BHC stock price data come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
We obtain information on BHCs’ subsidiary M&A deals from FDIC Failed Bank List, and 
then merge this data with BHCs data. We focus on the BHCs who have subsidiary M&A 
occurring only once during our sample period to avoid compound effects by more than one 
subsidiary M&A in consecutive time periods. Our final treatment group sample thus restricts 
to 363 BHCs that have failed subsidiaries. 
Our analyses further require a control group to compare with the BHCs with subsidiary 
M&As. We use two different procedures to obtain such control samples. The first procedure 
obtains a control group based on all BHCs that had no subsidiary M&As. We use this sample 
to get the summary statistics and all the main results. The second approach is based on a 
propensity score matching (PSM) procedure to match each treated BHC with a control one 
that is similar across all observable variables. In other words, this procedure provides a control 
sample that has similar bank characteristics to the BHCs with subsidiaries engaging in M&A 
activities, but different levels of subsidiary status, and hence internal financial circumstances. 
We mainly use this matched sample throughout our regression analyses. The matched sample 
analysis allows us to more effectively control for differences in relevant dimensions between 
BHCs with M&A subsidiaries and BHCs without.23  
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics for the whole sample. To reduce the influence of 
outliers, these variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentile. The average BHC in the 
sample has a market-to-book ratio of 0.93, a profitability ratio of 0.007, a diversification ratio 
of 0.154, and a liquidity ratio of 0.223. The average BHC also has a 10.2% increase of its 
lagged total assets in leverage, a 1% increase of its lagged total assets in long-term debt, a 0.6% 
increase of its lagged assets in short-term debt, and an 8.4% increase of its lagged assets in 
                                                          
23 We use exactly the same matching procedure as we use in Chapter IV except that in the first step, the 
dependent variable is replaced by M&A to acquire the propensity scores. Appendix B presents detailed matching 
procedures. 
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deposits. In terms of other real outcomes, the average BHC experiences relatively no change 
in subordinated debt, and contributes approximately to 1.4% of the loss during the worst days 
of the whole banking sector.  
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis for treated 
BHCs and control groups separately in the year prior to subsidiary M&As (i.e., iT  – 1). From 
Table 5.2, we find that the BHCs with subsidiary M&A in the next year, on average, have 
higher leverage ratio when compared with BHCs without subsidiary M&A in the following 
year. BHCs with subsidiary M&A in the next year tend to increase more long-term debt (5.7% 
versus 1.0% of lagged total assets), have more subordinate (0.3% versus 0.1% of lagged total 
assets), but rely less on short-term debt financing (0.4% versus 0.6% of lagged total assets) 
than those BHCs without subsidiary M&A in the following year. In terms of control variables, 
BHCs with M&A subsidiaries are larger, and more diversified than those without in Year iT  – 
1. The former also have higher market-to-book ratio and less liquidity, and contribute more to 
the aggregate banking sector’s loss prior to subsidiary failure, although the differences are lack 
of statistical significance.  
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Table 5. 1: Summary Statistics I 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis for the full sample. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total 
liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-
term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-
term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s 
subordinate debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔDeposits is the change in deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total 
deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the 
market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio 
of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; 
and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All 
variables are yearly results. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BHCs’ changes in Capital Structure      
ΔLeverage 9907 0.102 0.177 -0.656 3.989 
ΔLong-term debt 7872 0.010 0.043 -0.284 0.693 
ΔShort-term debt 7872 0.006 0.044 -0.844 0.719 
ΔSubordinate 9907 0.001 0.007 -0.048 0.231 
ΔDeposits 7785 0.084 0.148 -0.610 3.280 
      
Determinants of Capital Structure      
Size 10889 14.369 1.554 11.193 21.668 
Market-to-book ratio 10889 1.045 0.073 0.890 3.425 
Profitabilitiy 10889 0.007 0.011 -0.204 0.068 
Diversification 10889 0.154 0.147 -1.528 10.967 
Liquidity 8427 0.223 0.114 0.000 0.941 
MES 8041 1.388 5.070 -6.304 45.263 
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Table 5. 2: Summary Statistics II 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis separately for treated BHCs and control BHCs in the year prior to subsidiary M&As (i.e., iT  – 1). ΔLeverage is the change in 
leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated as 
ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current 
year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s subordinate 
debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔDeposits is the change in deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total deposits minus the previous year’s total 
deposits to the previous year’s total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total 
assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest 
income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during 
the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 BHCs with M&A Subsidiaries BHCs without M&A Subsidiaries   
 N Mean Median N Mean Median Difference t-statistics 
BHCs’ changes in Capital 
Structure 
        
ΔLeverage 363 0.184 0.110 9544 0.102 0.065 0.082** 2.07 
ΔLong-term debt 363 0.057 0.042 7509 0.010 0.000 0.046*** 4.89 
ΔShort-term debt 363 0.004 -0.002 7509 0.006 0.000 -0.002 -0.27 
ΔSubordinate 363 0.003 0.000 9544 0.001 0.000 0.002* 1.86 
ΔDeposits 308 0.136 0.075 7477 0.084 0.052 0.053 1.31 
         
Determinants of Capital 
Structure 
        
Size 363 15.496 14.651 10526 14.366 14.065 1.131*** 2.87 
Market-to-book ratio 363 1.051 1.054 10526 1.045 1.033 0.006 0.51 
Profitabilitiy 363 0.008 0.009 10526 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.96 
Diversification 363 0.197 0.176 10526 0.154 0.132 0.043* 1.78 
Liquidity 330 0.192 0.168 8097 0.223 0.209 -0.032 -1.46 
MES 330 1.395 1.588 7711 1.388 1.587 0.007 0.09 
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We present summary statistics for the year following subsidiary M&As (i.e., iT  + 1) in 
Table 5.3. As shown in the table, following subsidiary M&As the treated BHCs on average 
lower their leverage ratio relative to those control ones.      
When decomposing BHCs’ leverage, we find that, in contrast to the financing activities in 
Year iT  - 1, BHCs with subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities in the previous year are more 
likely to reduce long-term debt financing. The comparison between the two types of BHCs for 
other control variables in Year iT  + 1 is similar to that in Year iT  – 1.  
The correlations between the key variables used in the analysis have been reported in Table 
4.4 in Chapter IV. This chapter will thus not repeat this procedure again.  
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Table 5. 3: Summary Statistics III 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis separately for treated BHCs and control BHCs in the year following subsidiary M&As (i.e., iT  + 1). ΔLeverage is the change 
in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated 
as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current 
year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s subordinate 
debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔDeposits is the change in deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total deposits minus the previous year’s total 
deposits to the previous year’s total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total 
assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest 
income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during 
the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 BHCs with M&A Subsidiaries BHCs without M&A Subsidiaries   
 N Mean Median N Mean Median Difference t-statistics 
BHCs’ changes in Capital 
Structure 
        
ΔLeverage 363 0.015 0.032 9544 0.102 0.066 -0.087*** -5.94 
ΔLong-term debt 363 -0.023 -0.013 7509 0.011 0.000 -0.034*** -7.34 
ΔShort-term debt 363 0.002 0.000 7509 0.006 0.000 -0.005 -1.30 
ΔSubordinate 363 0.000 0.000 9544 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -1.12 
ΔDeposits 330 0.031 0.033 7455 0.084 0.052 -0.054*** -3.74 
         
Determinants of Capital 
Structure 
        
Size 363 15.565 14.741 10526 14.365 14.065 1.200*** 3.08 
Market-to-book ratio 363 1.040 1.031 10526 1.045 1.033 -0.005 -0.35 
Profitabilitiy 363 0.003 0.009 10526 0.007 0.009 -0.004 -0.95 
Diversification 363 0.199 0.183 10526 0.154 0.132 0.045* 1.91 
Liquidity 363 0.197 0.196 8064 0.223 0.210 -0.026 -1.48 
MES 319 1.402 1.579 7722 1.388 1.587 0.015 0.16 
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To provide a more intuitionistic pattern of BHC capital structure decisions around the 
subsidiary M&A year, we conduct the univariate analysis for the dynamic changes of various 
BHC liability items from three years prior to subsidiary M&A to three years after that 
occurring. We report the results in Figure 5.1. Note that the figures compare the changes of 
various liability items between BHCs that had subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities and 
those that did not have subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities.  
Figs. 5.1 plot BHCs’ cumulative capital structure decisions in the three years prior to and 
following subsidiary M&As. Much similar to the trend as reported in the summary statistics, 
in the years prior to M&A period BHCs that had subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities on 
average have higher levels of leverage and long-term debt changes than control BHCs. After 
that, however, the former on average lower the leverage and reduce the long-term debt, by 
approximately 8.7% and 3.4% of BHCs’ lagged assets, respectively, than the latter. The short-
term debt changes do not exhibit drastic differences among BHCs with M&A subsidiaries and 
BHCs without in both pre- and post-M&A years. Lastly, BHCs with subsidiaries engaging in 
M&A activities have similar changes in deposits as those without in the years prior to M&A 
period. After the M&A years, the former on average hold less deposits on their balance sheets.  
Overall, the results support our hypotheses. However, these comparisons are based on 
simple univariate analyses. In the next section, we employ more rigorous regression analyses 
to test our hypotheses.  
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Figure 5. 1 
The graphs show BHCs’ average capital structure changes during each of the three years prior 
to and following the announcement of subsidiary M&As (denoted as year ‘‘0’’ in the figures). 
All graphs are re-centered at year 0. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of 
the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous 
year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the 
current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s 
total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current 
year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total 
assets; ΔSubordinated debt is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current 
year’s subordinate debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total 
assets; and ΔDeposits is the change in deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total 
deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s total assets. 
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5.5. Empirical results 
 
5.5.1. BHCs’ leverage changes around subsidiary M&A 
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Table 5.4 presents the results from estimating Equation (5.1) by using Leverage  as the 
outcome variable. We report the coefficient estimates of   for each of the two years before 
and three years after subsidiary M&A. Column (1) reports the results from estimating the 
model without including control variables using the full sample. Column (2) adds additional 
controls that may affect BHCs’ leverage changes. Column (3) and (4) give the results using 
the matched sample. Across all columns in Table 5.4, the coefficients on Year 1 Before are all 
positive and statistically significant when adding control variables. When controlling for BHC 
characteristics, the estimates based on the full sample imply an absolute increase of 8.5 
percentage points in the leverage of BHCs with subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities, 
relative to the control group, during the year prior to the time when their subsidiaries make 
M&A deals. Contrarily, the consistently negative and significant coefficients on Year 1 After 
in Table 5.4 suggest a significant decrease in the leverage of those treated BHCs in the one 
year following subsidiary M&As.  
In terms of control variables, we find that BHC leverage is positively associated with 
market-to-book ratio and profitability, and negatively related with size. These findings are 
generally in line with prior studies on bank capital structure (e.g., Gropp and Heider, 2010), 
suggesting that our sample is representative.  
Overall, these findings support our hypotheses that BHCs are more likely to be more-
levered in the year prior to subsidiary M&As, and less levered in the year after. Additionally, 
because the significance of the subsidiary failure effect does not vary widely across all
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Table 5. 4: Subsidiary M&As and BHC Leverage Changes 
This table reports estimates of Equation (5.1) for US BHCs from 1986 to 2015. Columns (1) and (2) estimate the model using the full 
sample. Columns (3) and (4) estimate the model using the matched sample. Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to 
one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity three years ago and zero otherwise. ΔLeverage is the change 
in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total 
assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets 
to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; 
Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum 
of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's 
expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All control variables are at 
the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = 
significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 Full sample Matched sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLeverage ΔLeverage ΔLeverage 
Year 2 Before 0.010 0.013 0.007 0.013 
 (0.47) (0.59) (0.33) (0.53) 
Year 1 Before 0.062 0.085* 0.062 0.090* 
 (1.41) (1.79) (1.24) (1.68) 
Year 1 After 0.080*** 0.040* 0.088*** 0.044** 
 (4.71) (1.95) (4.46) (2.00) 
Year 2 After 0.042** 0.020 0.043* -0.025 
 (2.05) (1.20) (1.71) (-1.37) 
Year 3 After -0.019 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 
 (-0.66) (-0.49) (-0.35) (-0.45) 
Size  -0.220***  -0.239*** 
  (-12.28)  (-11.79) 
Market to book ratio  0.255***  0.243*** 
  (4.58)  (4.11) 
Profitability  2.681***  2.821*** 
  (5.46)  (5.39) 
Diversification  -0.047  -0.054 
  (-0.97)  (-0.84) 
Liquidity  -0.078*  -0.087* 
  (-1.78)  (-1.73) 
MES  0.002  0.004 
  (0.37)  (0.52) 
Constant 0.123*** 2.847*** 0.139*** 3.121*** 
 (12.44) (11.18) (13.49) (10.75) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9907 6779 819 819 
Adj. R2 0.074 0.237 0.078 0.243 
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columns, we restrict our attention to the matched sample with a full set of controls in the 
analyses in later sections.24  
 
5.5.2. The Reverse causality issue 
 
The main concern in this paper is the reverse causality issue. One may argue that it’s the 
substantial increase in leverage of parent BHCs that leads to the subsequent subsidiary 
engaging in M&A activities, and that the main argument that the parents intentionally increase 
leverage when foreseeing the substantial capital outflows during the takeover deals, is not true. 
To address this concern, we employ the following test.  
We construct a new binary response variable ,& i tM A  which indicates if a particular 
individual bank i makes a merger or acquisition deal at time t. It is important to note that these 
individual banks are at the subsidiary level. We regress the variable ,& i tM A  on the leverage 
changes of the subsidiary itself and its BHC. Apart from this, we also include a group of bank 
characteristics’ variables at the both parent and subsidiary level containing: size, market-to-
book ratio, profitability, marginal expected shortfall, diversification and liquidity, all of which 
are considered related to bank risk. Using BHCs’ leverage changes as a key explanatory 
variable, this test examines whether BHCs’ capital structure decisions would affect the extent 
of their subsidiaries participating in merger or acquisition transactions in the following year. If 
the reverse causality concern holds, the increase in leverage of parent BHCs should have a 
significant impact on their subsidiary M&A activities.  
Table 5.5 presents the results of the test. It shows that the subsidiary bank M&As is not 
significantly correlated to prior changes of the parent BHC’s capital structure. The evidence 
                                                          
24 This chapter uses the same method as used in the last chapter to build the matched sample. The detailed 
matching procedure is provided in the Appendix. 
144 
 
suggests that the increase in the leverage of the parent BHC does not increase the chance of its 
subsidiaries being acquired or acquiring other banks, which is counterfactual to the prediction 
arisen from the reverse causality concern.  
 
5.5.3. Decomposing BHC leverage 
  
Bank capital structure is fundamentally different from that of non-financial firms as banks 
take deposits. Deposits constitute an important financing source for commercial banks and are 
generally not available to firms. Apart from this, non-deposit liabilities are growing 
substantially over the past decades on banks’ balance sheet. According to Figure 2 in Gropp 
and Heider (2010), the proportion of non-deposit liabilities as a percentage of the book value 
of banks for the 200 largest publicly traded banks in the US and the EU has increased from 
rough 20% in the early 90s to 29% in 2004. By contrast, the proportion of deposits has 
declined from 73% in the early 90s to 64% in 2004. They argue that banks seem to rely more 
and more on non-deposit liabilities to finance their growth. Therefore, it is essential to 
differentiate specific liability changes from leverage changes.   
In the above analysis, we calculate BHC leverage by using bank total liabilities divided by 
total assets and examine its changes around subsidiary M&A period. In this section we 
decompose BHC liabilities into deposit and several non-deposit debt items, consisting of long-
term, short-term, and subordinated debt, and run regressions against each liability item using 
equation (5.1) to show which item primarily leads to relative leverage changes of treated
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Table 5. 5: Logit Test of the Effect of BHCs’ Leverage Changes on Subsidiary M&As 
This table examines the impact of BHCs’ leverage changes on each of their subsidiaries based on the individual subsidiary sample. The 
dependent variable M&A is a dummy variable indicating if the individual subsidiary bank makes an M&A announcement in the current 
calendar year. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total 
liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of 
the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book 
value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the 
ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is 
a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All variables are yearly 
results and classified as two groups including BHC and subsidiary level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant 
at 5%; * = significant at 10%.  
 M&At 
ΔLeverageBHC,t-1 -2.479 
 (-1.38) 
SizeBHC,t-1 0.318** 
 (2.48) 
Market-to-book ratioBHC,t-1 -1.322 
 (-0.41) 
ProfitabilityBHC,t-1 19.399 
 (0.70) 
DiversificationBHC,t-1 -0.125 
 (-0.06) 
LiquidityBHC,t-1 -2.517 
 (-1.24) 
MESBHC,t-1 -0.591 
 (-1.04) 
ΔLeverageSub,t-1 2.260 
 (1.27) 
SizeSub,t-1 0.332
*** 
 (2.59) 
Market-to-book ratioSub,t-1 -1.861
 
 (-0.50) 
ProfitabilitySub,t-1 35.045
 
 (1.00) 
DiversificationSub,t-1 -0.023
 
 (-0.01) 
LiquiditySub,t-1 -1.699 
 (-0.84) 
Constant -7.382* 
 (-1.88) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
N 62410 
Pseudo R2 0.539 
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BHCs surrounding their subsidiary M&As.25  
We report the results in Table 5.6 after controlling for BHC and year fixed effects. In 
column (1), we observe very similar pre-M&A increase and post-M&A decrease in treated 
BHCs’ relative long-term debt changes. Specifically, the positively significant coefficient on 
Year 1 Before in column (1) suggests that long-term debt of BHCs with subsidiary M&As 
increases by 4.5 percentage points during the year prior to their subsidiary announcing a M&A 
deal, on average. The negative and significant coefficient on Year 1 After indicates that BHCs 
with subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities in the previous year have significantly lower 
long-term debt relative to the control group. It is worth noting that the coefficients on Year 1 
Before and Year 1 After in column (3) both become significant after controlling for fixed 
effects, which implies that BHCs have incentives to issue more subordinated debt before their 
subsidiaries make M&A deals and may be forced to retire the outstanding subordinates in the 
market once the M&A deals have been announced. Also, the increase in subordinated debt 
prior to subsidiary M&A transactions reflects its relatively lower issuing costs (Sironi, 2003). 
The coefficients in column (4) indicate that there is no substantial relative deposit change for 
those treated BHCs around their subsidiary M&As.  
These findings are mutually supportive and show that BHCs with subsidiary M&As prefer 
to adjust their long-term debt financing including the adjustment of the subordinated debt 
around the announcements of their subsidiary M&A transactions, which mainly drives the 
changes of BHC leverage during these periods. Our results are consistent with the traditional 
findings from prior corporate finance literature that long-term debt acts as a cheaper financing 
resort and serves as a preferred choice for external financing (Flannery, 1986; Berger et al., 
2005). The evidence suggests that BHCs would like to avoid other costly financing resorts 
                                                          
25  Bank non-deposit liabilities can be viewed as debt for firms. They consist of senior long-term debt, 
subordinated debt and other debenture notes.  
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such as the equity financing and exploit the temporarily better creditworthiness to obtain funds 
through long-term debt at a relatively lower cost, knowing that they will experience substantial 
capital flows once the subsidiary M&A transaction is confirmed. This process therefore yields 
a higher leverage for these treated BHCs prior to their subsidiaries making such deals. 
 
5.5.4. Placebo-matched approach 
 
The above results could suffer the same endogeneity issue that appears in Chapter 4, i.e., 
BHCs having subsidiary acquisition is endogenous to their underlying characteristics. To 
address this issue, we again exploit the variation in the acquisition time of subsidiary banks 
among BHCs with subsidiary M&A. We treat BHCs with later subsidiary takeover as a 
placebo control group for BHCs with earlier subsidiary takeover. Specifically, we match the 
BHCs who have subsidiary acquisition in year  (treatment group) with the BHCs that have 
subsidiary acquisition in the future year  (placebo control group). Both groups of BHCs 
have subsidiary M&A and hence would potentially share certain common characteristics. 
However, because the BHCs in the control group did not have subsidiary acquisition in year 
, their capital structure changes from  to  serve as a comparison with the 
treatment group. This approach allows us to control for potential common characteristics when 
we test the capital structure changes of BHCs around the year of subsidiary M&A. 
The sample construction under this approach is similar to that in Section 4.5.4. To reiterate, 
in the subsample, both the treatment and control groups experience subsidiary acquisition, 
however, only the treatment group experiences a subsidiary acquisition in the estimation 
window. 
Applying this placebo control strategy, we estimate the following specification:  
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where iTreat  is a dummy variable that equals one if BHC i belongs to the treatment group 
defined in this section. The coefficients of interest are , which are difference-in-differences 
estimators, measuring the difference between treatment and placebo control BHCs with 
respect to the changes in capital structure from two years prior to subsidiary M&A to three 
years after the M&A.  
Based on this identification strategy, if a BHC’s capital structure changes prior to or 
following its subsidiary acquisition, that change will be captured by the coefficients  . These 
coefficients indicate whether the capital structure of the BHCs in the treatment group (who 
experience a subsidiary acquisition at time iT ) deviates from that of their counterparts in the 
placebo control group (who experience a subsidiary acquisition at a future time ) during 
the years prior to or following iT .  
Table 5.7 reports estimates from specification (5.2). The results are largely consistent with 
those from the standard event-study DID approach (5.1). We observe similar pre-M&A and 
post-M&A trends of capital structure changes compared with those reported in Table 5.4 and 
Table 5.6. This suggests that the baseline results do not suffer too much from the endogenous 
subsidiary acquisition issue. 
 
5.5.5. Subsidiary M&A effect by BHC size and capital ratio 
  
In this section, we again look at the subsample results. The results in Table 5.6 show a 
marked pre-M&A increase in treated BHCs’ relative long-term debt as well as their 
m
t
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subordinate debt issuance. This could reflect strategic behavior, or it could reflect a protective 
financing demand by BHCs who are uncertain about the future directions of capital flows 
(Bruno and Shin, 2015). We address this concern by identifying subsets of BHCs with 
different sizes. Large banks may have greater flexibility to withstand a short-term liquidity 
shortage (Vazquez and Federico, 2015). If the uncertainty of BHCs’ internal capital flows is 
the key driver of the leverage changes around subsidiary M&A deals, we would expect that
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Table 5. 6: Decomposing BHC Leverage 
This table reports estimates of Equation (5.1) after decomposing BHC leverage into long-term debt, short-term debt, subordinated debt, 
and deposits and controlling for BHC and time fixed effects based on the matched sample. Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to 
one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity three years ago and zero otherwise. ΔLong-term debt is the 
change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous 
year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the 
previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of 
the current year’s subordinate debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔDeposits is the change 
in deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s total 
assets; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets 
to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; 
Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum 
of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's 
expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All control variables are at 
the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = 
significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔSubordinate ΔDeposits 
Year 2 Before 0.011* 0.000 -0.000 0.002 
 (1.67) (0.05) (-0.66) (0.10) 
Year 1 Before 0.045*** -0.009 0.002* 0.055 
 (4.35) (-1.02) (1.94) (1.20) 
Year 1 After 0.022*** 0.002 0.002* -0.020 
 (3.88) (0.32) (1.91) (-0.91) 
Year 2 After 0.008 -0.025 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.69) (-1.51) (-1.16) (0.02) 
Year 3 After -0.010 -0.009 -0.000 0.011 
 (-1.13) (-1.51) (-0.00) (0.47) 
Size -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.001 -0.189*** 
 (-5.60) (-5.69) (-1.41) (-11.51) 
Market to book ratio 0.060** 0.063*** 0.005** 0.165*** 
 (2.33) (3.09) (2.23) (3.67) 
Profitability 0.121 0.035 0.014 2.347*** 
 (1.25) (0.51) (1.42) (5.50) 
Diversification 0.002 -0.005 -0.003** -0.006 
 (0.09) (-0.48) (-2.06) (-0.14) 
Liquidity -0.014 -0.012 -0.002 -0.032 
 (-1.10) (-0.96) (-1.34) (-0.83) 
MES 0.000 0.003* 0.000* -0.004 
 (0.10) (1.75) (1.77) (-0.69) 
Constant 0.162*** 0.137*** 0.008 2.484*** 
 (3.22) (3.49) (0.91) (11.03) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 819 819 819 819 
Adj. R2 0.088 0.054 0.282 0.229 
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Table 5. 7: Subsidiary M&A and BHC Capital Structure Changes Using Placebo Control Approach 
This table reports estimates of Equation (5.2). Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary 
engaging in M&A activity in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a 
subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had 
a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC 
had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity three years ago and zero otherwise. Appendix A provides all other variable 
definitions. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔSubordinate ΔDeposits 
Year 2 Before -0.027 0.080 -0.033 0.001 0.102*** 
 (-0.22) (1.26) (-0.60) (1.30) (2.61) 
Year 1 Before 0.111 0.127* -0.049*** 0.003** 0.028 
 (0.97) (1.87) (-5.79) (2.18) (0.99) 
Year 1 After -0.030 -0.009 0.007 0.001 -0.034 
 (-0.28) (-0.49) (1.21) (1.10) (-0.37) 
Year 2 After 0.045 0.078 -0.135 0.001 0.070 
 (1.00) (0.99) (-1.21) (1.10) (1.42) 
Year 3 After -0.047 -0.088 -0.052 0.001 0.085*** 
 (-0.45) (-1.09) (-1.43) (1.19) (3.67) 
Year 2 Before × Treat 0.039 -0.073 0.035 0.001 -0.107** 
 (0.37) (-1.15) (0.63) (0.72) (-2.46) 
Year 1 Before × Treat 0.154*** 0.042*** -0.100* 0.004*** 0.029 
 (2.86) (3.12) (-1.85) (3.04) (0.54) 
Year 1 After × Treat -0.150*** -0.024* -0.006 -0.003** 0.016 
 (-2.60) (-1.73) (-0.74) (-2.20) (0.18) 
Year 2 After × Treat -0.076* -0.079 0.125 -0.003* -0.082 
 (-1.65) (-1.01) (1.12) (-1.74) (-1.63) 
Year 3 After × Treat -0.010 0.100* 0.046 -0.001 -0.081*** 
 (-0.09) (1.85) (1.28) (-0.72) (-2.65) 
Constant 2.859*** 0.163*** 0.142*** 0.009 2.491*** 
 (11.28) (3.25) (3.61) (0.98) (11.13) 
BHC Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2106 2106 2106 2106 2106 
Adj. R2 0.238 0.094 0.060 0.282 0.230 
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this change is more significant for small banks compared to large banks as small banks are 
more vulnerable to the shock of the changes of internal capital flows resulting from the 
takeover transactions.  
In addition, the impact of subsidiary M&As on bank capital structure decisions could also 
be shaped by the regulatory frameworks. This may be especially crucial for the scenario of 
BHCs having subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities compared to the scenario of BHCs 
having failure subsidiaries. The reason is that the former involves in more uncertainty of bank 
capital flows as many subsidiaries in our sample make cross-border M&A transactions and the 
changes in capital flows are affected by a broader international context such as the fluctuations 
of currencies. The holding company has to take more precautionary measures to protect from 
the capital shortfall in case of sudden decrease in bank capital flows or substantial capital 
outflows during the acquisition process. Bruno and Shin (2015) summarize that the adjustment 
of bank capital structure acts as the linchpin through different risk-taking channels and cross-
border bank capital flows could be influenced by the inter-bank market as well as the spillover 
effect of different monetary policies. Moreover, as previously argued, banks may hold 
discretionary capital, above the regulatory minimum in order to avoid the costs of having to 
issue fresh equity at short notice (Peura and Keppo, 2006). Thus, we examine the differential 
effects of subsidiary M&As on capital structure decisions across the BHCs that might be 
subject to different regulatory requirements for capital adequacy. To evaluate these 
conjectures, we implement several tests as follows.  
First, we stratify the sample into two size groups. We define BHCs as of large size in a 
given year if their total assets are above $10 billion in that year. Otherwise, the BHCs are 
defined as of small size. Table 5.8 reruns Equation (5.1) for each group of BHCs and presents 
the results for the split sample without controlling for the BHC and year fixed effects. Table 
5.9 reports the results after controlling for the fixed effects to account for unobserved time-
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invariant BHC-specific factors and time-specific effects which are common to all BHCs and 
can change over time. The comparison between these two tables shows that there is not too 
much discrepancy in the results before and after controlling for BHC and year fixed effects. 
We hereby mainly report the results shown in Table 5.9. In the year prior to subsidiary M&A, 
we find that small BHCs have significantly more leverage increases than large BHCs. Small 
BHCs also have significantly more increases in long-term debt than large BHCs. There is no 
significant change for both large and small BHCs’ short-term debt. We again find that small 
BHCs have a significant decrease in both leverage and long-term debt in the year immediately 
following subsidiary bankruptcy. The coefficients also show that large BHCs lower their 
leverage and long-term debt during the year immediately following subsidiary bankruptcy. 
However, the results are lack of statistical significance. Nevertheless, these findings are 
consistent with the expectations and demonstrate that the more vulnerability to capital flows 
leads to small BHCs’ more heavy changes in capital structure around the periods when their 
subsidiaries make M&A transactions. This also suggests a more important utilization of debt 
financing as a component of capital structure for small BHCs especially in the periods when 
their financial conditions significantly change. 
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Table 5. 8: Subsidiary M&A Effect Stratified by BHC Size I 
This table reports estimates of Equation (5.1) for US BHCs from 1986 to 2015 on the stratified matched sample by BHC size and without controlling for fixed 
effects. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous 
year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term 
debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the 
previous year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging 
in M&A activity in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity 
in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity one year ago and zero 
otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 
After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity three years ago and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm 
of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and 
noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected 
Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All control variables 
are at the consolidated BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔShort-term debt 
 Large BHCs (above 
$10 bn) 
Small BHCs (below 
$10 bn) 
Large BHCs (above 
$10 bn) 
Small BHCs (below 
$10 bn) 
Large BHCs (above 
$10 bn) 
Small BHCs (below 
$10 bn) 
Year 2 Before 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.031* -0.004 
 (0.04) (0.22) (0.50) (1.23) (1.74) (-0.52) 
Year 1 Before 0.053 0.084** 0.019 0.044*** 0.010 -0.013 
 (0.86) (2.32) (1.03) (4.34) (0.60) (-1.40) 
Year 1 After -0.074 -0.070* -0.033** -0.026*** 0.002 -0.003 
 (-1.22) (-1.84) (-2.09) (-2.58) (0.13) (-0.34) 
Year 2 After -0.064 -0.036 0.019 -0.003 -0.049*** -0.008 
 (-1.00) (-0.93) (1.06) (-0.27) (-2.60) (-0.77) 
Year 3 After -0.008 -0.031 -0.012 -0.010 -0.007 -0.002 
 (-0.12) (-0.72) (-0.62) (-0.85) (-0.34) (-0.15) 
Size 0.004 -0.030*** 0.003* -0.004*** 0.003* -0.002** 
 (0.68) (-10.66) (1.76) (-5.34) (1.79) (-2.38) 
Market to book ratio 0.226*** 0.475*** 0.149*** 0.074*** 0.051** 0.067*** 
 (3.98) (12.52) (7.10) (6.85) (2.29) (7.03) 
Profitability 2.922*** 2.103*** 0.354 0.320*** 0.664** 0.074 
 (3.43) (8.68) (1.27) (4.29) (2.23) (1.12) 
Diversification -0.194*** -0.025 -0.064*** -0.025*** -0.044*** 0.012* 
 (-3.77) (-0.92) (-4.53) (-3.38) (-2.94) (1.85) 
Liquidity 0.151** -0.097*** -0.010 -0.004 0.031* 0.013*** 
 (2.47) (-4.91) (-0.57) (-0.67) (1.74) (2.63) 
MES 0.778* 0.018*** 0.056 0.001 0.197 0.002 
 (1.71) (2.78) (0.46) (0.79) (1.52) (1.38) 
Constant -1.458** 0.011 -0.272 -0.007 -0.419** -0.050*** 
 (-1.97) (0.22) (-1.38) (-0.51) (-1.99) (-4.01) 
N 220 599 220 599 220 599 
Adj. R2 0.078 0.084 0.115 0.036 0.049 0.019 
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Table 5. 9: Subsidiary M&A Effect Stratified by BHC Size II 
This table reports estimates of Equation (5.1) for US BHCs from 1986 to 2015, but stratifies the matched sample by BHC size and controls for BHC and year fixed effects. 
ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; 
ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total 
assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the previous 
year’s total assets; Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 
Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a 
subsidiary engaging in M&A activity two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A 
activity three years ago and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets 
to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest 
income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and 
MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All 
control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 
5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔShort-term debt 
 Large BHCs (above 
$10 bn) 
Small BHCs (below 
$10 bn) 
Large BHCs (above 
$10 bn) 
Small BHCs (below 
$10 bn) 
Large BHCs (above 
$10 bn) 
Small BHCs (below 
$10 bn) 
Year 2 Before 0.051 -0.000 0.016* 0.010 0.036 -0.007 
 (1.45) (-0.01) (1.89) (1.12) (1.44) (-1.11) 
Year 1 Before 0.055 0.072** 0.010 0.040*** 0.013 -0.016 
 (1.56) (2.14) (1.57) (2.77) (0.68) (-1.56) 
Year 1 After -0.035 -0.061** -0.012 -0.023*** 0.011 0.001 
 (-0.86) (-2.47) (-1.40) (-3.32) (1.48) (0.16) 
Year 2 After 0.010 -0.032 0.029 -0.001 -0.044 -0.008 
 (0.40) (-1.55) (0.88) (-0.34) (-1.22) (-1.09) 
Year 3 After 0.051 -0.035 -0.011 -0.009* -0.003 -0.003 
 (1.04) (-1.59) (-0.44) (-1.93) (-0.38) (-0.66) 
Size -0.286*** -0.240*** -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.038*** -0.011*** 
 (-6.12) (-10.65) (-3.72) (-4.76) (-3.62) (-3.93) 
Market to book ratio 0.218*** 0.322*** 0.056 0.052** 0.086** 0.055** 
 (3.58) (3.82) (0.98) (2.28) (2.34) (2.50) 
Profitability 2.797*** 2.525*** 0.190 0.105 0.458 0.007 
 (3.26) (4.79) (0.72) (1.07) (1.18) (0.11) 
Diversification -0.052 -0.058 -0.000 -0.000 -0.015 -0.002 
 (-0.44) (-1.04) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.49) (-0.22) 
Liquidity 0.133 -0.126*** 0.041* -0.026* -0.005 -0.016 
 (0.87) (-2.85) (1.72) (-1.80) (-0.10) (-1.43) 
MES 0.582* 0.008 -0.032 0.001 0.135 0.002 
 (1.84) (1.23) (-0.37) (0.53) (1.58) (0.84) 
Constant 3.690*** 2.942*** 0.400** 0.177*** 0.341* 0.091** 
 (4.47) (9.59) (2.45) (3.19) (1.71) (2.23) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 220 599 220 599 220 599 
Adj. R2 0.284 0.247 0.145 0.085 0.125 0.049 
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Second, well capitalized banks face less regulatory pressure and thus have more flexibility 
to make discretionary adjustments in capital structure. Therefore, we expect that there will be 
more leverage changes around the time of subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities for well 
capitalized BHCs. To evaluate this conjecture, we separate BHCs into two groups based on the 
BHC’s tier 1 capital ratio. Since the minimum tier 1 capital ratio specified in the Basel III is 6%, we 
classify the BHCs with tier 1 ratio greater than 6% as well capitalized and those with Tier 1 
less than 6% as lowly capitalized. Table 5.10 reports the sub-sample results. We find that in 
the year prior to subsidiary M&A, well capitalized BHCs significantly increase more long-
term debt and leverage compared to those lowly capitalized ones. One year after subsidiary 
M&A, we, however, see more decreases in long-term debt and leverage for well-capitalized 
BHCs relative to lowly capitalized counterparts.  
Third, to further confirm the above two types of results, we define a dummy variable Small 
as one if the total assets of a BHC in that year are below $10 billion, and zero otherwise. We 
then interact it with the DID estimators in equation (5.1) to examine the size effect using a 
difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimation strategy. Table 5.11 presents the 
results from our main specification. The positive and significant coefficient on Year 1 Before × 
Small in column (1) shows that small BHCs have relatively more leverage increase than large 
BHCs do in the year prior to subsidiary M&A. We also find that small BHCs have more long-
term and subordinated debt increases as indicated by the significant coefficients on the 
interaction term Year 1 Before × Small in columns (2) and (4). We, however, find that the 
leverage of small BHCs decreases significantly more than that of large BHCs in the year 
immediately following subsidiary M&A. Moreover, the negative and significant coefficient on 
Year 1 After × Small in column (5) shows that the deposits of small BHCs also significantly 
decrease more during this period. This reflects a weakening ability to attract deposits for small  
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Table 5. 10: Subsidiary M&A Effect Stratified by BHC Capital Ratio 
This table reports estimates of Equation (5.1) for US BHCs from 1986 to 2015 on the stratified matched sample by BHC capital ratio and controlling for BHC and year fixed 
effects. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total 
assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous 
year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the 
previous year’s total assets; Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in two years and zero otherwise. 
Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a 
subsidiary engaging in M&A activity two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A 
activity three years ago and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets 
to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest 
income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and 
MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All 
control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 
5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔShort-term debt 
 Well capitalized (Tier 
1 ≥ 6%)  
Low capitalized (Tier 
1 < 6%) 
Well capitalized (Tier 
1 ≥ 6%)  
Low capitalized (Tier 
1 < 6%) 
Well capitalized (Tier 
1 ≥ 6%)  
Low capitalized (Tier 
1 < 6%) 
Year 2 Before 0.000 0.129*** 0.007* 0.074 0.001 -0.024 
 (0.01) (2.93) (1.66) (1.52) (0.22) (-0.45) 
Year 1 Before 0.090* 0.136 0.039*** 0.069 -0.008 -0.024 
 (1.69) (1.36) (4.72) (1.23) (-0.85) (-1.28) 
Year 1 After -0.046** 0.025 -0.022*** -0.006 -0.001 -0.013 
 (-2.38) (0.32) (-3.63) (-0.12) (-0.18) (-0.16) 
Year 2 After -0.036** 0.115* -0.002 0.062 -0.009 -0.095 
 (-2.17) (1.66) (-0.68) (0.70) (-1.60) (-0.92) 
Year 3 After -0.012 0.041 -0.001 -0.122** -0.005 0.027 
 (-0.46) (0.89) (-0.18) (-2.52) (-0.88) (1.05) 
Size -0.221*** -0.233*** -0.013*** -0.054** -0.014*** -0.027 
 (-12.30) (-3.39) (-4.84) (-2.26) (-5.88) (-1.30) 
Market to book ratio 0.236*** 0.870*** 0.071*** 0.106 0.046** 0.427*** 
 (4.09) (3.67) (2.64) (1.04) (2.20) (2.94) 
Profitability 2.902*** 1.671*** 0.246** -0.292 0.018 0.025 
 (3.81) (2.91) (2.27) (-0.80) (0.23) (0.07) 
Diversification -0.087 0.230*** -0.018 0.072 0.003 0.029 
 (-1.51) (2.66) (-0.84) (1.63) (0.22) (0.56) 
Liquidity -0.104** -0.187 -0.026** 0.027 0.000 -0.100 
 (-2.25) (-0.98) (-2.05) (0.34) (0.03) (-1.49) 
MES -0.002 0.038 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.019 
 (-0.23) (1.38) (0.00) (-0.01) (0.74) (1.29) 
Constant 2.891*** 2.457** 0.120** 0.614* 0.145*** -0.012 
 (11.20) (2.46) (2.43) (1.69) (3.70) (-0.04) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 657 162 657 162 657 162 
Adj. R2 0.215 0.379 0.087 0.214 0.055 0.124 
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BHCs following M&A deals compared to those large counterparts and suggests the intrinsic 
vulnerability for these small banks when exposing to short-term massive capital flows. The 
results also suggest an even higher debt financing cost for small BHCs as their financial 
conditions deteriorate more severely due to the assets constraint.  
Fourth, we define a dummy variable Well Capitalization as one if the BHC’s tier 1 capital 
ratio is greater than 6%, and zero otherwise.26 We then interact it with the DID estimators in 
equation (5.1) to examine the regulatory effect using the same DDD strategy as used above. 
Table 5.12 reports the results. We find that in the year prior to subsidiary M&A, well 
capitalized BHCs have significantly more increase in leverage. Specifically, they increase 
more in long-term, short-term, and subordinated debt financing compared to lowly capitalized 
BHCs. Noticeably, one year after the deal announcement of subsidiary M&A activity, well 
capitalized BHCs substantially retire more subordinated debt from the outside market relative 
to the lowly capitalized counterparts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 The minimum tier 1 capital ratio specified in the Basel III is 6%. 
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Table 5. 11: Subsidiary M&A Effect by BHC Size 
This table estimates the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) effect of subsidiary M&A activities by BHC size for US BHCs 
from 1986 to 2015. Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in two 
years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity 
in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity 
one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity 
two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity 
three years ago and zero otherwise. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities minus the 
previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of 
the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term debt is the 
change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the 
previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s subordinate debt 
minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; and ΔDeposits is the change in deposits calculated as ratio 
of the current year’s total deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s total assets. All control variables are at 
the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = 
significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔSubordinate ΔDeposits 
Year 2 Before   0.042 0.014* 0.021 -0.002** 0.015 
 (1.42) (1.83) (1.14) (-2.09) (0.60) 
Year 1 Before 0.177* 0.055*** 0.004 0.005** 0.124 
 (1.65) (4.83) (0.27) (2.14) (1.15) 
Year 1 After 0.003 -0.019** -0.001 -0.002 0.020 
 (0.12) (-1.97) (-0.06) (-1.52) (0.94) 
Year 2 After  0.008 0.029 -0.062 0.000 0.041 
 (0.38) (0.82) (-1.34) (0.05) (1.34) 
Year 3 After 0.041 -0.011 -0.021 0.001 0.091*** 
 (0.80) (-0.44) (-1.50) (0.42) (2.64) 
Year 2 Before × Small   0.044 0.005 -0.029 0.003** -0.024 
 (1.06) (0.39) (-1.49) (2.00) (-0.60) 
Year 1 Before × Small 0.174* 0.032** -0.020 0.005*** -0.110 
 (1.88) (1.98) (-1.06) (2.81) (-0.98) 
Year 1 After × Small -0.063* -0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.064* 
 (-1.95) (-0.34) (0.18) (0.67) (-1.83) 
Year 2 After × Small -0.039 -0.030 0.054 -0.002 -0.061* 
 (-1.34) (-0.84) (1.17) (-0.84) (-1.66) 
Year 3 After × Small -0.077 0.002 0.018 -0.002 -0.119*** 
 (-1.37) (0.09) (1.21) (-0.61) (-2.91) 
Small -0.098*** -0.016*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.078*** 
 (-4.92) (-3.95) (-0.07) (-0.46) (-4.27) 
BHC Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 819 819 819 819 819 
Adj. R2 0.245 0.092 0.057 0.283 0.237 
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Table 5. 12: Subsidiary M&A Effect by BHC Capital Ratio 
This table estimates the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) effect of subsidiary M&A activities by BHC capital ratio for US 
BHCs from 1986 to 2015. Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity 
in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A 
activity in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A 
activity one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A 
activity two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A 
activity three years ago and zero otherwise. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liabilities 
minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-term debt calculated 
as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔShort-term 
debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt 
to the previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s subordinate 
debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; and ΔDeposits is the change in deposits calculated as 
ratio of the current year’s total deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s total assets. All control variables 
are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; 
** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔSubordinate ΔDeposits 
Year 2 Before -0.027 0.080 -0.033 -0.001** 0.102*** 
 (-0.22) (1.26) (-0.60) (-2.30) (2.61) 
Year 1 Before 0.111 0.127 -0.049*** -0.002** 0.028 
 (0.97) (1.57) (-5.79) (-2.18) (0.99) 
Year 1 After -0.030 -0.009 0.007 0.001 -0.034 
 (-0.28) (-0.49) (1.21) (1.10) (-0.37) 
Year 2 After 0.045 0.078 -0.135 0.001 0.070 
 (1.00) (0.99) (-1.21) (1.10) (1.42) 
Year 3 After -0.047 -0.100* -0.052 0.001 0.085*** 
 (-0.45) (-1.85) (-1.43) (1.19) (3.67) 
Year 2 Before × Well Capitalization   -0.150*** 0.073 0.035 0.001 -0.107** 
 (-2.60) (1.15) (0.63) (0.72) (-2.46) 
Year 1 Before × Well Capitalization 0.154*** 0.100* 0.042*** 0.004*** 0.029 
 (2.86) (1.85) (3.12) (3.04) (0.54) 
Year 1 After × Well Capitalization -0.010 -0.014 -0.006 -0.003** 0.016 
 (-0.09) (-0.73) (-0.74) (-2.20) (0.18) 
Year 2 After × Well Capitalization -0.076* -0.079 0.125 -0.003* -0.082 
 (-1.65) (-1.01) (1.12) (-1.74) (-1.63) 
Year 3 After × Well Capitalization 0.039 -0.088 0.046 -0.001 -0.081*** 
 (0.37) (-1.09) (1.28) (-0.72) (-2.65) 
Well Capitalization -0.017 -0.004 -0.009*** -0.001 -0.006 
 (-1.53) (-1.35) (-2.85) (-1.52) (-0.66) 
BHC Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 819 819 819 819 819 
Adj. R2 0.246 0.115 0.058 0.285 0.219 
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Overall, these results support our hypotheses that subsidiary M&A induces substantial 
internal capital flows and leverage changes of their parent BHCs surrounding the time of 
subsidiary M&A announcement. We find the significant evidence of differential effects of 
subsidiary M&A on financial policy for different groups of BHCs, which is consistent with 
our previous argument that BHCs’ leverage changes are mainly due to the internal financial 
deterioration.  
 
5.5.6. The effect of subsidiary M&A on BHCs’ liquidity and lending 
 
We nest analyze the dynamic pattern of BHCs’ liquidity and lending around the subsidiary 
M&A time. The above results show that BHCs’ external borrowing has significantly increased 
prior to the subsidiary M&A time. We have attributed this to the incentivized action by the 
managers’ anticipation of M&A deals. If the subsidiary bank engaging in M&A activities 
leads to the parent BHC not having surplus capital to distribute among its various other 
affiliates, and if the capital requirement limits the BHC’s ability to use insured deposits, then it 
follows that these parent BHCs of subsidiaries announcing M&A deals expecting limited 
internal funds may be forced to hoard more cash or liquidity assets, and curtail loans to ease 
the financial constraints. Therefore, we expect more increase in cash and liquidity assets, and 
more decrease in lending of treated BHCs relative to the control group, prior to the time of 
subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities.  
To test this conjecture, we estimate the same specification as Equation (5.1) by substituting 
the following three dependent variables: ΔCash/assets, ΔLiquidity/assets, and ΔTotal 
loans/assets. Table 5.13 reports the results. As shown in columns (1) and (2), the coefficients 
on Year 1 Before are significant and positive for dependent variables ΔCash/assets and 
162 
 
ΔLiquidity/assets, which implies that cash and liquidity assets of BHCs with subsidiaries 
engaging in M&A activities significantly climb one year before M&A deals. The significant 
and negative coefficient on Year 1 Before for the dependent variable ΔTotal loans/assets in 
column (3) suggests that loans of BHCs with subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities on 
average decline prior to the time of subsidiary M&A deals.  
We further exploit the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) regression model to 
explore which type of treated BHCs are more affected by the M&A activities of subsidiary 
banks. Similar as we do in Table 5.11, we interact the size dummy variable Small with the 
DID estimators in equation (5.1) to capture the size effect. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5.14 
show that treated BHCs with smaller size tend to hoard more cash and liquidity assets prior to 
the time of subsidiary M&A deals, as shown by the positive and significant coefficients on the 
interaction term Year 1 Before × Small. Similarly, column (3) shows that smaller BHCs with 
subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities in the following year have more cut in lending to 
firms. These results are reasonable as small BHCs are more vulnerable to capital flows and 
thus have more adjustments in both asset and liability parts on their balance sheet.   
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Table 5. 13: Subsidiary M&A Effect on BHCs’ Liquidity and Lending 
This table reports the dynamic effects of subsidiary M&A activities on BHCs’ liquidity and lending. 
ΔCash/Assets is calculated as ratio of the current year’s total cash minus the previous year’s total cash to the 
previous year’s total assets; ΔLiquidity is calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liquidity assets minus the 
previous year’s total liquidity assets to the previous year’s total assets; ΔTotal Loans/Assets is calculated as ratio 
of the current year’s total loans minus the previous year’s total loans to the previous year’s total assets; Year 2 
Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in two 
years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary 
engaging in M&A activity in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity two years ago and zero otherwise. 
Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity three years 
ago and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the 
ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum 
of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale 
securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's 
expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All 
control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are 
in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ΔCash/Assets ΔLiquidity ΔTotal Loans/Assets 
Year 2 Before -0.002 0.013 0.018 
 (-0.59) (0.48) (1.11) 
Year 1 Before 0.014** 0.086**   -0.069*** 
 (2.24) (2.34) (-4.20) 
Year 1 After -0.009* -0.003 0.047 
 (-1.92) (-0.19) (1.48) 
Year 2 After 0.003 0.011 -0.015 
 (0.73) (0.43) (-1.28) 
Year 3 After 0.001 -0.026* 0.002 
 (0.17) (-1.71) (0.11) 
Size -0.010*** -0.235*** -0.154*** 
 (-8.20) (-7.85) (-10.51) 
Market to book ratio 0.005 0.286*** 0.180*** 
 (0.63) (3.49) (4.21) 
Profitability 0.033 -1.398 2.475*** 
 (0.43) (-1.10) (5.75) 
Diversification 0.003 -0.033 -0.002 
 (0.21) (-0.26) (-0.05) 
Liquidity 0.014** -0.642*** 0.112*** 
 (2.35) (-7.28) (3.45) 
MES 0.001 0.014* -0.001 
 (1.04) (1.66) (-0.20) 
Constant 0.140*** 3.170*** 1.945*** 
 (7.34) (7.19) (9.64) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
N 819 819 819 
Adj. R2 0.065 0.341 0.244 
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Table 5. 14: The Effect of Size Variation on BHCs’ Liquidity and Lending 
This table reports the dynamic effects of subsidiary M&A activities on BHCs’ liquidity and lending. 
ΔCash/Assets is calculated as ratio of the current year’s total cash minus the previous year’s total cash to the 
previous year’s total assets; ΔLiquidity is calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liquidity assets minus the 
previous year’s total liquidity assets to the previous year’s total assets; ΔTotal Loans/Assets is calculated as ratio 
of the current year’s total loans minus the previous year’s total loans to the previous year’s total assets; Year 2 
Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in two 
years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary 
engaging in M&A activity in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity two years ago and zero otherwise. 
Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity three years 
ago and zero otherwise. The control variables include the following: Size is the natural logarithm of the book 
value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total 
assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; 
Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity 
is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the 
Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall 
return of the banking sector in that given year. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard 
errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; 
* = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ΔCash/Assets ΔLiquidity ΔTotal Loans/Assets 
Year 2 Before 0.003 -0.069*** 0.026** 
 (0.49) (-9.89) (2.12) 
Year 1 Before 0.025* 0.035** 0.098 
 (1.96) (2.50) (1.37) 
Year 1 After -0.022** -0.003 0.030 
 (-2.32) (-0.37) (1.43) 
Year 2 After 0.001 -0.063*** 0.018 
 (0.09) (-6.49) (1.12) 
Year 3 After 0.013* -0.022 0.057 
 (1.76) (-1.33) (1.56) 
Year 2 Before × Small   -0.007 -0.023 -0.015 
 (-1.01) (-0.59) (-0.57) 
Year 1 Before × Small 0.019* 0.142*** -0.079*** 
 (1.78) (3.44) (-2.96) 
Year 1 After × Small -0.029** -0.005 -0.081 
 (-2.13) (-0.24) (-1.08) 
Year 2 After × Small 0.003 0.087*** -0.046** 
 (0.37) (2.99) (-2.21) 
Year 3 After × Small -0.017* 0.001 -0.080* 
 (-1.92) (0.01) (-1.96) 
Small -0.007*** -0.074*** -0.064*** 
 (-3.85) (-3.53) (-4.40) 
BHC controls Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
N 819 819 819 
Adj. R2 0.069 0.347 0.250 
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We next define a dummy variable Low Capitalization as one if the BHC’s tier 1 capital 
ratio is less than 6%, and zero otherwise. We then interact it with the DID estimators in 
equation (5.1) to capture the regulatory effect. Columns (1) to (3) in Table 5.15 show that in 
the year prior to the announcement of subsidiary M&A deals, the increase trend in cash and 
liquidity assets and decrease trend in total loans for “troubled” BHCs are even more 
intensified for those lowly capitalized ones, as shown by the positive and significant 
coefficients on the interaction term Year 1 Before × Low Capitalization for dependent 
variables ΔCash/assets and ΔLiquidity/assets, and the negative and significant coefficient on 
the interaction term Year 1 Before × Low Capitalization for the dependent variable ΔTotal 
loans/assets. The findings suggest that lowly capitalized BHCs face more severe financial 
deteriorations prior to their subsidiary M&A time.  
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Table 5. 15: The Effect of Capitalization Variation on BHCs’ Liquidity and Lending 
This table reports the dynamic effects of subsidiary M&A activities on BHCs’ liquidity and lending. 
ΔCash/Assets is calculated as ratio of the current year’s total cash minus the previous year’s total cash to the 
previous year’s total assets; ΔLiquidity is calculated as ratio of the current year’s total liquidity assets minus the 
previous year’s total liquidity assets to the previous year’s total assets; ΔTotal Loans/Assets is calculated as ratio 
of the current year’s total loans minus the previous year’s total loans to the previous year’s total assets; Year 2 
Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in two 
years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary 
engaging in M&A activity in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity two years ago and zero otherwise. 
Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity three years 
ago and zero otherwise. The control variables include the following: Size is the natural logarithm of the book 
value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total 
assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; 
Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity 
is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the 
Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall 
return of the banking sector in that given year. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard 
errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; 
* = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ΔCash/Assets ΔLiquidity ΔTotal Loans/Assets 
Year 2 Before -0.001 -0.005 0.013 
 (-0.43) (-0.24) (0.79) 
Year 1 Before 0.008 0.022 0.049 
 (1.39) (0.75) (1.47) 
Year 1 After -0.012** -0.018* -0.019 
 (-2.58) (-1.67) (-1.26) 
Year 2 After -0.002 -0.003 -0.044 
 (-0.50) (-0.14) (-1.22) 
Year 3 After -0.002 -0.036*** -0.001 
 (-0.58) (-2.75) (-0.04) 
Year 2 Before × Low Capitalization   0.000 0.054 0.073* 
 (0.08) (0.73) (1.66) 
Year 1 Before × Low Capitalization 0.040*** 0.151* -0.020* 
 (2.91) (1.74) (-1.83) 
Year 1 After × Low Capitalization 0.028 0.002 -0.035 
 (1.25) (0.06) (-0.50) 
Year 2 After × Low Capitalization 0.033** 0.002 0.033 
 (2.41) (0.05) (0.73) 
Year 3 After × Low Capitalization -0.014** 0.001 0.032 
 (-2.09) (0.00) (0.64) 
Low Capitalization 0.004*** 0.021 -0.009 
 (2.61) (1.40) (-1.18) 
BHC controls Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
N 819 819 819 
Adj. R2 0.068 0.344 0.244 
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5.5.7. BHC performance transition around subsidiary M&A 
 
In this section, we check the performance of treated BHCs which increase long-term debt 
one year before subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities relative to those which do not around 
the M&A deal. As we have shown in the above section that BHCs with subsidiaries engaging 
in M&A activities tend to increase borrowing and liquidity, and cut lending beforehand to 
raise the cash reserve and ease the financial constraint problem, we expect that following the 
subsidiary M&A activities, these BHCs should have a more smooth transition in performance 
and suffer less in operating and market performance than those control BHCs which do not 
make such adjustments in advance. To test this hypothesis, we further analyze the dynamic 
patterns of BHC performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) and risk (MES) around the years of 
subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities.  
Table 5.16 first re-estimates the main specification – equation (5.1), but changes the 
dependent variables to ROA, Market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q), and MES. All these three 
variables are solid and reliable variables documented in various prior literature to reflect firm 
performance. ROA could be used to reflect the BHC’s operating performance. Tobin’s Q could 
reflect the BHC’s market performance with a higher value indicating that the market has a 
higher expectation on the firm’s value. MES is a valid systemic risk measure introduced by 
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2017). Across all three columns, we observe 
no apparent effect of subsidiary M&A on the relative operating and market performance, and 
risk of their BHCs around the year of the M&A deal.  
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Table 5. 16: The Dynamic Patterns of BHC Performance around Subsidiary M&A 
This table reports the dynamic effects of subsidiary M&A on BHCs’ performance and risk. The dependent variables are 
Profitability, Market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q), and MES (Marginal Expected Shortfall). Year 2 Before is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 
After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity one year ago and zero otherwise. 
Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity two years ago and zero 
otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity three years ago 
and zero otherwise. The control variables include the following: Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; 
Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of 
interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value 
of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the 
overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are 
clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Profitabilityt Market to book ratiot MESt 
Year 2 Before 0.002*** -0.006 -0.084 
 (3.78) (-1.01) (-1.63) 
Year 1 Before 0.002 -0.010 -0.056 
 (1.45) (-0.95) (-1.31) 
Year 1 After -0.001 -0.001 -0.031 
 (-0.20) (-0.12) (-0.71) 
Year 2 After -0.001 -0.004 0.032 
 (-0.42) (-0.55) (0.65) 
Year 3 After 0.002* 0.003 -0.077 
 (1.96) (0.42) (-1.25) 
Sizet - 1 -0.002*** -0.008*** 0.088*** 
 (-3.82) (-2.96) (4.42) 
Market to book ratiot - 1 0.024*** 0.503*** 0.345*** 
 (3.55) (7.84) (3.67) 
Profitabilityt - 1 0.301*** 0.116 -0.093 
 (6.45) (1.24) (-0.24) 
Diversificationt - 1 0.005* 0.002 -0.086 
 (1.71) (0.10) (-0.89) 
Liquidityt - 1 0.003 0.005 -0.126* 
 (1.58) (0.43) (-1.67) 
MESt - 1 -0.001** 0.001 0.106*** 
 (-2.38) (0.45) (5.22) 
Constant 0.013 0.624*** -0.477 
 (1.32) (7.90) (-1.59) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
N 819 819 819 
Adj. R2 0.344 0.596 0.126 
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In Table 5.17, we, similarly as we do in the last chapter, define a dummy variable Debt 
increase 1 year before as one if ΔLong-term debt for the BHC with one or more subsidiaries 
announcing M&A deals is greater than zero one year before the M&A time, and zero 
otherwise. We then employ the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimation 
strategy by interacting the event DID estimators in the main specification with Debt increase 1 
year before dummy to capture the dynamics of the performance of treated BHCs who increase 
long-term debt borrowing in the year prior to subsidiary M&A. It is worth noting that the 
dummy variable Debt increase 1 year before is dropped from the regression because of the 
inclusion of BHC fixed effects. As shown in columns (1) and (2), the positive and significant 
coefficients on Year 1 After × Debt increase 1 year before indicate that the operating and 
market performance of treated BHCs who increase long-term borrowing one year before the 
time of M&A increases more compared to those who do not in the one year following the 
subsidiaries announcing M&A deals. The negative and significant coefficient on Year 1 After 
× Debt increase 1 year before in column (3) indicates that the treated BHCs who increase 
long-term borrowing one year before the M&A contribute less to the systemic risk in the year 
following the subsidiaries’ M&A deals.  
Overall, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis and further imply that the 
activities taken by the parent BHCs including changes in liquidity, capital structure, and 
lending all aim to alleviate the concerns on financial constraints, stabilize the performance, 
and lower the risks.  
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Table 5. 17: The DDD Estimation of the Dynamic Patterns of BHC Performance around Subsidiary M&A 
This table reports the dynamic effects of subsidiary M&A on BHCs’ performance and risk using the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) 
estimation strategy. The dependent variables are Profitability, Market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q), and MES (Marginal Expected Shortfall). Year 2 Before is 
an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to 
one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a 
subsidiary engaging in M&A activity two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary 
engaging in M&A activity three years ago and zero otherwise. Debt increase 1 year before is a dummy variable defined as one if ΔLong-term debt for the 
treated BHC one year before the time of subsidiary M&A is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. The control variables include the following: Size is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; 
Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of 
interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is 
the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given 
year. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 
1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Profitabilityt Market to book ratiot MESt 
Year 2 Before 0.003 -0.017 0.025 
 (1.38) (-1.02) (0.23) 
Year 1 Before -0.001 -0.007 -0.050 
 (-0.90) (-0.90) (-1.12) 
Year 1 After 0.005*** -0.036*** 0.049 
 (3.06) (-3.87) (0.61) 
Year 2 After -0.002*** -0.016*** 0.054 
 (-3.79) (-3.18) (0.52) 
Year 3 After 0.005 0.009 0.052 
 (0.98) (0.89) (0.59) 
Year 2 Before × Debt increase 1 year before -0.001 0.012 -0.120 
 (-0.57) (0.66) (-0.99) 
Year 1 Before × Debt increase 1 year before -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 
 (-1.47) (-0.24) (-0.11) 
Year 1 After × Debt increase 1 year before 0.004** 0.038*** -0.107* 
 (2.25) (3.51) (-1.92) 
Year 2 After × Debt increase 1 year before 0.002 0.014 -0.024 
 (1.00) (1.63) (-0.20) 
Year 3 After × Debt increase 1 year before -0.004 -0.007 -0.142 
 (-0.66) (-0.56) (-1.28) 
Sizet - 1 -0.002*** -0.008*** 0.088*** 
 (-3.82) (-2.95) (4.41) 
Market to book ratiot - 1 0.024*** 0.502*** 0.347*** 
 (3.55) (7.83) (3.70) 
Profitabilityt - 1 0.301*** 0.116 -0.086 
 (6.45) (1.25) (-0.23) 
Diversificationt - 1 0.005* 0.002 -0.086 
 (1.71) (0.10) (-0.90) 
Liquidityt - 1 0.003 0.005 -0.126* 
 (1.58) (0.44) (-1.66) 
MESt - 1 -0.001** 0.001 0.106*** 
 (-2.37) (0.45) (5.22) 
Constant 0.013 0.624*** -0.478 
 (1.32) (7.91) (-1.60) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
N 819 819 819 
Adj. R2 0.344 0.596 0.126 
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5.6. Additional tests 
 
5.6.1. BHCs’ target leverage and adjustment speed around subsidiary M&A 
 
As discussed in Chapter II, the current prevalent opinion in academia regarding firm capital 
structure decisions is that firm managers choose a target leverage ratio to which they actively 
adjust over time. This argument corresponds to the universally accepted dynamic trade-off 
model, where firms have to trade off the benefits of interest tax shield against the costs of 
financial distress and agency costs when increasing their leverage ratio. There is an optimal 
point where the value of the firm reaches to the maximum and which firm managers target to. 
Whether banks have similar working mechanisms is largely in doubt. The relevant literature is 
also very limited. Some financial researchers have argued from the market perspective and 
reported that banks work through a similar trade-off model to the one used by the non-
financial firms determined by the various market factors. Such work includes, but is not 
limited to Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee, and Öztekin (2008), Flannery and Rangan (2008), 
and Gropp and Heider (2010) which can be regarded as preliminary explorations of banks’ 
target leverage. Others argue that the regulation indeed determines the banks’ capital choices. 
Banks hold the minimum required equity capital plus some cushion to avoid the high costs of 
issuing equity or reducing assets at a short notice by the regulation. While no consensus is 
reached, the results in this chapter are more supportive to the market view. Nevertheless, in 
this section, we examine the validity of the setting of the market view on banks’ leverage 
decisions and presents some mechanisms through which information asymmetry operates.  
We first test whether information asymmetry induced by subsidiary M&A activities affects 
BHCs’ capital structure decisions by increasing the adjustment speed to the target leverage 
ratio. The results above have shown that the affected BHCs heavily adjust their borrowing and 
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lending prior to the time when their subsidiaries engage in M&A activities. On the other side, 
these BHC’s activities are conducted when the public are not aware of the ongoing changes of 
one or more of their subsidiaries. We expect that the information advantage also incentivizes 
the senior BHC managers to increase the speed of adjustment in their capital structure 
decisions to quickly reach the target leverage knowing that the market discipline will take 
effect once their information advantage vanishes after the announcement of M&A deals by 
their subsidiaries. To test this conjecture, we first rebuild our treatment group and control 
group. For BHCs with subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities, we only include their BHC-
year observations from 3 years prior to the M&A deals to three years after the M&A deals, 
and these observations constitute the treatment group. We then identify all the BHCs without 
any subsidiary announcing a M&A deal within the sample period of the treatment group, and 
use them to build our control group. The sample is therefore larger compared to the matched 
sample used in the above empirical results section, and provides a greater testing power.  
We follow Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), and Gropp 
and Heider (2010) to employ a standard partial adjustment model on the treatment and control 
sample separately to check whether subsidiary M&A activities bring significant differences in 
the speed of adjustment to reach the target leverage for the two different groups of BHCs.  
In case one is not familiar with this model, we briefly review the standard partial 
adjustment model from the theoretical perspective. The standard partial adjustment model 
comprises two parts, a static part to describe how the desired amount (target) is determined 
and a dynamic part which includes the partial adjustment process:  
*
0 1 1
*
1 1( )
t t t
t t t t
y x u
y y y y
 


 
  
  
                                          (5.3) 
where y* is the desired level of y, and the λ is the adjustment parameter measuring the speed 
of adjustment and lies between 0 and 1. The closer it is to 1 the faster the speed of adjustment. 
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By substituting the expression for y* into the other equation we obtain the following 
estimating equation: 
0 1 1 1(1 )t t t ty y x u                                  (5.4) 
This equation actually belongs to the family of general autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) models which are standard least squares regressions that include lags of both the 
dependent variable and explanatory variables as regressors (Greene, 2012). The general format 
of equation (5.4) is shown as follows:  
0 1 1 2 3 1t t t t ty y x x                            (5.5) 
The following restriction condition would be imposed if the partial adjustment process 
occurs: 
2 0                                      (5.6) 
From the estimation of equation (5.5) we could get all the estimates of the parameters in the 
original equation (5.3) including the adjustment parameter λ: 
1
1
(1 )
(1 )
 
 
 
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                                       (5.7) 
In our BHC setting, equation (5.5) changes into the following specification:   
, 0 1 , 1 , -1 ,i t i t i t i tLeverage Leverage       vβ X                (5.8) 
where ,i tLeverage  is the changes in bank total liability from year t - 1 to year t, scaled by the 
total book assets at year t – 1, and , -1i tX  is a set of control variables containing bank 
characteristics that may affect bank capital choices.  
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Table 5.18 presents the estimation results of equation (5.8) for the treatment sample. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the pooled OLS estimates without controlling for fixed effects. The 
adjustment parameter λ does not show significance in both columns. Flannery and Rangan 
(2006) argue that the pooled OLS method may give underestimated adjustment speed as the 
model assumes that there does not exist unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across firms 
that may affect their target leverage ratio. Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) add that firm 
fixed effects rather than the observed time-variant corporate finance variables play the most 
important role in explaining the target capital structures of firms. Gropp and Heider (2010) 
confirm that these findings apply to banks and find that adding bank fixed effects increases the 
speed of adjustment by 34.4 percentage points (i.e., from 12.4% to 46.8%, see Gropp and 
Heider, 2010, Table X). Therefore, columns (3) and (4) repeat the regression in columns (1) 
and (2) after including BHC fixed effects. The adjustment parameter λ shows strong statistical 
and economic significance. Specifically, the value of λ in column (4) indicates that BHCs with 
subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities have a very fast speed of adjustment towards their 
target leverage ratio around the time of the M&A deals.  
Table 5.19 reports the estimation results of equation (5.8) for the control sample. The value 
of λ is generally not significant expect in column (3) where standard determinants of capital 
structure are not included. The finding shows that BHCs that do not have any subsidiaries 
engaging in M&A activities react very slowly to adjust their leverage towards the target ratio 
during the same period as their treated counterparts.  
175 
 
Table 5. 18: Partial Adjustment Estimations for Treated BHCs 
This table reports the partial adjustment estimation for the treated BHCs’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios. 
The dependent variable is ΔLeveraget which is the change in BHC leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total 
liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets. λ is the adjustment parameter 
measuring the speed of adjustment. The control variables include the following: Size is the natural logarithm of the book 
value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; 
Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio 
of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and 
available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's 
expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All control 
variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ΔLeveraget ΔLeveraget ΔLeveraget ΔLeveraget 
λ 0.443 0.310 0.575*** 0.639*** 
 (1.63) (0.30) (4.63) (6.18) 
Sizet - 1  0.005  -0.167
*** 
  (0.79)  (-6.69) 
Market to book ratiot - 1  0.242
***  0.263*** 
  (4.28)  (3.90) 
Profitabilityt - 1  2.741
***  0.893 
  (3.25)  (1.56) 
Diversificationt - 1  -0.181
***  0.177** 
  (-3.51)  (2.06) 
Liquidityt - 1  0.148
**  0.248* 
  (2.43)  (1.90) 
MESt - 1  0.747
*  0.627* 
  (1.66)  (1.83) 
Constant 0.096*** -1.442** 0.109*** 1.610*** 
 (16.16) (-1.97) (34.49) (2.86) 
BHC fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
N 901 901 901 901 
Adj. R2 0.002 0.071 0.006 0.226 
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Table 5. 19: Partial Adjustment Estimations for Control BHCs 
This table reports the partial adjustment estimation for the control BHCs’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios. 
The dependent variable is ΔLeveraget which is the change in BHC leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total 
liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets. λ is the adjustment parameter 
measuring the speed of adjustment. The control variables include the following: Size is the natural logarithm of the book 
value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; 
Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; Diversification is the ratio 
of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and 
available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's 
expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All control 
variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ΔLeveraget ΔLeveraget ΔLeveraget ΔLeveraget 
λ 0.049 0.041 0.057*** 0.008 
 (1.49) (1.00) (3.62) (0.35) 
Sizet - 1  -0.009
***  -0.126*** 
  (-5.13)  (-14.96) 
Market to book ratiot - 1  0.316
***  0.288*** 
  (10.61)  (5.97) 
Profitabilityt - 1  2.356
***  2.187*** 
  (10.40)  (4.69) 
Diversificationt - 1  -0.039
*  0.107*** 
  (-1.70)  (2.95) 
Liquidityt - 1  -0.060
***  -0.130*** 
  (-3.27)  (-3.08) 
MESt - 1  0.003  0.012 
  (0.45)  (1.59) 
Constant 0.076*** -0.126*** 0.090*** 1.589*** 
 (36.92) (-3.57) (52.60) (11.38) 
BHC fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
N 6326 6326 6326 6326 
Adj. R2 0.041 0.106 0.004 0.191 
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Overall, we conclude that the information asymmetry induced by the subsidiary status 
changes significantly impacts the parent BHCs’ capital structure decisions by substantially 
increasing their adjustment speed towards the target leverage.  
 
5.6.2. BHCs’ capital structure adjustment and risk  
 
In this section, we discuss the impact of BHCs’ adjustment in capital structure on their risk. 
Specifically, we test how the adjustment speed towards the target leverage for BHCs with 
subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities influences on systemic risk surrounding the time of 
M&A deals. 
Systemic risk has been a hot topic since the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Those banks who 
create too many systemic risks tend to have lower capital ratios, less stable funding, and more 
exposure to potentially risky market-based activities (Laeven, Ratnovski, and Tong, 2014; 
Laeven, Ratnovski, and Tong, 2016). Whether the unusual adjustment in capital structure 
around the M&A deals announced by subsidiary banks makes parent BHCs pose too much 
risk to the whole financial system is unclear. As changes in the status of subsidiary banks 
cause various degrees of financial constraint problems for the parent BHCs and we have 
documented above that BHCs conduct selections of activities to ease the deteriorations of their 
assets, we expect that around the time of subsidiary banks engaging in M&A activities, the 
more quickly the BHCs close the gap between the last year’s leverage and this year’s target, 
the less risk they contribute to the whole system.    
To test the conjecture, this section uses two systemic risk measures MES and CoVaR (e.g., 
see Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson, 2017; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016). 
The reaction speed of BHCs towards the target leverage is measured by the adjustment speed 
of ΔLeverage, which is derived using the partial adjustment model in the last section. We 
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again use the standard event-study difference-in-differences (DID) specification (10) while 
using the MES as the dependent variable and interacting the adjustment speed λ with those 
DID estimators to capture the effect of different BHCs’ speed of adjustment to the target 
leverage ratio on the systemic risk. A set of BHC characteristic variables are also included in 
the right hand side of our regression model to control for their effects on systemic risk.  
Table 5.20 reports the estimation results. We find that the coefficients on Year 1 After × λ 
are significant and negative whether we use the MES or ΔCoVaR to quantify the systemic risk. 
This testifies our hypothesis in the sense that when BHCs promptly adjust their leverage ratios 
in order to smooth out the negative impact of subsidiary M&As, systemic risk underlying the 
whole financial system will be significantly undermined.  
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Table 5. 20: BHC Capital Structure Adjustment and Systemic Risk around Subsidiary M&A 
This table reports the dynamic effects of BHC Capital Structure Adjustment on BHCs’ systemic risk using the difference-
in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimation strategy. The dependent variables are MES (Marginal Expected Shortfall) 
and ΔCoVaR. Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a subsidiary engaging in M&A 
activity in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have a 
subsidiary engaging in M&A activity in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had a subsidiary engaging in M&A activity three years ago and zero otherwise. λ 
is the adjustment parameter measuring the speed of adjustment. The control variables include the following: Size is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of total assets to 
the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total 
assets; Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is 
the ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal 
Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking 
sector in that given year. All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC 
level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) 
 MESt ΔCoVaRt 
Year 2 Before -0.018 0.023 
 (-1.02) (0.20) 
Year 1 Before 0.003 -0.052 
 (0.87) (-1.11) 
Year 1 After 0.040*** 0.053 
 (4.03) (0.62) 
Year 2 After 0.016* 0.057 
 (1.77) (0.52) 
Year 3 After 0.007 0.055 
 (0.77) (0.59) 
Year 2 Before × λ 0.013 -0.121 
 (0.68) (-0.94) 
Year 1 Before × λ -0.016 -0.007 
 (-1.30) (-0.11) 
Year 1 After × λ -0.037*** -0.092*** 
 (-4.76) (-2.95) 
Year 2 After × λ -0.019*** -0.079** 
 (-4.00) (-2.16) 
Year 3 After × λ -0.000 -0.151*** 
 (-0.01) (-4.16) 
λ -0.036*** -0.106*** 
 (-3.72) (-5.56) 
Sizet - 1 -0.011 0.091** 
 (-0.88) (2.42) 
Market to book ratiot - 1 0.479 0.373 
 (0.68) (0.94) 
Profitabilityt - 1 0.090 -0.346 
 (0.92) (-0.84) 
Diversificationt - 1 0.002 -0.157* 
 (0.09) (-1.77) 
Liquidityt - 1 0.007 -0.164** 
 (0.60) (-2.07) 
MESt - 1 0.001 0.100*** 
 (0.43) (4.89) 
Constant 0.691*** -0.512* 
 (8.69) (-1.66) 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes 
N 7227 7227 
Adj. R2 0.584 0.125 
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As an extension of our research, we also broadly review the effects of all the control 
variables on the bank systemic risk. As can be seen, bank diversification and local market 
power both have significant influences and their effects remain consistent for both measures of 
systemic risk employed in our analysis. These results uphold the former empirical claims such 
as Allen, Gu, and Kowalewski (2012). The other variables such as size, market-to-book ratio, 
and profitability do not appear to have uniform impacts or consistent significance in both 
regressions. This is implying that these individual BHC characteristics do not augment 
additional apparent effects on systemic risk. The previous literature has supported these 
findings. Zhu (2010) develops a theoretical model and shows that bank size is not necessarily 
a good proxy of systemic risk. He emphasizes that the financial system is not sensibly 
threatened by the crisis of a large bank, but rather the diversified activities of those “too big to 
fail” institutions might exert their influences on the whole banking system. Apart from this, 
the weaker evidence that either size or leverage contributes to systemic risk is also reported by 
Lopez-Espinosa, Moreno, Rubia, and Valderrama (2012), which further asserts what we have 
found in this paper.  
As a matter of fact, it’s not difficult to understand that BHCs’ increased speed of 
adjustment in the leverage in response to their subsidiary banks’ M&A deals plays an essential 
part in relieving systemic risk. We have, at least, two closely connected reasons to interpret 
this phenomenon. As we have discussed in the introduction part, banks’ overreliance on short-
term wholesale funding is a key trigger of the recent global financial crisis. This type of 
funding relates to interbank lending market tightly, making banks easier be exposed to 
liquidity risk, thus leading to the exacerbation of systemic risk. The new Basel III regulatory 
framework, being an overhaul of bank regulation, responds to this fatal deficiency by 
introducing brand new liquidity requirements including both NSFR and LCR, which exactly 
addresses this issue. The more stable and high quality funding required promotes structural 
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changes on bank balance sheet, helping reduce asset-liability maturity mismatches and finally 
mitigate systemic risk ignited by individual liquidity risk.  
Secondly, the higher pressure imposed by Basel III in liquidity regulation forces banks to 
increase liquidity adjustment speed to maintain a certain probability of complying with the 
regulatory requirements, very much like the action banks will take for the adjustment speed of 
their capital ratios as argued by Memmel and Raupach (2010). The higher adjustment speed 
shortens bank’s reaction time in the case of falling below the required liquidity ratio, thus 
reducing the likelihood of liquidity risk. The long term benefit of combined actions leads to a 
more stabilized financial system and lower systemic risk.  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter explores capital structure decisions of BHCs surrounding the time when their 
subsidiary banks engage in M&A activities. Similar to the setting in Chapter II, bank insiders 
possess better knowledge and precise predictions on BHCs’ next-period status, relative to 
public investors. By specifically focusing on the information asymmetry between these two 
parts, this study examines whether and how bank managers adjust the financial policy before 
and after their subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities.  
The study finds that BHCs are more likely to be more-levered in the year prior to subsidiary 
M&As, and less levered in the year after. Further results show a substantial pre-M&A increase 
and a post-M&A decrease in treated BHCs’ relative long-term debt changes. BHCs also tend 
to issue more subordinated debt before their subsidiaries make M&A deals. The study finds 
the significant evidence of differential effects of subsidiary M&A on financial policies for 
different groups of BHCs, which implies that BHCs’ leverage changes are mainly due to the 
internal financial deterioration. BHCs with subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities tend to 
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increase borrowing and liquidity, and cut lending beforehand to raise the cash reserve and ease 
the financial constraint problem. Following the subsidiary M&A activities, these BHCs have a 
more smooth transition in performance and suffer less in operating and market performance 
than those treated BHCs which do not make such adjustments in advance. 
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis and further imply that the activities taken 
by the parent BHCs including changes in liquidity, capital structure, and lending all aim to 
alleviate the concerns on financial constraints, stabilize the performance, and lower the risks.  
This chapter adds evidence to the core assumption of this thesis that information 
asymmetry is an important determinant of capital structure decisions. The relationship is more 
pronounced in banking industry. In line with the view by Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) 
and others, the study provides a further indication that a large portion of bank internal 
activities is difficult for outside investors to value, which, in turn, creates information 
problems for banks themselves when they have to raise external capital. Lastly, the findings in 
this chapter can be regarded as a supplement to the classic argument by Diamond (1984) that 
contracts and institutions need to ‘monitor the monitor’. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
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This thesis bundles three theoretical and empirical chapters in the area of capital structure 
in banking. These studies investigate the bank capital decisions and their influence with a 
special focus on the BHC-subsidiary relationship. The results of this thesis highlights how 
asymmetry information affects bank capital structure decisions in the real world with capital 
market friction in place. This chapter begins with the summary of the key findings and 
contributions, and then finishes with the remarks and suggestions for the future work.  
 
6.1. Key findings and contributions 
 
Chapter II majorly covers the following several aspects. First, this chapter starts by 
discussing capital structure decisions by firms in general. This helps us understand bank 
capital in a more intuitive way as banks, in the first instance, are firms. Some classic models 
are covered in this chapter, such as trade-off theory and pecking-order theory. It also discusses 
several famous surveys by financial researchers to exam the determinants that affect firms’ 
capital structure choices. Second, the chapter extends the discussion to banking firms. By 
comparing the similarities and differences between banks and non-financial firms, it discusses 
whether the findings concluded in the traditional corporate finance literature can be applied to 
banks for their capital structure decisions. It also discusses the trend in the recent decades that 
banks substantially increase their capital ratios well above the regulatory minimum. It draws 
out the core issue uncovered in this thesis that whether information asymmetry plays an 
important role in changing banks’ capital choices during this period. Third, this chapter further 
discusses some regulatory questions, such as bank illiquid assets and liquid liabilities, bank 
capital, deposits, and monitoring, etc. Fourth, this chapter conducts several preliminary tests to 
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identify the determinants that govern banks’ capital choices and sets out a clear view on the 
choices of control variables in the following chapters.  
Chapter III formally investigates the effects of information asymmetry on capital structure 
adjustments of US bank holding companies (BHCs) during 1986 to 2015. By identifying 
BHCs with bankrupt subsidiaries and arguing that their managers possess better knowledge 
than market investors concerning the failure of their subsidiaries, this chapter disentangles the 
real effect of private information on the capital structures of holding banks. Due to costly 
subsidiary failures, BHCs facing limited internal funds have incentives to find external 
financing before their financial conditions deteriorate. It is plausible that, prior to the 
subsidiary bankruptcy, the BHC may want to raise more debt at relatively lower costs. Once 
the subsidiary bankruptcy is realized, BHCs come under great pressures from regulators and 
market participants to control their default risk (Ashcraft, 2008). Thus, they may wish to lower 
the leverage and have more equity capital to secure the capital requirement. To examine these 
conjectures, this chapter employs a standard event-study difference-in-differences (DID) 
approach. This estimation strategy has been previously used by Schoar (2002), Autor (2003), 
and Almond, Hoynes, and Schanzenbach (2011), among others, to study firm performance 
around different events. In the event-study difference-in-differences (DID) framework, this 
chapter first estimates the leverage changes among BHCs with subsidiary failure (“troubled” 
BHCs) around the time of their subsidiary failure relative to the changes during the same 
period among those BHCs without subsidiary failure (“healthy” BHCs). The results show that 
subsidiary failure significantly affects financial policies of the parent companies. Specifically, 
BHCs increase leverage as early as one year prior to the failure of their subsidiaries, and 
substantially lower leverage after subsidiary failure. Further tests document that the parent 
BHCs increase not only debt borrowing but also liquidity assets, and curtail lending in 
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advance to avoid further liquidity and financial constraint problems after their subsidiary 
failure. Examinations on the dynamic patterns of these BHCs’ performance around the 
subsidiary failure time confirm a more smooth performance transition. The evidence suggests 
that the “troubled” BHCs foresee tightened credit market access and increased borrowing costs 
once the bankruptcy of subsidiary banks is realized. Thus, “troubled” BHCs increase debt 
financing in advance to take advantage of the presently cheaper debt financing and enjoy 
benefits. The findings are consistent with the argument of Billett and Garfinkel (2004) that, 
with the existence of asymmetric information, bank securities could be priced remarkably 
differently in segmented markets, and that banks take most advantage of the pricing 
discrepancies and target the segment, which has the lowest access costs. More importantly, the 
results provide strong support to the view that information asymmetry is an important 
determinant of capital structure decisions.  
Chapter IV makes the following contributions. First, prior research points out bank-specific 
information asymmetry. This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of information 
asymmetry on banks’ financial policies. Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) document that a 
great variety of bank activities may be difficult for outsiders to attain. Dell'Ariccia and 
Marquez (2004) argue that unfavorable private information of a bank, which is available only 
to insiders, may create morale hazard problems and result in a bank’s engagement in 
undesirable activities. Holod and Peek (2007) investigate the access of banks to information-
based external financial markets by comparing the behaviors of banks, including bank holding 
companies, with different transparency levels in response to exogenous shocks, and find that 
information asymmetry does affect their financing decisions. Morgan (2002) argues that the 
banking industry is more opaque than other industries, and finds that ratings from major 
agencies often disagree more over banks’ bond issues than issues by other types of firms. The 
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veil between banks and outsiders makes investors unable to accurately quantify the risk of 
banking firms as well as their securities. Second, this paper is related to the market timing (or 
windows of opportunity) theory, which states that firms prefer equity financing when the cost 
of equity is low, and prefer debt otherwise. In other words, firms do not generally care whether 
they finance with debt or equity, but choose the form of financing which, at that point in time, 
appears to be more valued by financial markets. Baker and Wurgler (2002) claim that market 
timing is the first order determinant of a corporate capital structure. Third, this paper is also 
related to the large strand of literature on risk-shifting.  
Chapter V, for the first time in the literature, systematically examines the dynamic aspects 
of various BHC capital structure decisions around the time of subsidiary bank M&A deals and 
their effects on BHC performance, liquidity, lending, and risk. It adds to the evidence in 
Chapter IV and discusses the information asymmetry effect by looking into BHCs with 
subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities (treated BHCs) and the impact on BHCs’ capital 
structure decisions, performance, and risk. The results show a marked pre-M&A increase in 
treated BHCs’ relative long-term debt as well as their subordinate debt issuance. The findings 
lend further support to the core assumption in this thesis. Further tests on cross-sectional 
variation in BHC specific characteristics using difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) 
regression models show that the impact of information asymmetry on bank capital structure 
decisions is more pronounced for small and better capitalized BHCs. These tests shed further 
light on the mechanisms underlying the main results. This chapter also analyzes the dynamic 
pattern of BHCs’ liquidity and lending around the subsidiary M&A time. The idea is to test 
whether the parent BHCs of subsidiaries experiencing M&A deals facing limited internal 
funds are forced to hoard more cash or liquidity assets, and curtail loans to ease the financial 
constraints before M&A deals taking place. The results validate this conjecture with the effect 
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being stronger for smaller and less well capitalized BHCs, which suggests they are more 
vulnerable to internal capital fluctuation and thus have more adjustments in both asset and 
liability parts on their balance sheet. Further check on the performance of treated BHCs which 
increase long-term debt one year before subsidiaries engaging in M&A activities relative to 
those which do not around M&A deals shows that the treated BHCs have a more smooth 
transition in performance and suffer less in operating and market performance than those 
control BHCs which do not make such adjustments in advance. This chapter also documents 
several other mechanisms through which subsidiary banks’ engagement in M&A activities 
affects parent BHCs’ capital structure decisions including the following two findings: 1. 
Information asymmetry induced by subsidiary M&A activities affects BHCs’ capital structure 
decisions by increasing the adjustment speed to the target leverage ratio; 2. Around the time of 
subsidiary banks engaging in M&A activities, the more quickly the BHCs close the gap 
between the last year’s leverage and this year’s target, the less risk they contribute to the 
whole system. Overall, this article, for the first time in the literature, systematically examines 
the dynamic aspects of various BHC capital structure decisions around the time of subsidiary 
bank M&A deals and their effects on BHC performance, liquidity, lending, and risk. The study 
can be seen as supplementary testimony in terms of the role of asymmetry information in 
affecting bank capital choices.  
Chapter V broadly contributes to the literature examining the determinants of firm and bank 
capital structure decisions (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008; 
Gropp and Heider, 2010; Marcus, 1983). This chapter also adds to the literature that examines 
bank mergers and acquisitions. For example, DeYoung et al. (2009) document the 
fundamental change of banks as the roles of financial intermediaries through the 
consolidations over the past decades, and evaluate the economic consequences of this ongoing 
189 
 
trend, Karolyi and Taboada (2015) study cross-border acquisitions and argue that they provide 
a mechanism through which banks can change their regulatory environment from a stronger 
supervision environment to a much weaker one, and Chen and Vashishtha (2017) explore the 
effects of bank M&As on corporate information disclosure and find that corporate borrowers 
significantly increase information disclosure after their lending banks engage in M&As. The 
main focus of this study is trying to build the link between subsidiary bank mergers and the 
parent BHC’s capital structure decisions. This study also extends prior work that focuses 
largely on the real effects of information asymmetry, such as financing arrangements (Sufi, 
2007), equity issues (Dierkens, 1991), asset prices (Chan, Menkveld, and Yang, 2008), and 
competition, adverse selection, and information dispersion in the banking industry (Marquez, 
2002).  
 
6.2. Concluding remarks and suggestions for the future work 
 
Many newspaper columnists and standard textbooks suggest that banking industry is 
generally heavily regulated, which brings the overriding departure in capital structure from 
what researchers have concluded for those non-financial firms. A financial economics 
textbook (Mishkin, 2013) reports that “Because of the high costs of holding capital for the 
reasons just described, bank managers often want to hold less bank capital relative to assets 
than is required by the regulatory authorities. In this case, the amount of bank capital is 
determined by the bank capital requirements.” While these views appear sensible, they 
actually contradict the evidence of bank capital build-up over the past decades. This thesis, 
based on the prior finding from Gropp and Heider (2010), tries to borrow the conclusions from 
those empirical literature on non-financial firms to explain the motives that actually govern 
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bank capital decisions. The results in this thesis can only be regarded as preliminary, and 
researchers are still far from reaching the consensus on several issues including whether banks 
actively adjust toward a target leverage ratio and whether the usual laws of corporate finance 
apply to banks. In addition, as discussed in Chapter II, in the models of most researchers, 
much of the variation in bank leverage is explained by fixed effects that are indeed there, but 
unknown, which reflects our limited knowledge of capital structure in banking. Nevertheless, 
it is better to have an explanation than no one at all, and it is more an invitation to further 
research than a pile of common arguments. 
The current literature on whether information asymmetry plays an important role in shaping 
capital structure decisions is very limited. While this thesis is trying to establish a link between 
these two through the setting of the BHC-subsidiary relationship, it does not directly answer 
the question of whether information asymmetry is an important determinant of bank capital 
structure decisions. Several other disputes also exist in the literature to provide alternative 
explanations such as regulatory buffer view, or market pressure view. Overall, the high bank 
capital levels over the past decades imply that bank capital structure is much more than that 
straightforward explanation in the standard textbook. Further studies should explore unified 
laws that can reconcile all the existing controversies in the context of the contemporary 
banking theory. 
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Appendix 
 
A. Main variable definitions 
Variable Description 
  
BHC Capital Structure  
ΔLeverage Change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current year’s total 
liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous 
year’s total assets 
ΔLong-term debt Change in long-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s 
long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the 
previous year’s total assets 
ΔShort-term debt Change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s 
short-term debt minus the previous year’s short-term debt to the 
previous year’s total assets 
ΔSubordinate Change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s 
subordinate debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the 
previous year’s total assets 
ΔDeposits Change in deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total 
deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous 
year’s total assets 
BHC Characteristics  
Size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
Market-to-book ratio Ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total 
assets 
Profitability Ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of 
total assets 
Diversification Ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and 
noninterest income 
Liquidity Ratio of the sum of cash and available for sale securities to the 
book value of total asset 
MES Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity 
loss during the 5% worst days for the overall return of the banking 
sector in that given year 
CoVaR Conditional value-at-risk, which is the banking system’s expected 
return during the 5% worst days among the time when BHC i is at 
its 5% worst return in that given year 
  
B. Propensity score matched sample  
We build our matched sample through a propensity score matching approach (PSM). The 
PSM test allows us to control for differences in relevant dimensions between BHCs with 
bankrupt subsidiaries and BHCs without failed subsidiaries. Following the spirit of the 
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econometric method developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we first need to control for 
differences in the characteristics of these two types of BHCs. A propensity score is computed 
for each BHC-year based on the logit model, where the dependent variable is , ii TD  as defined 
above and other independent variables include size, market-to-book ratio, profitability, 
marginal expected shortfall, diversification, and liquidity. These explanatory variables 
explicitly reflect BHC-specific characteristics that have economically significant impacts on 
the subsidiaries. Apart from that, they are observable for both the treatment group (BHCs with 
subsidiary failure) and the control group (BHCs without subsidiary failure). Having obtained 
the estimation results of the first model (reported in Panel A, Table B1), we then match the 
samples based on the Nearest Neighbor, which is the most commonly used matching method. 
Lastly, the treatment effect is determined by averaging the difference in capital structure 
changes between two pairs of groups. 
In essence, our job is to find two types of BHCs whose characteristics are sufficiently close. 
By utilizing bank characteristics the matching methods provide the optimal approach to 
building a control group. Panel B, Table B1 compares the means of capital structure changes 
between the two groups. We see the significant differences between the two types of BHCs 
and the results are consistent with our previous findings. BHCs with bankrupt subsidiaries 
raise more long-term debt than those “healthy” ones in the year prior to subsidiary failure, 
leading to a higher leverage. In the year following the bankruptcy, the former, however, turn to 
issue more equity. These evidence suggests that subsidiary failure brings a non-negligible 
impact on the BHC’s funding choices. 
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Table A. 1: Propensity score matching procedure 
This table provides the propensity score matching procedure which we use to obtain the matched sample. Panel A presents the pooled estimations of the 
propensity scores using the logit model for the year prior to subsidiary failure (i.e., iT  – 1). The procedure of estimating the propensity score is repeated for Year 
iT  + 1 and not reported for brevity. Panel B compares the average capital structure changes based on the matched samples for the treatment and control groups. 
The matching method used here is the Nearest Neighbor. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the 
market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; Profitability is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets; 
Diversification is the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of interest income and noninterest income; Liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and available for 
sale securities to the book value of total asset; and MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall, which is a bank's expected equity loss during the 5% worst days for 
the overall return of the banking sector in that given year. All variables are at the consolidated BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%; 
** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
Panel A: Estimations of Propensity Scores 
 SubFail 
Size 0.336*** 
 (2.72) 
Market to book ratio -0.596 
 (-0.21) 
Profitability 6.711 
 (0.29) 
Diversification -0.162 
 (-0.08) 
Liquidity -2.255 
 (-1.15) 
MES -0.614 
 (-1.10) 
Constant -8.575*** 
 (-2.65) 
N 6779 
Pseudo R2 0.359 
Panel B: Matching Results 
 In the year prior to subsidiary failure (i.e., iT  – 1) In the year following subsidiary failure (i.e., iT  + 1) 
 N BHCs with 
bankrupt 
subsidiaries 
BHCs 
without 
bankrupt 
subsidiaries 
Difference N BHCs with 
bankrupt 
subsidiaries 
BHCs 
without 
bankrupt 
subsidiaries 
Difference 
Nearest Neighbor Matching         
ΔLeverage 116 0.178 0.112 0.066*** 87 0.072 0.110 -0.038** 
ΔLong-term debt 89 0.060 0.009 0.051*** 60 -0.039 0.008 -0.047*** 
ΔShort-term debt 89 -0.001 0.005 -0.006** 60 0.003 0.002 0.001 
ΔSubordinate 89 0.005 0.000 0.005** 60 0.001 0.001 0.000 
ΔDeposits 89 0.102 0.089 0.013* 60 0.095 0.096 -0.001 
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Table A. 2: Subsidiary failure effect by BHC size using $50 billion cut-off point 
This table estimates the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) effect of subsidiary failure by BHC size for US BHCs from 1986 
to 2015. Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 
Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
BHC had subsidiary failure three years ago and zero otherwise. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current 
year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-
term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total 
assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous 
year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current 
year’s subordinate debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; and ΔDeposits is the change in 
deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s total assets. 
All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** 
= significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔSubordinate ΔDeposits 
Year 2 Before   0.032 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.013 
 (1.32) (0.09) (-0.04) (-0.70) (0.51) 
Year 1 Before 0.077 -0.014 0.003 0.004 0.001 
 (1.52) (-0.74) (0.21) (1.36) (0.03) 
Year 1 After -0.015 0.009 -0.003 -0.004** 0.015 
 (-0.47) (0.74) (-0.26) (-2.40) (0.47) 
Year 2 After  -0.000 -0.012 -0.017 -0.002 0.025 
 (-0.01) (-1.31) (-1.19) (-0.51) (0.55) 
Year 3 After 0.080 0.013 -0.015 0.002 0.091** 
 (1.42) (1.55) (-1.17) (0.51) (2.34) 
Year 2 Before × Small   -0.024 -0.018* 0.001 0.000 -0.015 
 (-0.68) (-1.88) (0.07) (0.31) (-0.41) 
Year 1 Before × Small 0.026*** 0.056*** -0.015 0.002* 0.064 
 (4.59) (3.80) (-0.90) (1.82) (0.91) 
Year 1 After × Small -0.120* -0.029*** 0.005 0.003 -0.043 
 (-1.95) (-2.95) (0.43) (1.60) (-1.04) 
Year 2 After × Small -0.026 0.025 -0.009 0.000 -0.031 
 (-0.64) (1.44) (-0.38) (0.12) (-0.62) 
Year 3 After × Small -0.031 -0.030** 0.008 -0.003 -0.107** 
 (-0.77) (-2.29) (0.56) (-0.63) (-2.36) 
Small -0.058* -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.068*** 
 (-1.84) (-0.36) (-0.61) (-0.72) (-3.32) 
BHC Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 338 338 338 338 338 
Adj. R2 0.238 0.089 0.055 0.283 0.231 
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Table A. 3: Subsidiary failure effect by BHC size using $100 billion cut-off point 
This table estimates the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) effect of subsidiary failure by BHC size for US BHCs from 1986 
to 2015. Year 2 Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in two years and zero otherwise. Year 1 
Before is an indicator variable equal to one if a BHC will have subsidiary failure in one year and zero otherwise. Year 1 After is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure one year ago and zero otherwise. Year 2 After is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a BHC had subsidiary failure two years ago and zero otherwise. Year 3 After is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
BHC had subsidiary failure three years ago and zero otherwise. ΔLeverage is the change in leverage calculated as ratio of the current 
year’s total liabilities minus the previous year’s total liabilities to the previous year’s total assets; ΔLong-term debt is the change in long-
term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s long-term debt minus the previous year’s long-term debt to the previous year’s total 
assets; ΔShort-term debt is the change in short-term debt calculated as ratio of the current year’s short-term debt minus the previous 
year’s short-term debt to the previous year’s total assets; ΔSubordinate is the change in subordinate debt calculated as ratio of the current 
year’s subordinate debt minus the previous year’s subordinate debt to the previous year’s total assets; and ΔDeposits is the change in 
deposits calculated as ratio of the current year’s total deposits minus the previous year’s total deposits to the previous year’s total assets. 
All control variables are at the consolidated BHC level. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** 
= significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ΔLeverage ΔLong-term debt ΔShort-term debt ΔSubordinate ΔDeposits 
Year 2 Before   0.034 0.019*** -0.032* -0.001 0.074*** 
 (0.90) (6.55) (-1.83) (-0.41) (5.06) 
Year 1 Before 0.239*** -0.024 0.016 0.001 0.123*** 
 (7.34) (-0.80) (0.48) (0.53) (3.62) 
Year 1 After 0.026 -0.012 -0.026 -0.005*** 0.072*** 
 (1.21) (-1.20) (-0.91) (-4.42) (3.17) 
Year 2 After  0.070*** -0.013 -0.023 -0.010 0.126*** 
 (4.91) (-0.72) (-0.95) (-0.89) (6.29) 
Year 3 After 0.014 0.002 -0.039** -0.006*** 0.085*** 
 (0.49) (0.22) (-2.20) (-5.68) (6.45) 
Year 2 Before × Small   -0.023 -0.008 0.035* 0.001 -0.078*** 
 (-0.51) (-1.05) (1.85) (0.27) (-2.93) 
Year 1 Before × Small 0.164*** 0.067** -0.027** 0.004*** -0.073 
 (2.74) (2.44) (-2.01) (2.76) (-1.21) 
Year 1 After × Small -0.068** -0.009** 0.031** 0.001 -0.098*** 
 (-2.31) (-2.31) (2.11) (0.35) (-3.06) 
Year 2 After × Small -0.095*** 0.023 -0.002 0.008** -0.135*** 
 (-4.38) (1.06) (-0.06) (2.07) (-5.07) 
Year 3 After × Small -0.026 -0.013 0.033* 0.006*** -0.080*** 
 (-0.67) (-0.91) (1.77) (4.51) (-2.98) 
Small -0.120** -0.017* 0.001 -0.001 -0.121*** 
 (-2.38) (-1.89) (0.09) (-0.82) (-3.38) 
BHC Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 338 338 338 338 338 
Adj. R2 0.240 0.089 0.055 0.283 0.234 
 
196 
 
References 
 
Acharya, V. V. (2003). Is the international convergence of capital adequacy regulation 
desirable?. The Journal of Finance, 58(6), 2745-2782. 
Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L. H., Philippon, T., & Richardson, M. (2017). Measuring systemic 
risk. Review of Financial Studies, 30(1), 2-47. 
Adrian, T., & Brunnermeier, M. K. (2016). CoVaR. The American Economic Review, 106(7), 
1705-1741. 
Afonso, G., Kovner, A., & Schoar, A. (2011). Stressed, not frozen: The federal funds market 
in the financial crisis. The Journal of Finance, 66(4), 1109-1139. 
Agarwal, S., Lucca, D., Seru, A., & Trebbi, F. (2014). Inconsistent regulators: Evidence from 
banking. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(2), 889-938. 
Allen, F., Carletti, E., & Marquez, R. (2015). Deposits and bank capital structure. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 118(3), 601-619. 
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2000). Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy, 108(1), 1-33. 
Allen, F., Gu, X., & Kowalewski, O. (2012). Financial crisis, structure and reform. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 36(11), 2960-2973. 
Almond, D., Hoynes, H. W., & Schanzenbach, D. W. (2011). Inside the war on poverty: The 
impact of food stamps on birth outcomes. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(2), 387-
403. 
Amel, D., Barnes, C., Panetta, F., & Salleo, C. (2004). Consolidation and efficiency in the 
financial sector: A review of the international evidence. Journal of Banking & Finance, 28(10), 
2493-2519. 
Ashcraft, A. B. (2005). Are banks really special? New evidence from the FDIC-induced 
failure of healthy banks. The American Economic Review, 95(5), 1712-1730.  
Ashcraft, A. B. (2008). Are bank holding companies a source of strength to their banking 
subsidiaries?. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 40(2‐3), 273-294 
Asquith, P., & Mullins, D. W. (1986). Equity issues and offering dilution. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 15(1), 61-89. 
Autor, D. H. (2003). Outsourcing at will: The contribution of unjust dismissal doctrine to the 
growth of employment outsourcing. Journal of Labor Economics, 21(1), 1-42. 
Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. (2002). Market timing and capital structure. The Journal of 
Finance, 57(1), 1-32.  
Barrell, R., Davis, E. P., Fic, T., Holland, D., Kirby, S., & Liadze, I. (2009). Optimal 
regulation of bank capital and liquidity: how to calibrate new international standards. FSA 
Occasional Paper No.38, October. 
197 
 
Bennett, R. L., Güntay, L., & Unal, H. (2015). Inside debt, bank default risk, and performance 
during the crisis. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 24(4), 487-513. 
Berger, A. N. (1998). The efficiency effects of bank mergers and acquisition: A preliminary 
look at the 1990s data. In Bank Mergers & Acquisitions (pp. 79-111). Springer US. 
Berger, A. N., & Davies, S. M. (1998). The information content of bank examinations. Journal 
of Financial Services Research, 14(2), 117-144. 
Berger, A. N., Demsetz, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (1999). The consolidation of the financial 
services industry: Causes, consequences, and implications for the future. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 23(2), 135-194. 
Berger, A. N., DeYoung, R., Flannery, M. J., Lee, D., & Öztekin, Ö. (2008). How do large 
banking organizations manage their capital ratios?. Journal of Financial Services 
Research, 34(2-3), 123-149. 
Berger, A. N., Espinosa‐Vega, M. A., Frame, W. S., & Miller, N. H. (2005). Debt maturity, 
risk, and asymmetric information. The Journal of Finance, 60(6), 2895-2923. 
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003). Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and 
managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy, 111(5), 1043-1075. 
Bharath, S. T., Pasquariello, P., & Wu, G. (2009). Does asymmetric information drive capital 
structure decisions?. Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), 3211-3243. 
Billett, M. T., & Garfinkel, J. A. (2004). Financial flexibility and the cost of external finance 
for US bank holding companies. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36(5), 827-852. 
Boyd, J. H., Graham, S. L., & Hewitt, R. S. (1993). Bank holding company mergers with 
nonbank financial firms: Effects on the risk of failure. Journal of Banking & Finance, 17(1), 
43-63. 
Brealey, R., Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1977). Informational asymmetries, financial 
structure, and financial intermediation. The Journal of Finance, 32(2), 371-387. 
Bris, A., & Cabolis, C. (2008). The value of investor protection: Firm evidence from cross-
border mergers. The Review of Financial Studies, 21(2), 605-648. 
Brunnermeier, M.K. 2009, "Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008", Journal 
of Economic Perspectives [H.W.Wilson - SSA], vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 77. 
Bruno, V., & Shin, H. S. (2015). Capital flows and the risk-taking channel of monetary 
policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 71, 119-132. 
Bucă, A., & Vermeulen, P. (2017). Corporate investment and bank-dependent borrowers 
during the recent financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 78, 164-180. 
Calormiris, C. W., & Wilson, B. (1998). Bank Capital and portfolio management: The 1930's 
capital crunch and scramble to shed risk (No. w6649). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
198 
 
Chan, K., Menkveld, A. J., & Yang, Z. (2008). Information asymmetry and asset prices: 
Evidence from the China foreign share discount. The Journal of Finance, 63(1), 159-196. 
Chemmanur, T. J., He, S., & Nandy, D. K. (2009). The going-public decision and the product 
market. The Review of Financial Studies, 23(5), 1855-1908. 
Chen, Q., & Vashishtha, R. (2017). The effects of bank mergers on corporate information 
disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 
Cheng, M., Dhaliwal, D., & Zhang, Y. (2013). Does investment efficiency improve after the 
disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting?. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 56(1), 1-18.  
Cornett, M. M., McNutt, J. J., Strahan, P. E., & Tehranian, H. (2011). Liquidity risk 
management and credit supply in the financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2), 
297-312. 
Dell'Ariccia, G., & Marquez, R. (2004). Information and bank credit allocation. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 72(1), 185-214.  
Dell’Ariccia, G., & Marquez, R. (2006). Competition among regulators and credit market 
integration. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(2), 401-430. 
Desai, M. A., Foley, C. F., & Hines, J. R. (2004). A multinational perspective on capital 
structure choice and internal capital markets. The Journal of Finance, 59(6), 2451-2487. 
DeYoung, R., Evanoff, D. D., & Molyneux, P. (2009). Mergers and acquisitions of financial 
institutions: a review of the post-2000 literature. Journal of Financial Services 
Research, 36(2-3), 87-110.  
Diamond, D. W. (1984). Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. The Review of 
Economic Studies, 51(3), 393-414. 
Diamond, D. W. (1991). Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and 
directly placed debt. Journal of Political Economy, 99(4), 689-721.  
Diamond, D. W., & Rajan, R. G. (2011). Fear of fire sales, illiquidity seeking, and credit 
freezes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(2), 557-591. 
Dierkens, N. (1991). Information asymmetry and equity issues. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 26(2), 181-199. 
Donaldson, G. (2000). Corporate debt capacity: A study of corporate debt policy and the 
determination of corporate debt capacity. Beard Books. 
Ellul, A., & Yerramilli, V. (2013). Stronger risk controls, lower risk: Evidence from US bank 
holding companies. The Journal of Finance, 68(5), 1757-1803. 
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2002). Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about 
dividends and debt. The Review of Financial Studies, 15(1), 1-33. 
199 
 
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2005). Financing decisions: who issues stock?. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 76(3), 549-582. 
Flannery, M. J. (1986). Asymmetric information and risky debt maturity choice. The Journal 
of Finance, 41(1), 19-37.  
Flannery, M. J., & Rangan, K. P. (2006). Partial adjustment toward target capital 
structures. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(3), 469-506. 
Flannery, M. J., & Rangan, K. P. (2008). What caused the bank capital build-up of the 
1990s?. Review of Finance, 12(2), 391-429. 
Focarelli, D., Panetta, F., & Salleo, C. (2002). Why do banks merge?. Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, 34(4), 1047-1066. 
Frankel, R., & Li, X. (2004). Characteristics of a firm's information environment and the 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 37(2), 229-259. 
Freixas, X., Parigi, B. M., & Rochet, J. C. (2000). Systemic risk, interbank relations, and 
liquidity provision by the central bank. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 611-638. 
Furlong, F. T., & Keeley, M. C. (1989). Capital regulation and bank risk-taking: A 
note. Journal of Banking & Finance, 13(6), 883-891. 
Gilje, E. P., Loutskina, E., & Strahan, P. E. (2016). Exporting liquidity: Branch banking and 
financial integration. The Journal of Finance, 71(3), 1159-1184. 
Goetz, M. R., Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2013). Identifying the valuation effects and agency 
costs of corporate diversification: Evidence from the geographic diversification of US 
banks. The Review of Financial Studies, 26(7), 1787-1823. 
Gopalan, R., Nanda, V., & Yerramilli, V. (2011). Does poor performance damage the 
reputation of financial intermediaries? Evidence from the loan syndication market. The 
Journal of Finance, 66(6), 2083-2120. 
Gordy, M. B., & Howells, B. (2006). Procyclicality in Basel II: Can we treat the disease 
without killing the patient?. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 15(3), 395-417. 
Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. (2001). The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence 
from the field. Journal of Financial Economics, 60(2), 187-243. 
Graham, J. R., Lemmon, M. L., & Schallheim, J. S. (1998). Debt, leases, taxes, and the 
endogeneity of corporate tax status. The Journal of Finance, 53(1), 131-162. 
Greene, W. H. (2012). Econometric Analysis (7th, international ed.). Boston, Mass; London; 
Pearson Education. 
Gropp, R. E., & Heider, F. (2010). The determinants of bank capital structure. Review of 
Finance, 14(4), 587-622.  
200 
 
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1991). The theory of capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 46(1), 
297-355. 
Helwege, J., Huang, J. Z., & Wang, Y. (2014). Liquidity effects in corporate bond 
spreads. Journal of Banking & Finance, 45, 105-116. 
Hennessy, C. A., Livdan, D., & Miranda, B. (2010). Repeated signaling and firm 
dynamics. The Review of Financial Studies, 23(5), 1981-2023. 
Holod, D., & Peek, J. (2007). Asymmetric information and liquidity constraints: a new 
test. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(8), 2425-2451. 
Houston, J., James, C., & Marcus, D. (1997). Capital market frictions and the role of internal 
capital markets in banking. Journal of Financial Economics, 46(2), 135-164. 
Houston, J. F., & James, C. (1998). Do bank internal capital markets promote 
lending?. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(6), 899-918. 
Houston, J. F., James, C. M., & Ryngaert, M. D. (2001). Where do merger gains come from? 
Bank mergers from the perspective of insiders and outsiders. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 60(2), 285-331. 
Hovakimian, A., Opler, T., & Titman, S. (2001). The debt-equity choice. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 36(01), 1-24. 
Hung, C.-H. D., Banerjee, A., & Meng, Q. (2017). Corporate financing and anticipated credit 
rating changes. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 48, 893-915.  
Jagtiani, J., & Lemieux, C. (2001). Market discipline prior to bank failure. Journal of 
Economics and Business, 53(2), 313-324. 
Karolyi, G. A., & Taboada, A. G. (2015). Regulatory arbitrage and cross‐border bank 
acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 70(6), 2395-2450. 
Kisgen, D. J. (2006). Credit ratings and capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 61(3), 1035-
1072. 
Klomp, J., & De Haan, J. (2012). Banking risk and regulation: Does one size fit all?. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 36(12), 3197-3212. 
Kwan, S., & Eisenbeis, R. A. (1997). Bank risk, capitalization, and operating 
efficiency. Journal of Financial Services Research, 12(2-3), 117-131. 
Laeven, M. L., Ratnovski, L., & Tong, H. (2014). Bank Size and Systemic Risk (No. 14). 
International Monetary Fund.  
Laeven, L., Ratnovski, L., & Tong, H. (2016). Bank size, capital, and systemic risk: Some 
international evidence. Journal of Banking & Finance, 69, S25-S34. 
201 
 
Leary, M. T. (2009). Bank loan supply, lender choice, and corporate capital structure. The 
Journal of Finance, 64(3), 1143-1185. 
Lemmon, M. L., Roberts, M. R., & Zender, J. F. (2008). Back to the beginning: persistence 
and the cross‐section of corporate capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 63(4), 1575-1608. 
López-Espinosa, G., Moreno, A., Rubia, A., & Valderrama, L. (2012). Short-term wholesale 
funding and systemic risk: A global CoVaR approach. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(12), 
3150-3162. 
Loutskina, E. (2011). The role of securitization in bank liquidity and funding 
management. Journal of Financial Economics, 100(3), 663-684. 
Lucas, D. J., & McDonald, R. L. (1992). Bank financing and investment decisions with 
asymmetric information about loan quality. The RAND Journal of Economics, 23(1), 86-105. 
Marcus, A. J. (1983). The bank capital decision: a time series—cross section analysis. The 
Journal of Finance, 38(4), 1217-1232. 
Marquez, R. (2002). Competition, adverse selection, and information dispersion in the banking 
industry. The Review of Financial Studies, 15(3), 901-926.  
Memmel, C., & Raupach, P. (2010). How do banks adjust their capital ratios?. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 19(4), 509-528. 
Mishkin, F. S. (2013). The economics of money, banking, and financial markets (10th global 
ed.). Harlow: Pearson. 
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory 
of investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297. 
Molyneux, P., Schaeck, K., & Zhou, T. M. (2014). ‘Too systemically important to fail’ in 
banking–Evidence from bank mergers and acquisitions. Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 49, 258-282. 
Morellec, E., & Schürhoff, N. (2011). Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric 
information. Journal of Financial Economics, 99(2), 262-288. 
Morgan, D.P. (2002). Rating banks: Risk and uncertainty in an opaque industry. The American 
Economic Review, 92(4), 874-888.  
Morrison, A. D., & White, L. (2009). Level playing fields in international financial 
regulation. The Journal of Finance, 64(3), 1099-1142. 
Myers, S. C. (1984). The capital structure puzzle. The Journal of Finance, 39(3), 574-592. 
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when 
firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 
187-221. 
202 
 
Myers, S. C. (2001). Capital structure. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 81-102. 
Penas, M. F., & Unal, H. (2004). Gains in bank mergers: Evidence from the bond 
markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 74(1), 149-179. 
Petersen, M. A. (2009). Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing 
approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480.  
Peura, S., & Keppo, J. (2006). Optimal bank capital with costly recapitalization. The Journal 
of Business, 79(4), 2163-2201.  
Piloff, S. J., & Santomero, A. M. (1998). The value effects of bank mergers and acquisitions. 
In Bank Mergers & Acquisitions (pp. 59-78). Springer US. 
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1995). What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence 
from international data. The Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421-1460. 
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in 
observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70(1), 41-55.  
Ross, S. A. (1977). The determination of financial structure: the incentive-signalling 
approach. The Bell Journal of Economics, 23-40. 
Rossi, S., & Volpin, P. F. (2004). Cross-country determinants of mergers and 
acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 74(2), 277-304. 
Schmaltz, C., Pokutta, S., Heidorn, T., & Andrae, S. (2014). How to make regulators and 
shareholders happy under Basel III. Journal of Banking & Finance, 46, 311-325. 
Schoar, A. (2002). Effects of corporate diversification on productivity. The Journal of 
Finance, 57(6), 2379-2403. 
Shin, H. S. (2008). Risk and liquidity in a system context. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 17(3), 315-329. 
Sironi, A. (2003). Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry: evidence 
from subordinated debt issues. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 35(3), 443-472. 
Slovin, M. B., & Sushka, M. E. (1997). The Implications of Equity Issuance Decisions within 
a Parent‐Subsidiary Governance Structure. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 841-857. 
Sufi, A. (2007). Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence from 
syndicated loans. The Journal of Finance, 62(2), 629-668. 
Tang, T. T. (2009). Information asymmetry and firms’ credit market access: Evidence from 
Moody's credit rating format refinement. Journal of Financial Economics, 93(2), 325-351. 
203 
 
Tarashev, N., & Zhu, H. (2008). Specification and calibration errors in measures of portfolio 
credit risk: The case of the ASRF model. International Journal of Central Banking, 4(2), 129-
173. 
Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988). The determinants of capital structure choice. The Journal of 
Finance, 43(1), 1-19. 
Vazquez, F., & Federico, P. (2015). Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the 
global financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 61, 1-14. 
Wall, L. D. (1987). Has bank holding companies' diversification affected their risk of 
failure?. Journal of Economics and Business, 39(4), 313-326.  
Wall, L. D., & Peterson, D. R. (1987). The effect of capital adequacy guidelines on large bank 
holding companies. Journal of Banking & Finance, 11(4), 581-600.  
Zollo, M., & Singh, H. (2004). Deliberate learning in corporate acquisitions: post‐acquisition 
strategies and integration capability in US bank mergers. Strategic Management 
Journal, 25(13), 1233-1256.  
 
  
204 
 
 
 
